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Abstract 
This thesis consists of empirical and methodological contributions to the literature on 
the wage differences between men and women, with a particular focus on Germany. 
Due to a lack of appropriate data, previous studies have been unable to document the 
potential impact of employers and establishments respectively on the wage differences 
between men and women. Based on a newly available data set – the Linked Employer-
Employee Data Set (LIAB) – which is provided by the IAB (Institute for Employment 
Research) the role of employers and establishments are investigated in three empirical 
studies.  
The first chapter gives an overview of various theoretical approaches to the gender 
wage gap and previous empirical findings for Germany.   
The second chapter pays attention to the gender wage gap within establishments. It 
provides a comprehensive study of the effects of the institutional framework and 
competitive pressure on the gender wage gap within establishments. For this purpose, 
two alternative measures describing the gender wage gap within establishments are 
defined. The first finding is that the gap within establishments varies tremendously 
across establishments. The empirical analysis shows that establishments with works 
council and those covered by collective wage agreements have a significantly smaller 
wage gap. Furthermore, the study provides some empirical evidence for the hypothesis 
that establishments operating under strong product market competition behave in a more 
egalitarian way.  
While the investigation in the second chapter treated the segregation of women and men 
in different establishments as given, in the third chapter the selection into firms is 
explicitly taken into account as an explanation for the overall wage gap. The key issue is 
to disentangle differences in the human capital endowment of men and women and the 
segregation of men and women in different types of establishment as sources for the 
gender wage inequality. Therefore, the traditional decomposition method by Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973) is extended to four terms and is undertaken across the entire 
wage distribution. Drawing on a flexible parametric decomposition approach by 
Machado and Mata (2005), the four decomposition terms are implemented directly at 
each percentile of the wage distribution. The empirical analysis shows that the gender 
wage gap is highest in the lower part of the wage distribution. The segregation of 
women into less successful and productive firms explains a sizeable part of the gap, 
especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. Gender differences in the human 
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capital endowment as well as differences in returns to human capital have a lesser 
impact upon the wage differential.   
Finally, the forth chapter also uses the LIAB data in order to examine the relationship 
between the share of women in establishments and the wages of men and women. The 
study addresses the possible reasons for such a correlation. For this, hypotheses are 
formulated as to what a high proportion of women in an establishment can indicate: 
attractive working conditions for women, lower qualification requirements or less 
discrimination against women. The empirical results show that an increasing proportion 
of women in an establishment reduce wages for males and females. By successively 
including worker and establishment characteristics, the proportion of females in an 
establishment still has a negative effect upon the wages of both sexes but it becomes 
smaller. In particular, the regression results reveal that attractive working conditions 
lead to lower wages in female dominated establishments.  
 
Keywords:  
gender-specific wage differentials, gender segregation, Linked Employer-Employee data 
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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Arbeit besteht aus empirischen und methodischen Beiträgen zur Literatur über 
Lohnunterschiede zwischen Männern und Frauen, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf 
Deutschland liegt. Bisher war es aus Mangel an geeigneten Daten nicht möglich, den 
potentiellen Einfluss von Arbeitgebern bzw. Firmen auf Lohnunterschiede zwischen 
Männern und Frauen zu untersuchen. Auf der Basis eines neues Datensatzes – dem 
Linked Employer-Employee Datensatz (LIAB, Integrierte Betriebs- und Personendaten) 
– der vom IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) zur Verfügung gestellt 
wird, wird in drei empirischen Studien die Rolle von Arbeitgebern und Firmen 
untersucht.  
Das erste Kapitel gibt zunächst einen Überblick zu verschiedenen theoretischen 
Erklärungsansätzen für den geschlechtsspezifischen Lohnunterschied und zu bisherigen 
empirischen Befunden für Deutschland.   
Das zweite Kapitel wendet sich dem innerbetrieblichen Lohnunterschied zwischen 
Männern und Frauen zu. Es enthält eine umfassende Untersuchung darüber, wie sich 
das institutionelle Umfeld und der Wettbewerbsdruck auf den Lohnunterschied 
innerhalb von Firmen auswirken. Für die Untersuchung werden zwei verschiedene 
Maßzahlen für den innerbetriebliche Lohnunterschied definiert. Wie die Untersuchung 
aufzeigt, schwankt der innerbetriebliche Lohnunterschied stark über die Firmen. Die 
empirische Analyse zeigt weiterhin, dass Unternehmen mit einem Betriebsrat und 
solche, die Tarifverträge anwenden, signifikant geringere Lohnunterschiede aufweisen. 
Darüber hinaus liefert die Studie teilweise empirische Evidenz für die Hypothese, dass 
Firmen, die einem starken Wettbewerbsdruck ausgesetzt sind, weniger Unterschiede 
hinsichtlich der Entlohnung zwischen ihren weiblichen und männlichen Mitarbeiter 
vornehmen.  
Während im zweiten Kapital die Verteilung von Frauen und Männer in 
unterschiedlichen Firmen als gegeben betrachtet wird, wird dies im dritten Kapital 
explizit als mögliche Ursache für den gesamten Lohnunterschied untersucht. Im 
Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Frage, wie viel des beobachteten Lohnunterschieds durch 
verschiedene individuelle Merkmale wie Bildung und Berufserfahrung erklärt werden 
kann und wie viel auf die Selektion in unterschiedliche Betriebe zurückzuführen ist. 
Dafür wird die traditionale Zerlegungsmethode, die auf Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973) zurückgeht, auf vier Zerlegungsterme erweitert und die Zerlegung über die 
gesamte Lohnverteilung vorgenommen. Unter Verwendung einer flexiblen 
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parametrischen Zerlegungsmethode, die auf Machado und Mata (2005) zurückgeht, 
werden die vier Erklärungskomponenten direkt in jedes Perzentil der Lohnverteilung 
implementiert. Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass der Lohnunterschied am unteren 
Rand der Lohnverteilung am höchsten ist. Auf die Segregation von Frauen in weniger 
erfolgreiche und produktive Firmen ist ein Teil des beobachteten Lohnunterschieds 
zurückzuführen, insbesondere am unteren Rand der Lohnverteilung. Unterschiede in der 
Humankapitalausstattung zwischen Männern und Frauen sowie unterschiedliche 
Ertragsraten haben nur einen geringen Einfluss auf den Lohnunterschied.  
Im vierten Kapitel werden wiederum die LIAB Daten verwendet, um die Beziehung 
zwischen dem Frauenanteil in Unternehmen und dem Lohn von Männern und Frauen zu 
untersuchen. Dabei befasst sich die Studie insbesondere mit den Gründen für eine 
solche Korrelation. Es werden Hypothesen aufgestellt, dass ein hoher Frauenanteil 
innerhalb von Unternehmen eine für Frauen attraktive Arbeitsumgebung, geringe 
Qualifikationsanforderungen von Seiten der Arbeitgeber oder weniger Diskriminierung 
gegenüber Frauen widerspiegelt. Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass ein steigender 
Frauenanteil innerhalb von Firmen zu einem geringeren Lohn von Frauen und Männern 
führt. Wenn jedoch sukzessive individuelle und Firmenmerkmale berücksichtigt 
werden, dann sinkt der Einfluss erheblich. Es zeigt sich, dass insbesondere eine 
attraktive Arbeitsumgebung zu einem geringen Lohn in frauendominierten Firmen führt. 
 
Schlagworte:  
geschlechtspezifischer Lohnunterschied, Geschlechtersegregation, Linked Employer-Employee 
Datensatz;  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction and overview 
1.1 Introduction  
 
"Equal pay for equal work" 
 
The principle of equal remuneration for equal work as between male and female 
employees has been firmly embedded in European and German law for many years 
now.1 However, despite the clear legislative framework, the reality is quite different. 
On average women earn less than men. Figure 1.1, which is based on the earnings 
survey (Verdiensterhebung) conducted by the German Federal Statistical Office 
(Statisches Bundesamt), reveals that although the pay gap has narrowed in western 
Germany since the 1960s, pay equality is still a long way off.  
15%
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white-collar worker (east)
blue-collar worker (west)
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Figure 1.1: Gender wage gap as difference between male and female earnings in relation 
to male earnings, western Germany 1960-2004, eastern Germany 1991-2004  
Note: The earnings of blue-collar workers are measured as gross hourly earnings and the earnings of 
white-collar worker are gross monthly earnings.  
Source: WSI FrauenDatenReport 2005 
 
 
                                                 
1 The principle of gender wage equity is written down in § 612 (3) BGB (German Civil Code) and Article 
14 of the EC Treaty, for example.  
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The relevant literature offers widely differing views on the reasons for the existence of 
- and changes in - pay differentials between men and women. Only a few years ago, 
empirical studies of the gender wage gap in Germany drew almost exclusively on 
individual data sets. While individual data sets provide information about individuals' 
income, gender, age, occupation, training, etc., they provide very little information 
about employers. However, a new data set, the Linked Employer-Employee Data Set 
of the IAB (LIAB)2, has become available in Germany since 2004 (Alda et al. 2005). 
This data set combines data derived from the IAB Establishment Panel and the 
Employment Statistics Register. The IAB Establishment Panel is based on annual 
surveys of a representative sample of firms and contains detailed information about 
aspects such as the workforce structure, the institutional setting, investments, total 
wages and salaries, the technology, etc. This information is then combined with data 
on employees paying social security contributions in the same establishments. The 
employee data are derived from the Employment Statistics Register. As a result, it is 
now possible to study the gender wage gap taking greater account of the establishment 
level. 
This is the starting point for this thesis which draws on this newly available 
representative data to examine the influence of corporate policies and other 
establishment and institutional features on the gender wage gap within establishments. 
Furthermore, this thesis examines the extent to which observed wage differentials 
between men and women may be explained by individual productivity differences or 
by segregation of men and women into different types of establishments. In order to 
arrive at a more profound understanding of the causes of the gender wage gap, the 
study takes account of differences across the entire wage distribution and not merely 
the mean differential. The final part of this thesis focuses on whether and why female 
dominated firms pay lower wages to their employees than male dominated firms.  
The studies are preceded by an overview of the previous research on the gender wage 
gap. This review begins with a presentation of various theoretical approaches and is 
followed by an overview of the empirical findings for Germany. Finally, international 
studies based on linked employer-employee data are used to shed new light on research 
into the gender wage gap before summarizing the authors’ own studies.  
 
                                                 
2 This data set is described in detail in chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4.  
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1.2 Theoretical approaches to the gender wage gap 
In neo-classical labor economics, wage differentials are primarily due to differences in 
productivity as, in perfectly competitive labor markets, wages reflect labor 
productivity. According to human capital theory (Becker 1964), productivity is a 
function of general and specific human capital. If men and women are endowed with 
different levels of human capital, different wage rates are regarded as legitimate. 
Different endowments of human capital are in turn derived from pre-labor market 
processes, including determinants such as family roles (Becker 1981, 1985). Due to 
family responsibilities and related career interruptions women may anticipate a shorter 
total working life and consequently, could invest less in their own human capital. 
Furthermore, acquired knowledge and skills can be lost during employment breaks 
(Mincer and Polachek 1974, Polachek and Siebert 1993).3 Human capital theory 
suggests that women would be well advised to choose occupations which promise a 
relatively high entry wage and lower wage losses during discontinuous labor force 
participation (Polachek 1981).  
Occupational choices are closely related to the human capital theory and can also 
explain wage differentials between men and women. There are certain typically female 
occupations which are seldom chosen by men and which are also less well paid. 
Preferences such as these may be historically determined, may be the outcome of 
gender-specific differences in labor productivity, or reflect the need to reconcile the 
demands of work and family (Becker 1981). Often mentioned in this context is the 
"overcrowding" model which proposes that women tend to concentrate on a narrower 
spectrum of occupations than do men (Bergmann 1974). A surplus supply of women in 
typical female occupations enables employers to pay wage rates below the wage at 
which men are employed. From this perspective the gender wage gap may also be 
ascribed to segregation in different occupations.   
However, even in instances in which labor market relevant characteristics are identical 
(i.e. education and occupation in particular) women generally earn less well than their 
male colleagues. This is often ascribed to wage discrimination.  
The literature basically distinguishes between three discrimination concepts. "Taste-
based" discrimination against women, monopsonistic discrimination based on 
                                                 
3 Polachek (1981) introduces an atrophy rate which describes the depreciation of human capital during 
employment breaks. 
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differences in the elasticity of labor supply between men and women, and statistical 
discrimination arising from incomplete information about individual productivity. 
These discrimination models are discussed in detail by Altonji and Blank (1999). 
The "taste-based" discrimination model proposed by Becker (1971) assumes that 
employers have discriminatory preferences against women4 and regard the 
employment of female employees as utility reduction. As a result, these employers hire 
fewer women and more men than non-discriminating employers. This in turn depresses 
the wages earned by women relative to those paid to men on the labor market. In the 
long term this is only possible under conditions of imperfect competition as otherwise 
discriminating employers are forced out of the market.  
The concept of monopsonistic discrimination is based on differences in the elasticity of 
labor supply between men and women (Robinson 1933). In this framework women are 
assumed to have a relatively lower elasticity of labor supply. One reason for this might 
be that domestic responsibilities reduce their mobility and commitment to finding paid 
work. Employers' profit maximization aims consequently result in women earning less 
because they are less responsive to changing wages than men.  
The concept of statistical discrimination ascribes wage differentials between men and 
women to incomplete information about individual productivity (e.g. Phelps 1972, 
Arrow 1973, Aigner and Cain 1977). It is very difficult for employers to determine 
whether or not a particular potential employee has certain productivity-relevant 
features, such as motivation or resilience to stress. According to this model employers 
tend to use gender as a productivity signal, thereby ascribing lower productivity to 
women. This is also a reason why women are less often employed and why they 
receive lower pay when they are taken on. 
Discriminatory behavior on the labor demand side can have an impact on labor supply 
side if women expect to be confronted with discrimination and therefore invest less in 
their skills which, in turn, results in real differences in productivity (e.g. Coate and 
Loury 1993).   
In summary, the theoretical approaches described so far offer a mix of complementary 
and conflicting explanations for earnings inequality between men and women. In the 
                                                 
4 This is only one of several other models which are based on the discriminatory tendencies. Customers 
and work colleagues can also have prejudice against women (see e.g. Altonji and Blank 1999). These 
models have attracted less discussion in the literature as the implications of both variants are in fact rarely 
observed in reality.  
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next section, some empirical results are discussed for the gender wage gap in 
Germany, which partly pick up these theoretical approaches.  
1.3 Empirical studies on the gender wage gap in Germany 
A large number of studies have focused on the gender wage gap in Germany over the 
last 30 years (refer to Hübler 2003 for an overview). 
These studies have mostly concentrated on the extent to which the wage gap is the 
outcome of sex discrimination. While almost all studies find evidence for such 
discrimination, they diverge substantially in when it comes to quantifying the extent of 
discrimination. In many cases this is due to the use of different methods and variables 
(Hübler 2003, Beblo et al. 2003, Kunze 2007 for a detailed discussion). However, most 
studies adopt very similar underlying procedures. Wage discrimination is determined 
indirectly by decomposing the observed wage differentials into two components. One 
component encompasses a wage differential based on observable characteristics (e.g. 
human capital or occupation). The other component represents gender-related 
discrimination. Discrimination is therefore determined as a residual term. Generally 
the more effectively the differentiation can be explained, the smaller the discrimination 
components are. This means that the inclusion of previously neglected variables or 
factors reduces the level of discrimination even further. While the limited availability 
of data forced earlier studies to focus primarily on different endowments of human 
capital (e.g. Bellmann and Gerlach 1984, Gerlach 1987) as the cause of wage 
differentials, later studies have also taken into account individual determinants such as 
marital status, number of children and occupation (e.g. Hübler 1990, 1991). As more 
and broader data becomes available researchers are able to switch their attention to 
developments over time and the wage differentials which arise after job changes and 
career interruptions. Other studies examine special groups of employees, such as 
university graduates and new entrants to the labor market, or segregation in specific 
occupations. Yet other studies deal with the wage gap on the labor market in eastern 
Germany or with differences across the wage distribution. These branches of research 
are presented in more detail in the following. They are primarily based on the 
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employment statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, the IAB Employment 
Subsample (IABS)5 and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)6. 
The development of the wage gap over time is discussed in particular by Fitzenberger 
and Wunderlich (2002), Lauer (2000) as well as Prey and Wolf (2004). The former 
present graphical evidence based on the IABS from 1975 – 1995 which shows that 
women's pay rose faster during this period than that of men with the same 
qualifications. In contrast, Lauer (2000) draws on the SOEP to investigate the effect of 
the expansion of education on the development of the gender wage gap in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The narrowing of this gap, from 45 percent to 36 percent, is ascribed in part 
to the improved human capital acquired by women. At the same time, returns to human 
capital over the same period dropped – in fact, they fell more for men than for women. 
Prey and Wolf (2004) also draw on the SOEP and conclude that, in terms of their 
observed qualifications, women made progress catching up with men in the period 
between 1984 and 2001. At the same time, there was a loss of unobserved skills or 
qualifications and/or women were confronted with increasing discrimination. 
However, this is overcompensated for by changes in the valuation of women's 
unobserved skills.7  
Other studies (Mavromaras and Rudolph 1995 and 1997 as well as Mavromaras 2003) 
concentrate on the wage gap following resumption of employment with a new 
employer after a job to job change or after a career interruption. They find substantial 
pay discrimination8, particularly at the beginning of such employment, while 
differences in qualification are found to have little explanatory power for the pay 
differential. Nonetheless, the extent of wage discrimination falls if the differing 
probabilities of women and men finding new employment are taken into account.9  
As far as the influence of career interruptions on the gender wage gap is concerned, the 
study by Beblo and Wolf (2003) emphasizes that employment breaks have a different 
                                                 
5 Information about the IABS and the employment statistics is available at http://fdz.iab.de/de.aspx or in 
Bender et al. (2000)  
6 Information about the SOEP can be found at www.diw.de/soep or in Haisken De-New and Frick (2005). 
7 These findings are based on a Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition (Juhn et al. 1993) which decomposes 
the change of the gender wage gap over time  into 4 components: (1) The change in observable 
characteristics – “endowment effect” (2) The change in the remuneration of observable characteristics – 
“remuneration effect” (3) The change in unobservable characteristics at unchanged remuneration – “gap 
effect” (4) The change in the relative remuneration of unobservable characteristics at unchanged 
unobservable characteristics – “unobserved remuneration effect”   
8 The unexplained decomposition term is interpreted as pay discrimination.  
9 In the authors' view, the differing probabilities of women and men finding new employment are based 
on gender-specific preferences and unobserved segregation which may have an influence on labor force 
participation.  
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impact on both sexes. The negative wage effects of career interruptions are 
significantly larger for female employees. Furthermore, they show that women's wage 
return to work experience is lower than for men. If women had the same work 
experience as men and received equal pay, the gender wage gap would be 15 percent 
narrower.  
Other studies concentrate on the wage differentials for special groups of employees. 
Machin and Puhani (2003), for example, study the impact of subject of degree on the 
wage earned by university graduates. The observation that women appear to prefer 
subjects of degree with which they will later earn lower pay on the labor market than 
men may ultimately explain around 2-4 percent points of the pay premium enjoyed by 
men compared with women.  
The income discrepancy between men and women already arises as soon as both have 
completed their vocational training (e.g. Engelbrech and Nagel 200210, Kunze 2003 
and 2005). On the basis of the IABS, Kunze (2003) observes a difference in entry 
wages paid to men and women of 22 percent. Yet, this gap widens during the first 
years of employment and narrows again after the fourth year of work. The differences 
in entry wages are largely determined by the choice of training occupation however, 
and not by "pre-labor market" characteristics, such as school qualifications and length 
of training (see also Kunze 2005). Women prefer occupations in the comparatively less 
well-paid service sector, while men choose jobs in the manufacturing sector (Kunze 
2005). Bearing in mind the relatively low occupational mobility in Germany, the 
choice of training occupation has a tremendously important impact on the later wage 
development. Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005)11 confirm this in a further study. The 
initial pay disadvantage experienced by women on completing their vocational training 
is sustained even as women gain further work experience. This is the case since they 
change their occupation less frequently and because they do not benefit as much from 
occupational changes as do their male colleagues.  
Another group of studies discusses the relationship between the distribution of men 
and women in different occupations and its impact on wage differentials (e.g. 
Mavromaras and Rudolph 2002, Jurajda and Harmgart 2007). A key finding of these 
                                                 
10 In 1997, women working full time in western Germany earned 84 percent of men's wages after 
completing their training. In eastern Germany this difference is somewhat lower at 89 percent. 
11 This study complements the studies carried out by Kunze (2003 and 2005) by also taking account of 
occupational mobility. The observation period is also extended and the effects across the wage 
distribution also considered.  
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studies is that a reduction in occupational segregation does not necessarily also result 
in a narrowing in the gender wage gap. The study by Mavromaras and Rudolph (2002) 
shows that reduced segregation12 in male dominated occupation can in fact result in a 
widening of the wage gap, while such a reduction has no effect in female dominated 
occupations.13 Jurajda and Harmgart (2007) also come to similar conclusions. In 
western Germany they find no significant impact of the proportion of women within 
certain occupations on male and female wage. In eastern Germany the authors find a 
positive effect on male wages. By controlling for unobserved heterogeneity this effect 
disappears. Apparently men are positively selected in female dominated occupations in 
eastern Germany. This is not observed in other countries such as the UK (e.g. 
Macpherson and Hirsch 1995).  
Against the background of the rapid transformation of the labor market in eastern 
Germany following German reunification, several studies focus on pay differentials in 
eastern Germany. Drawing on the SOEP, Hunt (2002) observed a fall in the gender 
wage gap of around 10 percent points in the 1990 - 1994 period. However, as studies 
by Hunt (2002) as well as Gang and Yun (2001) have shown, this supposedly good 
news is not due to reduced wage discrimination but basically to selection. Rather than 
encouraging gender equality, the restructuring of the eastern German labor market has 
tended to crowd out low qualified women from employment altogether.  
Research on wage differentials is deepened by consideration of the wage distribution 
between men and women. It is apparent that the wage gap at the bottom of the 
distribution is wider than it is at the top (e.g. Fitzenberger and Kunze 2005 as well as 
Hübler 2005).14 Observed earnings inequality in the lower tail in the period 1975 to 
1995, for example, fell much more substantially than in the upper tail (Fitzenberger 
and Wunderlich 2002). This is due to the fact that wage inequality increased among 
men in this period while it decreased among women. Hübler (2005) ascribes the wage 
gap in the lower part of the wage distribution mainly to the less advantageous 
individual characteristics of women.  
                                                 
12 Segregation is measured with the help of the Duncan and Duncan (1955) index.   
13 The study also controls for changes in the qualification and age structure within occupations, for 
example.  
14  Hübler (2005) draws on the SOEP to show that in 1998 pay differentials were around 39 percent in the 
10th percentile and approximately 28 percent in the 90th percentile.  
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1.4 Including the firms’ perspective  
The studies referred to above show that the gender wage gap can be explained in part 
by different individual characteristics. These are based on individual data sets and are 
therefore only capable of shedding light on labor supply side effects. However, also the 
labor demand side is likely to have an impact on the gender wage gap through wage 
differentials between firms. The literature offers a number of different reasons for 
inter-firm wage differentials. Groshen (1991b), for example, discusses compensating 
wage differentials, efficiency wages and rent-sharing processes as explanations. 
Institutional settings also have a significant impact on wage differentials. In this 
context collective agreements play a particularly important role in German industrial 
relations. The distribution of men and women across different establishments means 
that the related wage differentials can also have implications for the gender wage gap. 
For this reason, it also makes sense to include the establishment level in the discussion 
of the gender wage gap.  
The incorporation of the establishment level in empirical research is facilitated by the 
availability of new data which includes both individual and employer information. 
Linked employer-employee (LEE) data sets15, in particular, which have recently 
become available in Germany in the form of the Linked Employer-Employee Data Set 
of the IAB (LIAB), have stimulated new research on wage differentials. The LIAB is a 
linked data set which comprises data from a representative annual establishment 
survey as well as individual data generated in labor administration and social security 
data processing. This thesis is among the first studies that use these data in general and 
in particular to explore the gender wage gap. As most of the empirical literature on this 
topic is international, the key findings of both German and international studies are 
presented in the following.  
The majority of the studies which are based on LEE data consider the segregation of 
men and women into different occupations and establishments (e.g. Groshen 1991a, 
Carrington and Troske 1998, Reilly and Wirjanto 1999a, Bayard et al. 2003, Datta 
Gupta and Rothstein 2005, or Vieira et al. 2005, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 
2006). Basically these studies arrive at two key findings. On the one hand they confirm 
that women and men not only choose different occupations, but are also employed in 
                                                 
15 The data sets differ strongly in terms of employer information and the employees they cover. An 
overview can be found in Abowd and Kramarz (1999). 
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different types of establishments. This segregation explains a major part of observed 
wage differentials. On the other hand, it is shown that within establishments as well as 
within particular occupations in establishments (job cells) women and men are paid 
differently. The studies disagree on the extent to which this wage gap can be explained 
by segregation. In a pioneering approach to this topic, Groshen (1991a) assigned the 
wage gap in the U.S. almost exclusively to segregation. In contrast, Bayard et al. 
(2003) find that after controlling for segregation of women into lower-paying 
occupations, industries, establishments and job cells one half of the wage gap remains 
unexplained. Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) and Amuendo-Dorantes and De la Rica 
(2006) come to similar conclusions for Denmark and Spain respectively as Bayard et 
al. (2003). Accordingly, Hinz and Gartner (2005) conclude that in Germany only a 
small part of the wage gap is explained by segregation in industry, establishment, 
occupation and job cell. Controlling in addition for human capital endowment, the 
residual wage gap amounts to about 15 percent, which is high in international terms. 
Several studies consider and attempt to quantify the within-firm wage gap (Meng 
2004, Meng and Meurs 2004, Jirjahn and Stephan 2006). Separate individual wage 
regressions with firm-specific fixed effects are estimated.16 The difference in these 
firm-specific fixed effects between men and women is interpreted as the within-firm 
wage gap. Meng (2004) shows that the gender wage gap in Australia is smaller in 
firms which are better able to measure the individual productivity of their employees. 
In contrast, wage bargaining at the establishment level leads to greater gender 
inequality than does collective bargaining at a more centralized level. Comparing 
France and Australia, a similar result is obtained by Meng and Meurs (2004). 
Other studies focus on the gender wage gap between firms and consider to which 
extent the establishment characteristics contribute to the explanation of the wage gap 
(e.g. Drolet 2002, Achatz et al. 2005). Drolet (2002), for example, attributes around 42 
percent of observed pay gap in Canada to differences in firm-specific characteristics 
such as training expenditures and flexible working hours. In contrast, only around 19 
percent of the wage gap results from differences in individual characteristics. In 
Germany, the binding nature of collective bargaining agreements plays a particularly 
significant role in narrowing the wage gap (Achatz et al. 2005). The negative impact of 
                                                 
16 The estimation approach is based on panel estimates with individual fixed effects. Instead of observing 
several individuals at a particular point in time, this approach entails using several different employees 
from a single establishment to identify the firm-specific fixed effect. The estimation approach can be 
compared with an approach in which dummies are used for the firms.  
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collective agreements on the gender wage gap is also confirmed by Gartner and 
Stephan (2004).   
1.5 Summary of the thesis  
This thesis contains three independent empirical studies dealing with wage differences 
between men and women, with a particular focus on Germany. The studies are 
summarized in the following.  
 
The intra-firm gender wage gap: A new view of wage differentials based on linked 
employer-employee data (jointly with Elke Wolf)  
 
Several international studies (e.g. Bayard et al. 2003, Datta Gupta and Rothstein 2005 
as well as Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2006) and Hinz and Gartner (2005) for 
Germany show that the selection of women and men into different establishments 
explains only part of the observed wage gap. The unexplained portion suggests that 
women and men are also treated unequally with regard to pay within firms. This 
within-firm wage gap is in the focus of the first study. This study considers the 
influence, among other things, of collective agreements, works councils and 
competitive pressures on the within-firm wage gap.  
In Germany collective bargaining exercises a huge influence on the wage setting 
process in firms.17 It is not entirely clear, however, to what extent collective 
agreements lead to an increase and/or decrease in the within-firm wage gap. Drawing 
on the literature, the hypothesis is proposed that collective agreements tend to reduce 
the within-firm wage gap. Arguments in favor of this hypothesis include wage 
compression from which women benefit more (Blau and Kahn 1999, 2003) and the 
restrictions on arbitrary unequal treatment of men and women (Cornfield 1987). On the 
other hand, it is also assumed that collective agreements lead to a widening in the 
within-firm wage gap as unions, acting as the representatives of employees, tend to 
emphasize the interests of the majority of their male members (Sap 1993). Additional 
information on the proportion of female union members is matched to the LIAB in 
order to verify this aspect in particular.  
                                                 
17 According to the WSI Tarifarchiv (2001) collective bargaining applies to 48 percent of all 
establishments and covers at least 70 percent of all employees in the year 2000.   
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Works councils are expected to affect the within-firm gender wage gap as well. While 
they do not directly engage in wage bargaining, they participate in the implementation 
of collective agreements and the assignment of wage groups. As an "equalizing agent" 
(Baron 1984) they may be expected to contribute to a reduction of the within-firm 
wage gap.  
The impact of competitive pressure on the within-firm wage gap is also examined 
based on the argument that discrimination can only take place in firms which are able 
to afford such discrimination. Firms underlying a competitive pressure do not earn 
enough profits to afford discrimination. (Becker 1971) 
These hypotheses are examined drawing on the rich information available in the LIAB. 
The empirical analysis draws on two measures of the within-firm wage gap: the 
observed mean gender wage gap in an establishment and a wage gap adjusted for 
within-firm human capital differences between men and women. The second measure 
is calculated on the basis of establishment-specific wage regressions which control for 
human capital. In this way the heterogeneity of the wage setting process across firms is 
taken into account.  
The outcome is that establishments subject to collective agreements show a narrower 
wage gap than other establishments. The existence of works councils has a similar 
impact. Furthermore, the hypothesis that firms which are subject to strong international 
competitive pressures pay women and men more equally is confirmed. Finally, it is 
apparent that, on the basis of collective agreements, unions with a large female 
membership do not foster a reduction of the within-firm wage gap.  
 
Beyond the mean gender wage gap: Decomposition of differences in wage distributions 
using quantile regression  
 
While the investigation of the within-firm wage gap in the first study considered the 
segregation of women and men in different establishments as given, this study takes 
explicit account of selection into firms as an explanation for the wage gap. The key 
issue here is the extent to which the observed wage gap can be explained by different 
individual characteristics such as education and work experience and how much is due 
to selection into different establishments. Based on the Oaxaca-Blinder 
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decomposition18, the observed wage gap is assigned to four explanatory components: 
(1) Difference in the individual characteristics, (2) Difference in the remuneration of 
these individual characteristics, (3) Difference in establishment characteristics, 
(4) Difference in the remuneration of these establishment characteristics. Beyond the 
decomposition of the mean wage gap, the decomposition is undertaken across the 
entire wage distribution. This study consequently links two aspects of current 
empirical research on the gender wage gap. On the one hand, the establishment level is 
included in the study and, on the other hand, the analysis is extented to include the 
entire wage distribution. Drawing on a flexible parametric decomposition approach by 
Machado and Mata (2005), the four decomposition terms are implemented directly at 
each percentile of the wage distribution. The idea behind this method is to simulate 
counterfactual wages on the basis of estimated quantile regression coefficients and 
randomly drawn individual and establishment characteristics. This method is used for 
the first time to decompose the gender wage gap in Germany. 
Based on the LIAB the finding is that, on average, women earn 23.5 percent less than 
men. The gender wage gap is larger in the lower tail of the wage distribution than on 
the upper tail. For instance, the gap is 32.6 percent at the 10th percentile and 21.6 
percent at the 80th percentile. The decomposition of the observed wage gap shows that 
the four defined decomposition components vary only mildly across the wage 
distribution. Only a small part of the wage gap is due to differences in the individual 
characteristics between men and women. In the middle of the wage distribution women 
are even endowed with better individual characteristics. The segregation of men and 
women in different firms also explains part of the wage gap, particularly in the lower 
part of the wage distribution. The largest part of the wage gap is attributable to 
differences in the remuneration of establishment characteristics. It is apparent that even 
if men and women have the same individual characteristics, receive the same 
remuneration of these individual characteristics and work in the same firm, women still 
earn 16 percent less than men on average. This within-firm wage gap is more 
pronounced in the lower part of the wage distribution than at the upper part.  
In summary, the sources of the gender wage gap do not differ much between 
individuals in the lower and the upper part of the wage distribution. Compared with the 
                                                 
18 The decomposition method is derived from Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). The observed wage gap 
is decomposed into two explanatory components: Difference in the observed characteristics and the 
difference in the evaluation of these characteristics  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and overview 
 
14 
selection of men and women into different establishments, differences in qualification 
between men and women explain only a small part of the observed wage differential. 
The findings consequently suggest that establishments are the key fields of action and 
the site at which measures to narrow the gender wage gap should be taken.  
    
Earnings of men and women in firms with a female dominated workforce: What drives 
the impact of sex segregation on wages?  
 
International studies based on the LEE data (e.g. Carrington and Troske 1998 Reilly 
and Wirjanto 1999a, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2006) find that both men and 
women receive lower wage rates in firms with a high proportion of female employees. 
The third study considers this topic for Germany. The study also addresses the possible 
reasons for a correlation between the proportion of women in establishments and the 
wage earned by women and men.  
The first hypothesis is that establishments with a high share of female employees offer 
attractive working conditions by, for example, reconciling the demands of work and 
family. On the basis of compensating wage differentials (Rosen 1986) the employees 
in such establishments tend to be paid lower wages.  
The second hypothesis is based on two assumptions: Women are less qualified than 
men and establishments are heterogeneous in terms of the qualification requirements of 
their employees. It is therefore assumed that establishments seeking low qualified 
individuals show a high proportion of female employees in their workforce and pay 
lower wages. 
Another possible explanation discussed for the correlation between the proportion of 
female employees in establishments and the individual wage is the discrimination 
preference of the employer. In the framework of this third hypothesis, discriminatory 
employers are assumed to hire fewer women and to pay them lower wages, while men 
receive a preferential treatment and higher pay in such firms.  
These hypotheses are systematically examined in the empirical analysis. In addition to 
the proportion of female employees in the establishment, various individual and 
establishment characteristics are included successively in the regression analysis as 
determinants of wages. Individual qualifications and workplace characteristics can be 
controlled for by drawing on the extensive information provided by the LIAB data.  
The wage regressions – which, apart from the proportion of female employees in 
establishment workforces, only include human capital characteristics and occupation 
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as explanatory variables – show different relationships for eastern and western 
Germany. In western Germany, the proportion of female employees has a negative 
impact on the individual wages paid to men and women. In eastern Germany, in 
contrast, there appears to be no significant relationship between individual wages and 
the proportion of female employees. If the industry sector and the size of the 
establishment are included in the regressions as additional explanatory variables, the 
expected negative relationships between the proportion of female employees and 
individual wages applies to men and women. This suggests that women in eastern 
Germany are employed in larger, better paying firms, while women in western 
Germany tend in contrast to work in smaller, lower paying firms. If variables 
describing workplace characteristics which appear to be particularly attractive for 
women are included, the impact of the proportion of female employees becomes less 
significant. Thus, there is empirical evidence that women themselves select firms 
which offer them an attractive working environment for which they are prepared to 
accept a reduction in pay. However, this effect is much weaker in eastern than in 
western Germany.  
The second hypothesis is confirmed in part. The proportion of females in an 
establishment would appear to reflect the lower qualifications of female employees. 
Less qualified men do not select employment into female dominated firms. 
Nonetheless, men in female dominated firms are less well paid than men working 
elsewhere.  
The discrimination preferences of employers cannot directly be observed. This means 
that the third hypothesis can only be tested indirectly. After controlling for individual 
qualifications and establishment characteristics, the proportion of female employees in 
an establishment is shown to have a negative impact on the wages of men and women, 
thus partly contradicting the discrimination hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2 
The intra-firm gender wage gap: A new view on 
wage differentials based on linked employer-
employee data 
(Joint work with Elke Wolf)   
2.1 Introduction 
Most studies analyze gender pay differentials by focusing primarily on differences in 
the wage-determining characteristics of men and women and how these characteristics 
are rewarded. The latter ones, called the “unexplained” wage gap, may either result 
from unobserved productivity differences between men and women or simply 
illustrates the degree of discrimination. The idea that organizations play an important 
role in creating and maintaining gender inequality by the way they define and reward 
jobs as well as by their recruiting and training practices, has become more and more 
popular during the last decade (see e.g. Baron 1984, Acker 1990, 1992). In most 
countries, however, the wage setting process is not just the result of free negotiations 
between employee and employer, but is substantially affected by various restrictions 
and legislation. Most importantly, wage bargaining is affected by unions as well as the 
degree of employee co-determination. In Germany, collective bargaining over wages 
and work conditions is generally conducted outside the establishment between trade 
unions and employers’ associations. It applies to 48 percent of all West German 
establishments and covers at least 70 percent of all employees in the year 2000. This 
commitment is even more marked among larger establishments (WSI Tarifarchiv 
2001). Works councils are charged with implementing collective agreements at the 
plant level and are actively involved in setting wages outside the agreed scale rates and 
arranging the provision of special allowances. A comprehensive system of co-
determination is meant to involve works councils in many decisions concerning the 
wage structure within establishments. Apart from this institutional framework, the 
intra-firm distribution of wages is presumably also shaped by economic restrictions 
arising from competitive pressures on the product market.  
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Wages of German men and women are therefore likely to depend on the way co-
determination rights are implemented and put into practice, on whether establishments 
are subject to collective wage agreements or not, and the degree to which 
establishments are exposed to (international) competition. While it is well accepted 
that these firm characteristics affect wage levels as well as overall wage distributions 
(see e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger 1991, Bronars and Famulari 1997, Abowd et al. 1999, 
Addison et al. 2006), most empirical studies do not consider whether these firm 
characteristics and the institutional environment limit the discretion of establishments 
and hence constrain discrimination against women and reduce GWGs. Exceptions are 
Blau und Kahn (1995, 1999 and 2003), who analyze the impact of institutions on the 
gender wage gap in a cross-country comparison. Meng and Meurs (2004) extend the 
traditional decomposition of the observed gap in an endowment and a remuneration 
effect by an additional firm effect and herewith determine the different effects of the 
institutional setting in France and Australia. They find that wage bargaining at the 
establishment level, like in Australia, leads to greater gender inequality than does 
collective bargaining at a more centralized level as in France. Duguet and Petit (2006) 
find that union representatives have no impact on the GWG at the establishment level 
in France. The Anglo-Saxon literature, in contrast, points out that union action seems 
to reduce the GWG attributable to discrimination by increasing the wages of females 
more than the wages of males (Main and Reilly 1992, Doiron and Riddell 1994, or 
Elvira and Saporta 2001). Addison et al. (2006) as well as Gartner and Stephan (2004) 
look at the impact of unions and works councils on the wage structure of men and 
women in Germany. To our knowledge, none of the studies analyzing the effect of 
competitive pressure on the remuneration of male and female labor market 
characteristics refer to Germany (see e.g. Black and Strahan 2001, Black and Brainerd 
2004, Oostendorp 2004).  
Since most theoretical explanations of discrimination are based on the matching of 
employers and employees (see e.g. Becker 1971), it seems very promising to link wage 
differences between men and women to the characteristics of employees and 
employers (see also Hamermesh 1999). The goal of our research is therefore to move 
beyond the individual and consider the importance of the wage setting process and the 
degree of competition to explain gender pay differentials. The fundamentally 
innovative nature of our approach is that we do not just analyze average male and 
female wage differences, but consider gender wage differentials at establishment level. 
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Provided that the distribution of women among establishments is not random, the 
results and interpretation of our approach may differ substantially from traditional 
analyses which only consider overall wage differentials. Our descriptive figures 
illustrate that the mean cross-section GWG within establishments is smaller than the 
mean overall GWG by about one to two percent points, which hints at a certain 
selection of women into low-paying establishments. Using the within-firm GWG as a 
dependent variable, our analysis describes the effect of firm characteristics and the 
institutional setting on the GWG, taken the selection into establishments – a decision 
which is very difficult to explain without special survey data on job seeking – as given. 
In the following study, we will focus on the impact of works councils and the 
collective bargaining process. In contrast with the existing literature, we use a broader 
set of variables to describe industrial relations by merging additional information on 
unions. An attempt to explain the wage differences between men and women would 
not be comprehensive and convincing without a consideration of Becker’s theory of 
discrimination. We therefore propose alternative concepts to measure the degree of 
competition in order to test the hypotheses that discrimination decreases with 
competitive pressure. 
To investigate the theoretical hypotheses regarding the effect of firm and institutional 
characteristics on wage inequality, we define two alternative measures describing the 
firm-specific GWG. First, we use the observed wage gap as the difference between the 
mean wages of men and women within an establishment. One important factor 
explaining this observed wage gap is the difference in the human capital endowment 
and other labor market relevant characteristics of employees. As a second measure, we 
therefore calculate a wage gap under the assumption that male and female employees 
would have the same characteristics within each establishment. Taking these two 
measures for the GWG as dependent variables in the second step, we can determine the 
impact of selected firm characteristics and the institutional framework on average 
wage inequality within establishments using regression analyses. Given the rich 
information on the establishments in our survey, we can control for many firm-specific 
attributes and features, such as establishment size, average wage level, female share or 
employee qualification level. Based on our results, we provide new insights into the 
nature and the sources of gender wage inequality in Germany.  
The empirical analysis is based on the German LIAB data, a representative linked 
employer-employee panel which includes information on all employees of 
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establishments covered by the IAB establishment survey. The LIAB merges annual 
survey data (the IAB Establishment Panel) and process generated individual data (the 
Employment Statistical Register of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), 
which is based on administrative social security records). 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the 
theoretical background of our empirical analysis. The econometric methodology is 
expounded in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes our data sources and in the subsequent 
section the results are presented. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Theoretical background and empirical implementation 
No theories are currently available which explicitly deal with gender wage differences 
at the establishment level. However, hypotheses about the impact of selected firm 
characteristics or institutional settings on wage inequality within establishments can be 
derived from deliberations in other theories like collective bargaining models or the 
model of employer discrimination (Becker 1971).   
According to the discrimination model, gender earnings differentials may be attributed 
to direct discrimination by employers, employees and customers against women. 
Employers with a “taste for discrimination” against women will hire fewer than the 
profit-maximizing number of women. Furthermore, the model predicts that men are 
paid above and women below their marginal product. This implies that discriminating 
employers earn lower profits than non-discriminators. However, in a competitive 
market discrimination is costly and restricts the employer’s scale and profitability. 
Hence, Becker (1971), Arrow (1973) and Cain (1986), among others, argue that under 
strong product market competition establishments may not be able to afford 
discrimination and will therefore behave in a more egalitarian fashion. Assuming that 
larger establishments are more likely to have market power than smaller 
establishments, this hypothesis can be tested by establishment size, measured 
according to the number of employees. Alternatively, we use the relative establishment 
size to test the hypothesis that establishments acting in more concentrated markets may 
be able to afford more discrimination.19 Finally, we include a variable which describes 
                                                 
19 The relative establishment size is measured by the number of employees within the establishment 
relative to the number of employees within the whole industry sector in western Germany. Thanks to the 
IAB Establishment Panel, we can distinguish between 41 industries. Note, however, that the industry 
employment relies only on establishments covered by the panel. Since the industry structure of the panel 
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the export quota of the establishment as an indicator of the level of competition. The 
underlying idea is that establishments operating on the world market are more subject 
to competition than establishments which only operate on the local or national market. 
Given Becker’s theory, exporting establishments are less likely to have a persistent 
taste for discrimination and are hence are more likely to pay the value of worker’s 
marginal products, which is assumed not to differ by sex.20  
Perhaps one of the most important factors influencing wage determination within 
establishments is whether wages are subject to collective bargaining or not (Elvira and 
Saporta 2001). This insight is particularly true for Germany, where unions still play an 
important role in the wage setting process. While the overall impact of unions on the 
GWG is not obvious, collective bargaining models provide several reasons for arguing 
that collective agreements tend to reduce the GWG within establishments. First of all, 
it is argued that unions generally reduce the wage dispersion among employees 
covered by the same collective bargaining agreement, especially those working in the 
same occupation (Freeman and Medoff 1984, Fitzenberger and Kohn 2005). 
International evidence also suggests that there is limited wage dispersion in countries 
with centralized collective bargaining, which is – to a large extent – caused by more 
compressed inter-firm wage dispersion (Blau and Kahn 1999, 2003). Even if the wage 
compressing effect seems to be more pronounced among male employees (see e.g. 
Card et al. 2003a), it automatically reduces the GWG for women performing the same 
activity as male colleagues in the same establishment, since workers at the bottom of 
the wage distribution are more likely to be female. Freeman (1980) also shows that 
unions tend to reduce wage differentials within and across establishments regardless of 
occupation by setting fixed wage levels for specific jobs. As a result, the gap between 
segregated female and male jobs should also narrow.  
Second, collective bargaining agreements regulating wage rates and general working 
conditions may limit the extent of arbitrary remuneration. In Germany, each sector-
specific bargaining agreement assigns typical jobs to a set of wage groups which are 
associated with a certain level of required skills and responsibility. This should reduce 
discrimination potential and the resulting GWG. Cornfield (1987) points out, for 
example, that in the case of layoffs, bureaucratic rules consequently reduce 
                                                                                                                                               
sample is supposed to be representative, this figure should serve as a good proxy of the concentration in 
the market.  
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discrimination potential. Accordingly, Elvira and Saporta (2001) argue that unionized 
establishments are more likely to adhere to such bureaucratic wage setting rules, 
reducing the arbitrariness in wage rates and generating more predictable wages for 
male and female employees.  
But these arguments may be somewhat naive as regards the shares of male and female 
union membership. Based on the median voter approach we would expect union 
leaders up for re-election to speak out in favor of a majority group's interests and not to 
support the interests of minority groups. According to Koch-Baumgarten (2002), 
despite their growing importance women still represent a minority among union 
members in Germany. 30.4 percent of DGB members (the umbrella organization of all 
unions, the Federation of German Trade Unions) were female in 1999. Even if some 
unions have adopted pay equity as a strategic policy goal – possibly in order to attract 
new members at a time when unions are losing members fast (see e.g. Fitzenberger et 
al. 1999, Card 2001) – it is nonetheless by no means obvious that unions are actively 
trying to reduce the GWG in general. Based on a theoretical model of intra-union 
bargaining and the assumption that negotiated boosts in wages are divided between 
male and female unionists, Sap (1993) even comes to the conclusion that unions lead 
to greater discrimination.  
In order to examine the effect of unionization on the GWG we include variables which 
indicate whether an establishment is subject to collective agreements or not. More 
precisely, we distinguish between industry-wide collective wage agreements (covering 
63 percent of all employees in western Germany in the year 2000), firm-specific 
collective wage agreements as well as wage determination (covering 7 percent), and 
without collective bargaining coverage (30 percent, while 15 percent nonetheless 
follow the wage agreements) (WSI Tarifarchiv 2001). In order to test the hypothesis 
that unions aim to represent the preferences of their median member, we also exploit 
information about the female share among the members of different German unions. 
We would expect collective agreements with unions that register a high proportion of 
female members (e.g. unions bargaining in the retail sector) to be more likely to reduce 
the firm-specific GWG than a collective agreement with a union that is still dominated 
by men, such as the IG BAU (union for the construction, agriculture and forestry 
sector). Based on this background information, which is merged with our 
                                                                                                                                               
20 Alternatively, Black and Brainerd (2004) use the import quota and the four-firm concentration ratio to 
measure the competitive pressure within an industry.   
Chapter 2: Intra-firm gender wage gap 
 
23
establishment-level data, we can first test whether unions tend to reduce the GWG in 
general, or whether this effect only occurs in unions with a high proportion of female 
members. 
Furthermore, wage distribution within establishments is not only affected by collective 
wage agreements but also by the existence of works councils (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003, 
Stephan and Gerlach 2005). Works councils establish a comprehensive system of 
establishment-level participation that is formally independent of the collective 
bargaining process. They also have the task of implementing the collective agreement 
within the establishment. This means that works councils cannot directly intervene in 
the wage bargaining process but may influence the establishment’s wage structure 
thanks to their right of co-determination in negotiations on the assignment of workers 
to different wage groups. They are also involved in decision-making on the 
introduction of pay systems, such as performance-related pay schemes, and the setting 
of wages above agreed tariff and bonus rates. Their implementation is formally 
designated by law but depends upon the activity of the employees. According to Baron 
(1984), works councils often act as equalizing agents by monitoring compliance with 
corporate or legal principals aimed at achieving equal opportunities and avoiding 
discrimination. As a result, the existence of a works council should counteract wage 
inequality within establishments.  
More differentiated hypotheses about the objectives of works councils can again be 
derived from the median-voter theory or the insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck and 
Snower 1988). According to the former approach, works councils act in favor of the 
majority of the workforce while the interests of fringe groups are neglected. In this 
setting, works councils foster equal treatment of male and female employees only in 
establishments with a high proportion of female employees. A male dominated 
workforce is presumably associated with a male dominated works council which is 
unlikely to promote wage equality. Therefore, the effect of employees’ representation 
on the GWG is not unambiguous, either. To examine whether the effect of works 
councils depends upon the proportion of female employees in an establishment we also 
include an interaction term between the works council-dummy and the firm-specific 
share of women.21  
                                                 
21 Since we have no information on the female share among the works council members, we cannot 
directly test the implications derived from the insider-outsider theory.  
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2.3 Methodology 
To investigate the theoretical hypothesis we define two measures which reflect the 
degree of wage inequality within an establishment. First, we use the observed wage 
gap: 
1
11 ,    ,   g=m,f
g
jN
m f g g
j j j j ijg
jj
Gap w w w w
N =
= − = ∑       (2.1) 
where wij denotes the log earnings for individual i at establishment j superscripts m and 
f refer to male and female observations. gjN indicated the number of male and female 
employees, respectively, in establishment j. Since the wage information in our data set 
is right-censored (see Section 2.4 for more details), the observed wage gap defined in 
equation underestimates the actual raw wage differential. In order to determine the 
actual observed wage gap we apply a simple Tobit model. By estimating the following 
equation for each establishment, we can directly derive the wage differential between 
male and female employees: 
,ij j j ij ijw femα γ μ= + +          (2.2)  
where α  is an absolute term measuring the average wage rate in establishment j, fem  
is a dummy variable reflecting the gender of individual i and ijμ  denotes the error 
term. The estimated coefficient jγˆ  then represents the raw GWG in establishment j 
(Gap1j) taking into account that wij is censored from above. 
From an economic viewpoint the wage gap which is due to differences in occupational 
skills shall be deemed to be justified and comprehensible. Therefore, we calculate a 
second measure of the gender pay differential which is adjusted by the difference in 
human capital of employees:  
( )ˆ ˆ2 1 m m m fj j j ij j ijGap Gap X Xβ β= − −                                                    (2.3) 
ijX  includes mean characteristics of the individuals i at establishment j and 
m
jβˆ  is a 
vector of estimated coefficients – derived from wage regressions – of the individual 
characteristics Xij of male employees in establishment j. Hence, Gap2 reflects the 
difference in the rewards for individual human capital characteristics and unobserved 
wage effects between male and female employees within each establishment j. The 
calculation of this measure requires the estimation of wage equations for male 
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employees only.22 In order to allow for the heterogeneity and complexity of the wage 
setting process we estimate – as far as possible – separate wage equations for each 
establishment: 
100 .m m m mij j ij ijw X for establishments with at least  male employeesβ ε= +    (2.4) 
The dependent variable describes the daily log wage rate. We restrict the wage 
equation to a standard Mincer equation aiming to adjust the observed wage rate by 
differences in human capital endowments between men and women. Since other 
possible wage determinants, such as the occupational status and the occupational group 
are determined by human capital and presumably also by other firm characteristics, we 
exclude them from our wage equation. Hence, mijX  includes potential experience 
(squares), dummy variables for different education levels and job tenure.23 The right-
censoring of the dependent variable again requires the estimation of a Tobit model. In 
order to make sure that our firm-specific wage estimations yield statistically 
meaningful results, we only take into account establishments with at least 100 male 
employees. This procedure is most suitable to take into account the heterogeneity 
among establishments. The benefit of this approach is only feasible, however, at the 
expense of the number of considered establishments. To exploit information from 
establishments with less than 100 male employees, we run pooled regressions for all 
establishments with between twenty and ninety-nine male employees: 
100 .m m m mij ij ijw X for establishments with less than employeesβ ε= +    (2.5) 
Given the results of equation (2.4) and (2.5) respectively, we can calculate Gap2 which 
describes the GWG within establishments assuming that men had the same human 
capital endowment as women within an establishment. Note, however, that part of the 
differences in characteristics may be explained by inequality in access to and 
encouragement of education. Furthermore, there might be a discriminating element in 
the selection of employees such that observed characteristics of employees as well as 
estimated coefficients are not distributed randomly across establishments.24  
                                                 
22 Alternatively, one may use female wages and characteristics to determine the remuneration of human 
capital. Given that the regression of male wages are unlikely to be biased due to selection problems and 
that men are less concerned with discrimination, we argue that male wage coefficients better represent the 
market value of selected qualification characteristics. 
23 Note that the inclusion of firm effects or industry-level variables is not required in this specification 
because we run firm-specific wage regressions and hence identification would not be feasible. 
24 In order to correct for this selection we would have to estimate employment probabilities (Datta Gupta 
1993). Due to the lack of information on the household context and the individual background, it is 
difficult to implement this procedure which requires convincing exclusion restrictions. 
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Using these two measures for the firm-specific wage differential as dependent 
variables allows us to analyze the effect of firm characteristics and institutional 
framework on wage inequality within establishments. To ensure the significance of our 
results, both indicators are only calculated for establishments with at least 20 male and 
20 female employees.  
,          1,2.j j jGapK Z Kδ ε= + =         (2.6) 
The observed wage gap (Gap1) as well as the GWG which is adjusted for the 
difference in human capital characteristics (Gap2) is assumed to depend on the vector 
Zj including firm characteristics and information on the institutional framework of 
establishment j. δ captures the impact of the corresponding explanatory variables, 
derived from the theories expounded in Section 2.2. To investigate the hypotheses 
based on Becker’s discrimination model, we use the establishment size, the relative 
establishment size within the sector and the export quota. Implications from the 
bargaining model are tested by variables such as “application of collective wage 
agreements” and “existence of a works council”. To determine whether the naive 
notion of collective bargaining holds, i.e. that unions aim to increase wages at the 
lower tail of the wage distribution irrespective of sex, we add the female share of union 
members in the relevant union to vector Zj in equation (2.6). In order to test whether 
the works council acts in favor of the majority of the workforce, we interact the 
existence of a works council with the female share in the establishment. As well as the 
variables attributable to we also use specific control variables such as region and 
industry.  
In this second estimation step we can exploit the panel structure of the data by 
applying a random effects model. In the first estimation step, that is the wage 
estimation, it is not possible to apply fixed-effects panel estimation in a Tobit model, 
because most of our human capital variables are time invariant. Even if it would be 
straightforward to apply a random effects Tobit model, we currently refrain from this 
approach because of computer time restrictions. Since the variance of the calculated 
gender wage gap varies by establishment size per definition, we calculate robust 
standard errors accommodating heteroscedasty in the dependent variable. 
A general issue in assessing the effect of firm characteristics is the firm self-selection 
into works council status or the adoption of collective agreements. In our setting, this 
problem becomes relevant if employees of establishments with high gender wage gaps 
were more or less likely to implement works council or follow collective agreements. 
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According to Addison et al. (2006), however, endogeneity of works councils does not 
seem to be important for Germany.  
2.4 Data and some descriptive figures 
The present analysis of the effects of firm characteristics and institutional framework 
on wage inequality within establishments is only feasible with linked information on 
employer and employees. For this reason we use a representative German employer-
employee linked panel data set. This data set is constructed by merging the IAB 
Establishment Panel and the Employment Statistics of the Federal Employment 
Agency based on a unique establishment identification number. To test the hypothesis 
concerning the effect of the proportion of female union members, we further merge 
union membership data at the sector level. Information about the share of women 
among union members is published on the homepage of the Federation of German 
Trade Unions.25  
The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual survey of German establishments, which 
was launched in western Germany in 1993 and was extended to eastern Germany in 
1996.26 The sample of selected establishments is random and stratified by industries, 
establishment size classes and regions. The data is collected by personal interviews 
with the owners or senior managers of smaller establishments and personnel managers 
in larger establishments. It is performed by specially trained professional interviewers 
from a well-known market research institute. As far as possible, the survey is carried 
out by the same interviewer and interviewee each year. This procedure ensures 
response rates between 63 and 73 percent - depending on the shares of first and follow-
up interviews (Fischer et al. 2008). Given that the response rate of follow-up 
interviews is higher, panel attrition amounts to less than 20 percent. In order to keep 
the panel representative and correct for panel mortality, exits, and newly-founded 
units, additional establishments are drawn in each year, yielding an unbalanced panel. 
These additional establishments are stratified with respect to ten categories of 
establishment size and 34 economic sectors.  
The sample unit is the establishment as the local business unit. Note, however, that 
firm and establishment are used as synonyms in this study. The surveyed 
                                                 
25 http://www.dgb.de/dgb/mitgliederzahlen/mitglieder.htm. 
26 Detailed information on the IAB Establishment Panel is given by Kölling (2000). 
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establishments are selected from the parent sample of all German establishments that 
employ at least one employee covered by social security. Thus, self-employed people 
and establishments that employ only people not covered by social security 
(mineworkers, farmers, artists, journalists, etc.) as well as public employers engaging 
solely civil servants are excluded from the original sample. The establishments 
covered by the survey have been questioned every year about turnover, number of 
employees, personnel problems, industrial relations, wage policies, apprenticeship 
training, investments, innovations, and business strategies. Casually, other topics, such 
as training and human resource policies, were added to the questionnaire. 
The employment statistic of the Federal Employment Agency, so-called Employment 
Statistics Register, is an administrative panel data set of all employees in Germany 
paying social security contributions.27 The Employment Statistics are collected by the 
social insurance institutions for their purposes according to a procedure introduced in 
1973. These data cover the period between 1975 and 2002, that is, every person who 
was employed for at least one day from 1975 to 2002 and/or with claims to pension 
benefits is included.28 During this time, social security contributions were mandatory 
for all employees who earned more than a lower earnings limit. Civil servants, self-
employed and people with marginal jobs, that is, employees whose earnings are below 
a lower earnings limit or temporary jobs which last 50 working days at most, are not 
covered by this sample. Altogether, the Employment Statistics Register represents 
about 80 percent of all employees in western Germany. Employers are required by law 
to report information on all employed contributors at the beginning and end of their 
employment spells. In addition an annual report for each employee is compulsory at 
the end of a year. This report contains information on an employee’s occupation, 
occupational status, qualifications, sex, age, nationality, industry and the size of the 
employing company. The available information on daily gross earnings (including all 
overtime premiums and other allowances) refers to employment spells that employers 
report to the Federal Employment Agency.29 If the wage rate exceeds the upper 
earnings limit (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”), the daily social security threshold is 
                                                 
27 Information on the Employment Statistics Register is given by Bender, Haas and Klose (2000). 
28 These are people who, as employees, have paid contributions to the pension system or who have been 
covered by the pension system through contributions to the unemployment insurance scheme or by being 
a parent (depending on the birth year of the child, a set number of years is counted as child caring time 
during which the non-working parent is entitled to receive pension benefits). 
29 To deal with the problem of overlapping spells, we apply a hierarchical order of activities where 
employment trumps all other activities.  
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reported instead.30 Note that the daily wage rate is therefore censored from above – 
mostly relevant for men – and truncated from below, which concerns women’s wages 
in particular. The male wage regressions presented in Section 2.3, therefore, ignore 
potential sample selection issues. 
Both data sets contain a unique establishment identifier which is used to match 
information on all employees paying social security contributions with the 
establishment in the IAB Establishment Panel. To create a data set appropriate to 
assess the effect of labor relations on the GWG, we first exclude all part-time 
employees and homeworkers, because the limited information on working hours does 
not allow calculating hourly wage rates in that case. Second, apprentices as well as 
employees under the age of 20 or over the age of 60 are dropped in order to eliminate 
the particularities of early retirement and the transition from school to work. 
Furthermore, we restrict our sample to German employees, because the wage setting 
process of immigrants presumably further depends on other factors, such as the years 
since migration, the origin of their schooling and other qualification degrees, as well as 
the penchant for discrimination within the establishment, which are not available in our 
data. Regarding establishments, we further restrict our sample to the private sector in 
western Germany. We use information on all establishments participating in the IAB 
Establishment Panel in at least one year from 1997 to 2001.31 Finally we exclude 
establishments which employ less than 20 women or 20 men because the calculation of 
the firm-specific GWGs as well as their regression on the firm characteristics derived 
in Section 2.2 is not statistically meaningful in these organizations. Table A1 in the 
appendix illustrates the effect of our sample selection criterions on the distribution of 
establishment size and industry sectors. Not surprisingly, our sample underrepresents 
establishments with less than 100 employees compared to the original LIAB sample. 
                                                 
30 Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) show that this particularly affects the wage rate of high-skilled 
employees. According to their results, about 50 percent of high-skilled men earn wages above the upper 
earnings limit. Among high-skilled full-time females, this share amounts to at least 20 percent.  
31 Eastern German establishments are not considered in the analysis because both the wage level as well 
as the wage setting process is still very different. Given the small number of union members in eastern 
Germany and the limited application of co-determination, the importance of the institutional framework is 
supposed to be less relevant. A common investigation of both regions would therefore not be very 
meaningful. Furthermore, the GWG is much smaller in eastern Germany. A separate analysis for eastern 
Germany would not be comparable either, because the wage setting process and the resulting GWG in 
eastern German establishments is likely to be driven by internal processes, which cannot be captured by 
our data, such as the devaluation of female labor as well as the crowding out of women in the labor 
market and particularly women in occupations which were dominated by females in eastern Germany 
before unification. 
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The relatively high share of establishments referring to manufacturing presumably also 
results from the large number of bigger establishments. In contrast, establishments 
belonging to trade and repair, construction and services are somewhat 
underrepresented in our sample.  
One innovation of our study is the firm-specific estimation of the wage equations. 
Based on these results, we can calculate an adjusted wage gap (Gap2) accommodating 
the firm-specific wage setting process. To guarantee the reliability of our estimation 
results, we restrict this procedure to larger establishments. These are establishments 
employing at least 100 full-time employed German men who are subject to social 
security contributions. Since this condition does not hold for many smaller 
establishments, we would have to leave out many establishments and information on 
the determinants of the firm-specific GWG. To maximize the number of 
establishments in the second estimation step, we apply an alternative estimation 
strategy for smaller establishments. The employees of establishments employing 
twenty to ninety-nine full-time employed German men are considered in a pooled 
wage estimation (see equation (2.5)).  
Table 2.1 shows the number of firms as well as the number of their male and female 
employees in each observation year which enters the wage estimations. The rather 
small share of female employees results from our sample definition, which excludes 
the public sector and all part-time employees. The number of yearly observations 
varies between 1148 and 1852 establishments. The 4th column of Table 2.1 contains 
the average of the observed log gender wage gaps within firms as defined in equation 
(2.1). 
Table 2. 1: Description of the sample and the gender wage gap 
Number of 
firms 
Number of 
male 
employees
Number of 
female 
employees
Within-firm 
GWG based 
on reported 
value (in 
logarithm) 
Adjusted 
within-firm 
GWG (in 
logarithm) 
for right 
censoring 
Adjusted 
overall GWG 
(in 
logarithm) 
Year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1997 1,148 655,002 189,807 0.183 0.198 0.207 
1998 1,195 604,140 181,452 0.184 0.199 0.211 
1999 1,179 543,955 164,154 0.181 0.196 0.215 
2000 1,640 605,410 184,514 0.185 0.202 0.215 
 2001 1,852 669,695 207,085 0.180 0.197 0.219 
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 20 male and 20 female employees. Further explanations are 
given in the text. 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001 
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A look at Table A2 in the appendix reveals that the observed wage gap is larger in 
establishments with fewer male employees. Note, however, that this figure is based on 
reported wage rates and ignores the fact that actual earnings could be higher. In our 
sample, 15 percent of male employees earn wage rates above the upper earnings limit 
while this is true for only 4 percent of female employees. As a result, the measure 
based on equation (2.1) underestimates the true GWG within firms. In order to correct 
for the right-censoring of the wage information, we estimate equation (2.2) with a 
Tobit model. The average of the estimated raw wage gaps within firms is presented in 
the 5th column. As expected, the actual raw wage gap is higher then the calculated 
values in column 4. The last column show the average adjusted overall gender wage 
gap without taking into account the establishment level.  
The wage gap in the last column is corrected for the censoring, but compares the wage 
rates of males and females across all establishments. That is, equation (2.2) is 
estimated by a pooled Tobit model across all employees. In every year, the overall 
wage gap is a higher than the wage differential within establishments. The difference 
between these two measures of gender wage differential indicates that women tend to 
select into lower paying establishments. The average difference in the GWG amounts 
to at least one percent points. Our results should hence be interpreted bearing in mind 
that selection into establishments is considerable and taken as given. 
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Figure 2.1: Kernel estimation of Gap1 and Gap2 
Note: Gap1 denotes the observed wage differential between men and women within the same 
establishment. Gap2 describes the gender wage gap under the assumption that male employees would 
have the same characteristics as female employees. Both measures accommodate the censoring of our 
wage variable by applying Tobit estimates. The Epanechnikov kernel function is used in the kernel 
density estimations of Gap1 and Gap2. 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001. 
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Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of Gap1 and Gap2 in across establishments. Gap1 has 
a mean of about 0.2 and a standard deviation of 0.12. Gap2 is smaller on average with 
a mean of 0.14. The corresponding standard deviation amounts to 0.10. Since Gap2 
controls for the differences in human capital and hence much of the heterogeneity 
between establishments, the distribution of Gap2 is steeper and the mode appears to be 
at a lower level than the one of Gap1.  
2.5 Estimation results 
2.5.1 First estimation step: Wage regression  
To calculate the within-firm GWG under the assumption that male employees have the 
same characteristics as female employees within each establishment (Gap2), we first 
have to determine wage estimates for all establishments in our sample. For 
establishments with at least 100 male employees, we estimate 1,704 wage equations 
with a Tobit model in order to account for censoring. The estimated firm-specific wage 
coefficients are used to determine Gap2 according to equation (2.3). This estimation 
strategy is not applicable for establishments with fewer employees because the within-
firm estimation would yield no statistically meaningful results. For this reason, we 
estimate a pooled wage equation across all male employees in establishments with less 
than 100 male employees. The summary statistics of the dependent and explanatory 
variables are presented in Table A3 and A4 in the appendix. 
 
Table 2. 2: Coefficients of the wage estimations in a Tobit model (establishments ≥ 100 
male employees) 
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean of 
the 
coeff. 
Mean of 
the t-
value 
Share of 
significant 
coeff. 
Share of 
same 
sign 
Std. 
deviation 
of coeff. 
QuotientVariable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (2)/(6) 
Potential experience 1,704 0.024 7.624 0.887 0.978 0.015 0.625 
(Potential experience)2/100 1,704 -0.040 -6.011 0.799 0.952 0.029 -0.725 
Job tenure (in days)/1000 1,704 0.412 7.072 0.808 0.892 0.787 1.910 
Low education without 
vocational training 1,192 -0.424 -11.077 0.898 0.972 0.219 -0.517 
Vocational training 1,669 -0.130 -4.433 0.796 0.693 0.265 -2.038 
Secondary school 904 0.054 0.823 0.746 0.516 0.323 5.981 
College of higher education 
or university 1,118 0.336 9.066 0.814 0.953 0.239 0.711 
Note: Coefficients result from wage regressions in establishments with at least 100 male and 20 female 
employees. Further explanations are given in the text. 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001 
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As the coefficients from the 1,704 large establishments cannot be displayed in detail, 
we present a summary of the firm-specific estimation results in larger establishments 
in Table 2.2.  
Column 1 in Table 2.2 describes the number of estimated coefficients for each 
characteristic. Note that some characteristics are missing in some establishments, such 
that specific coefficients cannot be determined in every establishment. The second 
column presents the mean of the coefficients of the firm-specific wage estimations and 
column 3 shows the corresponding mean of the t-values. Table 2.2 contains 
coefficients for all possible education levels because the left-out category differs from 
establishment to establishment. The means of the estimated coefficients show that the 
variables have the expected effect on the wage rate. That is, the wage rate increases 
with the education level and potential experience on average. As predicted by Mincer 
(1974), the squared term of potential experience is negative, hinting at diminishing 
returns to experience. Longer spells within the same establishment also cause small but 
positive effects on the wage rate. In order to obtain a more exact impression of the 
significance of the estimated coefficient, column 4 shows the shares of the estimated 
coefficients which are significant at the 5 percent level. We can see that about 75 to 90 
percent of the estimated coefficients are statistically different from zero. Note, 
however, that not all coefficients show in the same direction. Column 5 describes the 
share of coefficients with the same sign as the mean of the coefficient in column 2. The 
firm-specific coefficients of vocational training and secondary schooling exhibit the 
smallest share of consistent signs. Furthermore, Table 2.2 includes the standard 
deviation of the estimated coefficients to illustrate the heterogeneity of the wage 
regressions across establishments (see column 6). The last column presents a sort of 
variation coefficient, which is a quotient of the standard deviation of the coefficient 
and the absolute value of the corresponding mean. Hence, this figure illustrates the 
standardized variation of coefficients across establishments. High values of this 
quotient indicate that the variation of firm-specific coefficients is high, supporting our 
supposition that the wage setting process differs tremendously across establishments. 
Small values signal moderate heterogeneity of wage returns to the corresponding 
characteristics. The results in Table 2.2 point out, for example, that the remuneration of 
job tenure varies much more across establishments than the coefficients for experience. 
In consideration of the varying coefficients, the wage estimation in each establishment 
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seems to be advantageous in determining the correct remuneration of the 
characteristics. 
In addition to these summary statistics, we also present the 25th, 50th and 75th 
percentiles of the estimated coefficients in Table A6 in the appendix. The results show 
that the rather “extreme” values of the estimated coefficients also indicate the well 
known fact that education, establishment tenure and experience have a positive effect 
on individual wage levels.  
 
Table 2. 3: Coefficients of the pooled wage estimations in a Tobit model 
(establishments with 20 to 99 male employees) 
Standard deviation 
Variables Coefficients of coefficients t-value 
Potential experience 0.036 0.000 98.19 
(Potential experience)2/100 -0.063 0.001 -80.62 
Job tenure (in days)/1000 0.263 0.003 75.87 
Low education without vocational training -0.299 0.002 -124.87 
Vocational training (reference group) - - - 
Secondary school 0.204 0.003 62.79 
College of higher education or university 0.432 0.003 135.89 
No. of observations 120,091   
Log likelihood -26,970   
Note: The regression includes male employees from establishments with 20 to 99 male and at least 20 
female employees. Instead of a constant variable we include all year dummies.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001. 
 
Table 2.3 presents the estimation results of the pooled Tobit regression for smaller 
establishments. Note that the education level vocational training serves as the only 
reference group in this setting. The estimated coefficients are highly significant and 
also exhibit the expected sizes and signs. 
 
2.5.2 Second estimation step: Explaining the firm-specific gender wage 
gap  
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the estimated coefficients are used to calculate the 
adjusted GWG, Gap2. In order to derive conclusions about the impact of firm 
characteristics and the institutional framework on the GWG, we regress selected 
establishment-level and industry-level variables on the raw firm-specific wage gaps 
(Gap1) and on the adjusted firm-specific wage gaps (Gap2). We use the export quota, 
the establishment size as well as the relative establishment size to test whether 
establishments with market power discriminate more and therefore reveal a higher 
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GWG or not. The impact of the institutional framework on the GWG is investigated by 
including a dummy variable for the existence of a works council. Furthermore, we use 
an interaction term between this dummy and the share of female employees within an 
establishment to test whether the effect of employees’ representations depend upon the 
female share among the staff. In order to check the hypothesis that collective wage 
agreements entail smaller GWGs, we distinguish between industry-wide, firm-specific 
and no wage agreements. In one model specification, we also include the female share 
among union members in the relevant union, to see whether the naive notion of 
collective bargaining holds. A positive coefficient of the female share in the 
corresponding union would suggest that unions with a high female share are more 
successful in reducing the wage gap between men and women. Unfortunately, our data 
do not provide any information about which collective bargaining agreement is 
relevant for establishment j. We therefore assign each establishment to an industry-
specific union according to the industry affiliation of the establishment. This implies, 
for example, that an establishment in the construction sector is supposed to be subject 
to the collective agreement of the union called “IG-Bau”.32 As a consequence, we 
assign the same female share to all establishments in the construction sector. For this 
reason, the error terms of establishments negotiating with the same union are not 
independent. To adjust for the correlation within each union-cluster, we calculate 
clustered standard errors. Due to the decreasing number of unions in Germany33, we 
can only distinguish between seven unions and one cluster of establishments without 
collective wage agreements. Since the estimation approach requires that establishments 
remain in the same cluster during the whole observation period, we lose 493 
observations of establishments which changed their union status or the industry 
sector.34 A switch between industry-wide or firm-specific wage agreements has no 
effect on the number of observations. In order to make sure that we use as much 
information as possible and to avoid our estimation results being affected by the 
restriction of the sample, we include this variable only in an additional model 
                                                 
32 In the case of a firm-specific wage agreement, the establishment negotiates directly with the 
corresponding union. The female share of the union members is hence merged in the same way as in the 
case of industry-wide wage agreements. 
33 For instance, five separate unions covering the service sector merged to form the large union “ver.di” in 
2001 and other small unions joined more powerful unions like “IG Metall”. 
34 These 493 observations refer to 198 different establishments. Most switches across clusters were due to 
changes in the union status, that is, establishments quit the employer association and did not negotiate 
with unions anymore (189 establishments). Only 9 establishments actually changed their industry sector. 
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specification. Summary statistics of the selected variables in both samples are 
presented in Table A5 in the appendix. 
In all regressions, differences between regions, industries and years are captured by 
several control variables. Apart from that, we include the wage bill per employee to 
control for differences between high and low wage establishments. Table 2.4 shows 
the effects of the selected variables on our two measures of the gender earnings gap. 
The results rely on the whole sample as the female share among union members does 
not enter this baseline specification. The number of different establishments entering 
our estimation is 2,758, of which 1,054 establishments belong to the group of smaller 
establishments (with pooled wage regressions) and 1,704 are large establishments 
(with firm-specific wage regressions). The estimated coefficients of the control 
variables region, industry and year dummies are not presented here but are available on 
request.  
 
Table 2. 4: Determinants of the firm-specific gender wage gap  
GAP1 GAP2 
Variables Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Constant 0.2528** 0.0173 0.2145 ** 0.0145
Number of employees/1000 -0.0099** 0.0023 -0.0094 ** 0.0022
(Number of employees/1000)2 0.0003** 0.0001 0.0003 ** 0.0001
Relative firm size 0.0631* 0.0337 0.0826 ** 0.0309
Export quota (of sales)/10 -0.0265 0.0683 -0.1272 ** 0.0575
Wage bill per employee/100000 0.1430* 0.0773 0.0075  0.0666
Female share (of all employees) 0.0603** 0.0299 0.0120  0.0261
Works council -0.0341** 0.0150 -0.0461 ** 0.0132
Works council * Female share 0.0306 0.0300  0.0385  0.0264
Industry-wide wage agreement -0.0149** 0.0046 -0.0100 ** 0.0037
Firm-specific wage agreement -0.0128** 0.0055  -0.0103 ** 0.0045
Observations 5,802   5,802   
R2 0.1871      0.1456     
Note: The dummy variables for the years, regions and industry are also included in the estimation. The 
results are available on request. Significance levels: **: 5 percent, *: 10 percent.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001 
 
Before discussing the effect of the institutional setting and the degree of competition, 
we now take a short look at the list of control variables which are meant to capture 
observed heterogeneity among establishments. Unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity 
is captured by the random effects determined by the estimation model. The positive 
impact of the female share on Gap1 and Gap2 may be interpreted as a segregation 
effect. The regressions show that establishments employing comparatively many 
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women seem to provide less equality among men and women than those with a small 
share of female workers. If the devaluation of jobs due to a high share of female 
employees is more pronounced for women (see e.g. Carrington and Troske 1998), 
segregation not only reduces the wage level but also reinforces the pay differential 
between men and women. Another explanation could be that the few men working in 
female dominated establishments mostly hold managerial positions and the mass of 
women perform simple tasks in lower paid positions (see e.g. Dolado et al. 2004). A 
typical example of this type of work sharing is the retail industry, where most women 
are employed as shop assistants or cashiers while most men work as shop managers. 
This interpretation corresponds to the result that the effect is smaller and not even 
significant in the estimation of Gap2, implying that part of the female effect is driven 
by the gender differences in human capital endowment.  
The positive coefficient of the wage bill per employee in the regression of Gap1 shows 
that the GWG is larger in high wage establishments.35 This may be due to the so-called 
glass ceiling effect. According to this phenomenon, the wage rate of women is capped 
at a certain threshold, partly because women do not reach the top positions in most 
establishments. As a result, the GWG at the right tail of the earnings distribution is 
higher than at the mean. In the regression of Gap2, which controls for differences in 
human capital endowment, the effect of the firm-specific wage level is insignificant. 
We therefore conclude that controlling for human capital partly explains the larger 
gender pay differences in high wage establishments.  
Note, however, that due to our sample selection criterions, establishments with less 
than 100 employees are underrepresented in our sample (see Table A1 in the 
appendix). Hence, applying all these conclusions to small businesses may be bold. 
We now turn to the alternative indicators of competition. The results reveal a negative 
relation between the number of employees and the two measures of the GWG. 
However, the positive coefficient of the quadratic term points out that the negative 
impact of the number of employees decreases at a certain establishment size. The 
GWG starts to rise with the number of employees once the establishment employs 
more than 15,050 workers in the case of Gap1 (respectively 14,700 in the case of 
                                                 
35 The average wage level is not correlated with the GWG per definition, because the first figure relies on 
the establishment panel and corresponds to all employees while the GWG only refers to the selected 
employees as described in Section 2.4.  
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Gap2).36 This implies that the hypothesis that very large establishments can afford 
more discrimination due to their market power only holds for establishments with 
more than about 15,000 employees, which only applies to 0.03 percent of observations 
in the sample. This result suggests that it may be too simplistic just to assume that 
large establishments have more market power. The negative coefficient appears 
plausible bearing in mind that large establishments are more in the public eye and that 
public pressure tends to lower the GWG. Another reason for the smaller GWG in large 
establishments may be the fact that male and female employees are more likely to 
work in comparable job positions (unless jobs are not fully segregated) in large 
establishments. Hinz and Schübel (2001) show, for instance, that occupational gender 
segregation decreases with the establishment size. In this case, it is more difficult to 
enforce different wage rates for equal jobs because employees can easily compare their 
tasks and wage rates.  
The relative establishment size in terms of establishment employment relative to the 
number of employees in the industry sector increases the GWG within the 
establishment and hence supports the hypothesis of a discrimination-reducing effect of 
competition.37 The fact that this effect is somewhat stronger for Gap2 implies that 
relatively large establishments tend to employ a higher share of high-skilled women. 
The export quota – suggesting additional competition on the global markets – has a 
significant negative impact on Gap2, which is also in line with Becker’s model of 
discrimination. The coefficient of the export quota is smaller and has no significant 
effect on Gap1, however. An interpretation which is perfectly in line with the results of 
Black and Brainerd (2004) would be that international trade increases inequality by 
reducing the relative wages of less skilled workers who are predominantly female. As 
a consequence, the observed GWG is not reduced. At the same time, trade appears to 
benefit women by reducing the ability of establishments to discriminate, as revealed by 
a diminishing Gap2.  
As far as the effect of institutional setting is concerned, we find pretty clear and 
convincing results which concur with those of earlier studies. The estimates indicate 
that industrial relations are strongly linked to the GWG. The existence of a works 
council has a significant negative impact on Gap1 and Gap2, denoting that employees’ 
                                                 
36 By calculating this number of employees we assume that the total number of employees in the industry 
sector is constant and for simplification we use the average of the total number of employees in the 
industry sector.   
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representatives foster equal treatment of male and female employees within 
establishments. The consistent effect on both measures implies that the existence of 
works councils also limits the potential of discrimination within qualification levels. 
The interaction between works councils and the female share within an establishment 
is positive but has no significant impact in any regression. We therefore conclude that 
works councils tend to reduce inequality between men and women irrespective of the 
gender relations within the establishment. In other words, the median voter approach 
does not seem to apply in this setting. Note, however, that even if a high share of 
female employees does not seem to foster the effectiveness of co-determination in 
terms of wage equality, it may be likely that the female share among the works 
council’s members influences the goals of the staff association. Given that we have no 
individual information on the membership in works councils, we cannot test this 
hypothesis. 
As the collective bargaining model suggests, establishments under collective 
agreements tend to have smaller pay gaps between males and females than those 
without wage agreements. The results on the effect of alternative wage bargaining 
regimes show that the impact of the industry-wide and firm-specific wage agreements 
are very similar. A Wald test indicates that the null hypothesis specificfirmindustry −= δδ  
cannot be rejected at conventional levels in both estimations.38 Since firm-specific 
contracts are generally bargained by sector-specific unions, one possible explanation 
might be that a considerable fraction of the firm-specific contracts simply adopt most 
of the terms negotiated in the corresponding industry agreement in order to lower 
transaction costs (see e.g. Gürtzgen 2005). This argument becomes even more 
plausible if we think of firm-specific contracts that are primarily aimed at saving jobs. 
In these cases firm-specific contracts include individual agreements on working hours, 
periods of notice and possibly reduce overall wage increases.39 
Even if these results seem to support the naive notion of unions’ goals, there might be 
differences in the effect on the GWG with respect to the gender composition among 
the union members. We therefore investigate the hypothesis that unions with a higher 
                                                                                                                                               
37 Alternatively, we calculated the relative establishment size in terms of turnover. However, the results 
do not provide empirical evidence for the hypotheses derived in Section 2.2.  
38 The p-values are 0.6052 for the raw wage gap and 0.9209 for the adjusted wage gap. 
39 This result partly contrasts with the conclusion of Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2006) for Spain, 
who find evidence for different effects of firm-level agreements and more centralized collective 
bargaining agreements on the GWG in 2002, but not in 1995. Blau and Kahn (2003) also reason that the 
decentralization of bargaining processes raises the overall wage gap. 
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share of female members act more in favor of female interests and hence have a greater 
effect on the firm-specific wage gap. Union membership data are merged on an 
aggregated sector level (7 categories according to the sector classification of the 
unions) and interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether the establishment is 
subject to an industry- or firm-specific collective agreement or not.  
Table 2. 5: Determinants of the firm-specific gender wage gap (restricted sample) 
GAP1 GAP2 
Variables Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Constant 0.2834** 0.0176 0.2275 ** 0.0198
Number of employees/1000 -0.0098** 0.0027 -0.0091 ** 0.0027
(Number of employees/1000)2 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003  0.0002
Relative firm size 0.0918** 0.0189 0.1101 ** 0.0286
Export quota (of sales)/10 0.1613* 0.0878 0.0092  0.0418
Wage bill per employee/100000 -0.0331 0.0444 -0.1252 ** 0.0267
Female share (of all employees) 0.0434 0.0514 0.0150  0.0505
Works council -0.0359** 0.0129 -0.0387 ** 0.0113
Works council * Female share 0.0483 0.0441 0.0319  0.0296
Industry-wide wage agreement -0.0498** 0.0108 -0.0385 ** 0.0092
Firm-specific wage agreement -0.0521** 0.0116 -0.0433 ** 0.0092
Collective agreement * Female 
share of involved union 0.0285  0.0178  0.0356 ** 0.0149
Observations 5,374  5,374  
R2 0.1929     0.1533    
Note: The dummy variables for the years, regions and industry are also included in the estimation. The 
results are available on request. The female share of involved union is assigned to the establishment on 
the basis of the industry.  Significance levels: **: 5 percent, *: 10 percent.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997, 1999, 2001. The female share of unions is 
given on the homepage of the DGB: http://www.dgb.de/dgb/mitgliederzahlen/mitglieder.htm. 
 
Table 2.5 presents the results of the clustered regression. Note that the number of 
observations is somewhat smaller due to establishments switching their union status. 
Our regressions cannot prove the hypothesis. Instead, the results show a positive 
relationship between the number of women involved in the union and the wage 
differential within establishments. The coefficient of the interaction term is, however, 
not significant in the regression of Gap1. One explanation for this result may be that 
negotiating about wages is not the most important aim of female union members, but 
that they are more interested in improving the compatibility of family and job by 
means of family-friendly work practices, such as childcare facilities, human resource 
measures easing the integration of mothers after employment breaks, promotion of 
part-time employees or flexible work schedules.  
Chapter 2: Intra-firm gender wage gap 
 
41
Note that the results of the restricted sample also differ in some respect compared to 
our baseline models presented in Table 2.4. For example, the female share has no 
significant impact on Gap1 anymore. This result hints at a positive correlation between 
the female share within establishments and the corresponding union. In contrast, the 
importance of relative establishment size is more evident in the clustered regression 
based on the reduced sample. Apart from that, the results are very similar and hence 
support the conclusion derived above.  
2.6 Conclusions 
This study provides a first comprehensive analysis of the GWG within German 
establishments. Being aware that other firm-specific factors, such as segregation (see 
e.g. Reilly and Wirjanto 1999, Bayard et al. 2003 or Datta Gupta and Rothstein 2005), 
training (see e.g. Wolf and Heinze 2007) or organizational structure (see e.g. Drolet 
2002, Datta Gupta and Eriksson 2006 or Wolf and Heinze 2007) may also frame the 
wage differences between men and women at establishment level, we focus here on the 
impact of industrial relations and the stress of competition. The specific benefit of our 
research is that we exploit the linked information on employer and employees by 
looking at gender pay differentials at establishment level. Since our descriptive figures 
illustrate that the mean cross-section GWG at establishment level is smaller than the 
mean overall GWG by about one to two percent points, our results should be 
interpreted as the impact of firm characteristics and the institutional setting on the 
GWG, taking the selection into establishments – depending on many factors we cannot 
control for with our data – as given. The empirical analysis is based on the German 
LIAB data, a representative linked employer-employee panel including information on 
all employees of establishments covered by the IAB establishment survey.  
To assess the impact of industrial relations and competitive pressure on the GWG, we 
define two measures describing the firm-specific GWG. First, we use the observed 
GWG and second a wage gap, which is adjusted for the differences in human capital 
characteristics between men and women at establishment level. In order to calculate 
the second measure, we estimate separate wage equations – as far as possible – for 
male employees in each establishment.  
Our findings suggest that establishments bargaining their wages within the framework 
of collective agreements have a smaller gender pay gap. Given that most unions are 
still dominated by men, this result is not self-evident. It is, however, not possible to 
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empirically detect any additional effects of unions in which a higher proportion of 
members are female. In contrast, it is noticeable that a high proportion of female union 
members correlates with larger pay differentials. One plausible explanation may be 
that female union members rather focus on improving working conditions and the 
compatibility of work and family than simply negotiating on wages. Our results also 
point to a gender equalizing effect of formalized co-determination. This suggests that 
works councils systematically influence the establishment’s wage structure and 
actively use their right to decide on new pay schemes and the setting of wages above 
agreed tariff and bonus rates. Again, the hypothesis that works councils only realize 
the interests of women if they represent a larger part of the staff is not supported by the 
data. Considering that not only German establishments increasingly loosen from 
institutional restriction on the part of unions and works councils, the trend of 
stagnating GWGs observed in many countries (see e.g. European Commission 2007) 
may be aggravated by the reduced importance of formalized labor relations. 
Finally, we tested the hypothesis that the degree of Becker’s discrimination 
preferences depends upon the market structure and the returns to scale using various 
alternative proxies for the degree of competition. While establishment size (up to 
15,000 employees) tends to decrease discrimination, the relative establishment size, 
which is supposed to correlate with market power, seems to increase the pay 
differences between men and women within establishments. The negative coefficient 
of the export quota also yields support for the hypothesis derived from the 
discrimination model.  
An alternative interpretation of the effect of relative establishment size may be that the 
market dominating establishments may have monopsonistic power. Robinson (1933) 
first introduced the idea of monopsonistic discrimination in the labor market. 
According to this approach, a single employer may set wages below the marginal 
revenue product if there is little or no competition on the factor market. The more 
inelastic the labor supply, the larger the gap will be between the achievable wage rate 
and the marginal revenue product. By differentiating wages between groups with 
variously elastic labor supply curves, the monopsonist may maximize his profit. For 
instance, gender can be one dimension along which the employer may differentiate. 
Given the limited job mobility – for instance due to family responsibilities of women40 
                                                 
40 The reasons for the lower job mobility of women are manifold. First, the availability of family-friendly 
jobs is still limited. In this setting, wages become a less important job criterion compared with flexible 
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- there exists theoretical and also some empirical evidence that female labor supply at 
the establishment level is less elastic than male labor supply (see for instance Barth 
and Dale-Olsen 1999, Ransom and Oaxaca 2005, Hirsch et al. 2006 and Hirsch 2008). 
In the case of monopsonistic power, women will hence have to accept lower wages 
than men relative to their productivity. Unfortunately, we must refrain from an exact 
empirical implementation of this hypothesis because we have no direct information 
capturing the monopsonistic power of the establishment.41 
                                                                                                                                               
work schedules, commuting or career perspectives for part-time employees. Second, since husbands earn 
higher wages in general, local mobility is mostly driven by men.  
41 To test a model of monopsonistic discrimination according to Burdett and Mortensen (1998), one 
would need gender-specific labor turnover rates, strictly speaking the resignation rate of men and women 
and the potential to recruit new male and female employees for each establishment. These indicators may 
be constructed by imposing relatively strong assumptions, though.  
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Chapter 3 
Beyond the mean gender wage gap: 
Decomposition of differences in wage 
distributions using quantile regression 
3.1 Motivation 
The gender wage gap has been extensively studied in the labor economics and 
sociological literature. Even though the pay differential tends to shrink over time, a 
sizeable gender wage gap persists (see for example, the international evidence in Blau 
and Kahn, 1996, 2003 and the OECD 2002). Identifying the different source of wage 
differentials is crucial for explaining and understanding this persistence. In addition, 
policy options are different depending on the underlying reasons for the wage 
differentials.  
Traditionally, the gap has been explained by gender differences in the human capital 
endowment and its reward in the labor market. A widely-used way to explore gender 
wage differentials empirically is to decompose the observed mean gap into a component 
attributable to differences in human capital characteristics (endowment part) and a 
component referring to differences in returns to these characteristics (remuneration 
part). This decomposition into two parts was introduced by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973).  
More recently, gender segregation as a further source of wage differentials has moved 
more and more into the focus of scholarly interest. The empirical finding is that the 
segregation of women into low-paying labor market structures is a major source of 
wage differentials between men and women (e.g. Groshen 1991a, Dolado et al. 2004, 
Bayard et al. 2003). Although the seminal studies in this field emphasize the importance 
of female segregation into low-paying occupations (see for an overview Sorensen 
1990), more recent studies have extended the analysis to firm segregation and conclude 
that this segregation is also an important source of gender wage differentials (e.g. 
Groshen 1991a, Carrington and Troske 1998, Reilly and Wirjanto 1999a, Bayard et al. 
2003). The importance of firm segregation of men and women is related to empirical 
findings which point to the influence of labor demand-side factors in wage 
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determinations. This empirical literature shows that wage differentials can also be the 
result of inter-firm wage differentials (overview in Abowd and Kramarz 1999). Thereby 
the inter-firm wage differentials can be attributed to different reasons, such as 
compensating wage differentials, efficiency wage payments, institutional settings or 
rent-sharing processes (see for a theoretical overview Groshen 1991b). Since men and 
women work in different firms, these inter-firm wage differentials can also have an 
impact on the gender wage gap.  
One purpose of this study is to disentangle the effect of differences in personal 
characteristics and the effect of selection into different firms of women and men on the 
gender wage gap. For this aim, the wage equations include establishment characteristics 
in addition to individual characteristics and the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) 
decomposition is extended. 
Another relevant finding in the recent gender wage gap literature is that the gap is very 
complex and varies across the wage distribution. Albrecht et al. (2003), for instance, 
detect that while the average gender wage gap is indeed relatively small in Sweden, the 
gap increases throughout the wage distribution and rises even more in the upper tail. 
They conclude that the earnings potential of women in the upper part of the wage 
distribution is limited (glass ceiling effect). Hence, assuming a constant wage gap 
throughout the wage distribution is misleading because this could wrongly lead us to 
conclude the gender wage gap to be of minor importance. Furthermore, the traditional 
approach is based on the assumption that the importance of explanatory factors does not 
vary with the wage rate. This assumption is not very realistic. Among others, Albrecht 
et al. (2003) show an increasing impact of education on the wage differential across the 
wage distribution. In fact, there are many good reasons to believe that male and female 
wages are also not equally affected by innovative human resource practices and 
institutional settings across the wage distribution. In particular, firm characteristics 
describing the collective bargaining and co-determination are supposed to be more 
important in the wage determination process of employees with low earnings because 
these workers belong to the main target group of unions. Furthermore, it is conceivable 
that firm’s profits have a stronger impact on the wage rate of highly-paid employees 
because they are more likely to get corresponding bonus payments.  
As an additional contribution, therefore, this study decomposes the gender wage gap 
across the wage distribution and thus combines two important strands of the recent 
empirical literature. On the one hand differences in the workplaces of male and female 
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employees are taken into account and on the other hand the analysis is extended to the 
entire wage distribution. More precisely, I include a detailed set of firm characteristics 
in addition to individual characteristics as wage determinants. Then in order to 
decompose the observed wage gap, I apply an extension of the traditional OB 
decomposition to disentangle the effect of personnel characteristics (including human 
capital and occupations) and the effect of firm characteristics in explaining the gender 
wage gap. The extended decomposition results in four terms: one attributable to 
differences in individual characteristics, one referring to differences in returns to 
individual characteristics, another that captures differences in firm-specific 
characteristics and finally one resulting from differences in returns to these 
characteristics. In order to accommodate differences across the wage distribution, the 
four decompositions terms are implemented at each percentile of the wage distribution. 
To this end a flexible parametric method introduced by Machado and Mata (2005) is 
applied.  
The empirical analysis is based on a large German linked employer-employee data set. 
The comparison of the wage information for male and female employees in the sample 
shows that the raw gender wage gap is sharply decreasing within the first quartile, the 
decrease then decelerates up to the 60th percentile, and after that the gap is slightly 
increasing again.  
The decomposition shows that the selection of women into less successful and 
productive firms explains a sizeable part of the gap. This selection is more pronounced 
in the lower part of the wage distribution than in the upper part. In addition, women 
benefit from the success of firms to a lesser extent than their male colleagues. This is 
the source of the largest part of the pay gap. Gender differences in individual 
characteristics as well as differences in returns to these characteristics play a smaller 
role in explaining the wage differential.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly discusses the 
literature on decomposing gender wage gaps throughout the wage distribution. The 
econometric methodology is presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes the data 
source and the specification of the wage equations. Section 3.5 presents and discusses 
the results. Finally Section 3.6 gives some concluding remarks.  
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3.2 Decomposing the gender wage gap: Some background 
A decomposition analysis is a standard approach to explore the wage differential 
between male and female employees. It is often used to examine the sources of the gap 
and to answer the question, how much of the gap is attributable to discrimination. In this 
approach the mean wage differential is decomposed into one part capturing differences 
in characteristics and another part referring to different returns using the estimates of 
male and female wage equations (Oaxaca 1973 and Blinder 1973). The latter part is 
called the unexplained part of the wage differential or the remuneration effect. This 
fraction of the gap is often used as a measure of wage discrimination.42  
However, one drawback of this standard approach by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973) is the focus on the average gender wage differential. Thus, potentially 
important variations of the wage differences across the wage distribution are not taken 
into account. Hence, the attention in empirical gender studies has shifted towards 
investigating the degree to which the gender wage gap varies across the wage 
distribution. For instance, Fortin and Lemieux (1998) decompose changes in the US 
gender wage gap at various wage percentiles. They apply rank regressions to estimate 
the probability of an individual being in a certain wage segment given this individual’s 
characteristics. Bonjour and Gerfin (2001) apply a methodology proposed by Donald 
et al. (2000) to decompose the gender wage gap across the earnings distributions in 
Switzerland. The basic idea of the applied method is to recover estimates of the density 
and distribution functions from the estimated parameters of a hazard function. 
Most recently, studies use quantile regressions in order to decompose the gender wage 
gap at different points of the wage distribution. García et al. (2001) propose to use 
quantile regressions in order to compare quantiles of the male and the female wage 
distribution conditional on the same set of characteristics as an approximation of the 
unexplained part of the gap. However, their decomposition of the Spanish gender wage 
gap evaluates the vector of characteristics of men and women at only one point, the 
unconditional mean, regardless of which quantile is considered. Gardeazabel and 
Ugidos (2005) consider it more suited to weight the difference in returns to a certain 
                                                 
42 However, Altonji and Blank (1999) argue in their survey article “Race and Gender in the Labor 
Market” that this is a misleading terminology, because if any control variables are omitted that are 
correlated with the included characteristics, then the coefficients will be affected. The unexplained part 
therefore captures both the effects of discrimination and unobserved gender differences in productivity 
and tastes. Furthermore, discriminatory barriers in the labor market can also affect the characteristics 
(such as education) of individuals.  
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characteristic (for example primary education) at a given quantile according to the 
proportion of individuals with this characteristic at that quantile. Based on this 
methodological approach, their findings for the Spanish wage gap contradict the results 
of García et al. (2001). While in the analysis of García et al. (2001) the part of the 
gender wage gap due to different returns to characteristics increases throughout the 
wage distribution, Gardeazabel and Ugidos (2005) find the opposite to be the case.  
Considering only the mean of the regressors like García et al. (2001) neglects some 
important factors explaining the difference between the two distributions. Assume, for 
instance, that the sample means of the characteritics are the same for males and 
females, but the variance is much higher for males. In this setting, the distribution of 
the dependent variable will also have a higher variance for males. This feature can not 
be analyzed with the method suggested by García et al. (2001) or the one used by 
Gardeazabel and Ugidos (2005). Machado and Mata (2005) (MM) hence propose an 
alternative decomposition procedure which combines a quantile regression and a 
bootstrap approach in order to estimate counterfactual density functions. Albrecht et al. 
(2003) applied this method for the first time to decompose the gender wage gap in 
Sweden. They show that the gender wage gap in Sweden increases throughout the 
wage distribution and rises in the upper tail. The authors interpret this as a strong glass 
ceiling effect. The wage gap also increases throughout the wage distribution after 
controlling for gender differences in individual characteristics. Using the same 
estimation strategy, De la Rica et al. (2005) show that the gender wage gap in Spain is 
much flatter than in Sweden. However, if the sample is split according to education, 
the authors also find a glass ceiling effect for the group of high skilled employees, 
while the gender wage gap decreases throughout the wage distribution for workers 
with low education. Albrecht et al. (2004) investigate the gender wage gap in the 
Netherlands using the MM decomposition method and take into account a selection of 
women into full time employment. Thus, the authors’ purpose is to make statements 
for all employed women regardless of their hours of work. Also applying the MM 
decomposition method, Arulampalam et al. (2007) explore the wage differential for 
eleven European countries. Their results show a u-shaped raw wage gap for the private 
sector in Germany. However, in the public sector the gender wage gap is smaller and 
wider at the left hand side. While the unexplained part of wage differential is nearly 
constant across the wage distribution in the private sector, this part decrease 
throughout the distribution in the public sector. Beblo et al. (2003) also take into 
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account the whole distribution in their analysis of the gender wage gap in Germany by 
using the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce (Juhn et al. 1993) decomposition. They pool employees 
of the public and private sector and find a u-shaped raw wage gap. Furthermore their 
results show that the part explained by differences in individual characteristics 
increases throughout the distribution. The part attributable to difference in returns to 
these characteristics has the reverse pattern. The results of Hübler (2005) differ from 
Beblo et al. (2003). He considers the gender wage differential over a time period from 
1984 to 2002. In his study the raw wage gap decreases with increasing quantiles of the 
wage distribution. Based on a combination of linear local matching and quantile 
regressions he shows that the unexplained wage differences between males and 
females are larger in the higher percentiles of the wage distribution. Furthermore, the 
difference in the unexplained wage gap between the 10th and 90th percentile narrows 
over time. Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005) like Hübler (2005) find that the German 
gender wage gap is highest in the lower part and lowest in the upper part of the 
distribution. Their study highlights that occupational segregation and lower 
occupational mobility among females may explain the gender wage gap, a result that 
differs across the wage distribution. Using the MM decomposition method they show 
that in the lower part of wage distribution, females benefit less from occupational 
mobility than males. In the upper tail the gains are similar for both sexes.  
My study differs from existing studies in three respects. First, I include a set of detailed 
establishment characteristics in addition to individual characteristics as explanatory 
variables. Second, I extend the traditional OB decomposition to disentangle the effect 
of individual characteristics and the effect of establishment characteristics in 
explaining the mean gender wage gap. Finally, I implement the decomposition across 
the entire wage distribution with the MM method. Based on this most flexible 
parametric decomposition, I provide new insights into the nature and the sources of 
gender wage inequality in Germany. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Wage regression  
OLS and most other estimation approaches are used to investigate mean effects. In this 
framework the effect of covariates operates only as a shift factor. Koenker and Bassett 
(1978) introduced a more flexible approach, the quantile regression model. This model 
allows for studying marginal effects of covariates on the dependent variable at various 
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points in the distribution, not just at the mean. There is a comprehensive literature 
concerning the application of quantile regressions, see Fitzenberger et al. (2001) and 
Koenker and Hallock (2001) for surveys.  
Let iw  denote the log wage of worker i. iX  is a vector of covariates representing his 
individual characteristics, whereas iZ  represents establishment characteristics. The 
statistical model specifies the θth quantile of the conditional distribution of iw  given 
iX and iZ  as a linear function of the covariates,  
 ( ) ( ), ,     0,1i i i i iQ w X Z X Zθ θ θβ δ θ= + ∈ .               (3.1) 
As shown by Koenker and Bassett (1978), the quantile regression coefficients θβ  and 
θδ  are estimated as the solution to the following minimization problem:43 
     ( )
, : :
ˆ
arg min 1 .
ˆ
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i w X Z i w X Z
w X Z w X Zθ
β δ β δ β δθ
β θ β δ θ β δδ ≥ + < +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑  (3.2) 
The estimated quantile regression coefficients, θˆβ  and θˆδ , are interpreted as the 
estimated returns to individual and establishment characteristics at the θth quantile of 
the log wage distribution.  
Since wages observed in the data are censored from above at the social security 
taxation threshold sc , one observes only { }min ,i iw w c=% . Powell (1984, 1986) 
developed censored quantile regressions as a robust extension to the censored 
regression problem. There are different algorithms to solve this non-convex 
optimization problem in the literature (see e.g. Buchinsky 1994, Koenker and Park 
1996 or Fitzenberger 1997a, 1997b). However, as the access to the data44 is limited and 
the sample size is large it is not possible to implement censored quantile regressions. 
As an alternative, I apply quantile regressions after imputing estimated uncensored 
wages (see Gartner 2005). As described in the next section, right-censored 
observations are replaced by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal 
distribution. The predicted wages from a Tobit wage regression are used to construct 
the moments of this truncated normal distribution. The lower truncation point of the 
                                                 
43 Consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimators can be proved if the minimization problem 
(3.2) is transferred into a GMM framework (see e.g. Buchinsky 1998). The asymptotic covariance 
matrix of the estimator can also be derived from this model framework.  
44 The data are only available at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency 
(BA) in Nuremberg. The FDZ offers the possibility to work with the data on site and to send programs to 
a remote data access. However, the computation time is limited. 
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truncated normal distribution is given by the contribution limit of the social security 
system. In the Tobit regression model, the same exogenous variables are used as in the 
quantile regression model.  
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for the quantile regression estimates can 
be obtained by means of the design matrix bootstraps (see e.g. Kohn 2006). Again, 
because of the limited access to the data, I cannot estimate standard errors. 
Nevertheless the decomposition method applied in this study, still yields valuable 
insights.  
 
3.3.2 Decomposition 
The quantile regression analysis provides detailed insights into the remuneration of 
observed worker and establishment characteristics for men and women across the 
whole wage distribution. A decomposition analysis can complement the regression 
evidence by showing whether differences in observed distributions follow from 
differences in estimated coefficients or from differences in the composition of the 
workforce. In an OB decomposition, the gender wage gap is evaluated at the average 
characteristics of male (m) and female (f) employees:45 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆm f m f m f m fw w X X Xβ β β− = − + − ,       (3.3) 
where gw  is the mean of the log wage for ,g m f= , gX  the vector of average 
characteristics of male and female employees and ˆ gβ  the estimated vector of returns 
to characteristics. The first term on the right hand side of equation (3.3) represents the 
part of the wage gap due to different characteristics of males and females, whereas the 
second term is the part attributable to differences in the returns to these characteristics. 
In order to distinguish between individual characteristics ( )X  and establishment 
characteristics ( )Z  I extend the OB decomposition in the following way: 
         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .m f m f m f m f m f m f m f
i iiiii iv
w w X X X Z Z Zβ β β δ δ δ− = − + − + − + −1442443 14424431442443 1442443   (3.4) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (3.4) captures the part of the wage 
differential that is attributable to differences in individual characteristics (i). The third 
term shows the component of the wage gap due to differences in the establishment 
                                                 
45 The mean gender wage gap in equation (3.3) is decomposed by adding and simultaneous subtracting a 
counterfactual wage ˆc f mw X β=  from the difference between the average male and average female wage. 
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characteristics (iii). The second and the forth term represent the components 
attributable to differences in the returns to individual characteristics (ii) and to 
establishment characteristics (iv), respectively. In order to decompose the gender wage 
gap as in equation (3.4), I use as counterfactual wage46   
ˆ ˆc f m f mw X Zβ δ= +           (3.5) 
that reflects what the log wage would have been had females receive the same returns 
to characteristics as their male counterparts. The approach assumes that male returns 
are the relevant benchmark for the distribution in the absence of any 
“discrimination”.47  
The approach in equation (3.4) considers only differences in the average earnings. As 
stated above, the average wage gap is not representative of the gap at different 
quantiles of the wage distribution. Garcia et al. (2001) combine the OB decomposition 
technique with quantile regressions to determine the decomposition terms at various 
points of the wage distribution. They consider the mean of the covariates and quantile 
regression estimates. Thus differences in higher moments of the distribution of the 
independent variables are not controlled for. The method proposed by Machado and 
Mata (2005) can account for such differences. It combines a quantile regression model 
with a bootstrap approach to simulate counterfactual wage densities.48  
In order to save computation time, I apply a simplification of the MM techniques as 
suggested in Albrecht et al. (2003).  Formally, the estimation procedure involves four 
steps: 
1. Estimate quantile regression coefficients at each single percentile for male and 
female employees:  
ˆ ˆ
,  ;   0.01...0.99.
ˆ ˆ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
m f
m f
θ θ
θ θ
β β θδ δ  This results in 99 
coefficient vectors for males and 99 coefficient vectors for females. 
                                                 
46 It is well known that the partition depends on the ordering of the effects and that the decomposition 
results may not be invariant with respect to the choice of the involved counterfactual. See the surveys of 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Silber and Weber (1999). Therefore, the choice of a counterfactual 
should be guided by the questions of economic interest.  
47 Most other studies to the gender wage gap use male returns as benchmark and thus comparisons are 
possible.  
48  The MM method relies on the following ideas. First, the conditional quantiles of w  given by equation 
(3.1) can be estimated by quantile regressions. Second, the probability integral transformation theorem is 
used: If U is uniformly distributed on [ ]0,1 , then ( )1F U−  has distribution F . Thus, for given [ ]:i iX Z  
and a random [ ]0,1Uθ   , i iX Zθ θβ δ+  has the same distribution as ,i i iw X Z . If [ ]:X Z  are randomly 
drawn from the population, instead of keeping [ ]:i iX Z  fixed, X Zθ θβ δ+  has the same distribution as 
w  (see also Melly 2005). 
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2. Randomly draw samples of size M=10000 with replacement from the set of 
covariates [ ]:X Z  for each estimated coefficient vector:  
{ } { } { }
1 1 1
: ;  : ;  :
M M Mm m f f f m
i i i i i ii i i
X Z X Z X Z= = =
% % % % % % . 
3. Calculate { }
1
ˆ ˆ Mm m m m m
i i i i
w X Zθ θβ δ == +% %%  and { } 1ˆ ˆ Mf f f f fi i i iw X Zθ θβ δ == +% %%  for each 
estimated coefficient vector. These two data sets are random samples of 
99M × observations from the marginal wage distributions of w  which is 
consistent with the linear model in equation  (3.1). 
4. Generate the following random samples of the counterfactual distributions with 
the estimated coefficients of each percentile: 
{ } { } { }1 2 3
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ,   and 
M M Mf m m m f f m m f f f m
i i i i i i i i ii i i
w X Z w X Z w X Zθ θ θ θ θ θβ δ β δ β δ= = == + = + = +% % % % % %% % %  
1w%  is the hypothetical log wage for female employees if they had the 
establishment characteristics of male employees and had been paid as male 
employees. 2w%  is the hypothetical log wage for female employees if they had 
the establishment characteristics of male employees and only those 
characteristics had the same returns as for male employees. Finally, 3w%  denotes 
the hypothetical log wage for female employees as it their establishment 
characteristics had been rewarded as they are for men. 
The empirical implementation of this procedure is, however, not straightforward. In 
the second step of the estimation procedure above, I have to draw a random sample 
that contains random draws of women’s individual characteristics and men’s 
establishment characteristics. If the characteristics were independent it would be 
possible to assign the randomly drawn female to any drawn male employee. However, 
it is not very realistic to assume independence between individual and establishment 
covariates. In contrast, a self selection of individuals into certain firms is much more 
likely. Alternatively, employers demand employees with certain skills. In order to 
incorporate the correlation between individual and establishment covariates, I decide 
for the following assignment strategy guided by the economic meaning behind the 
counterfactual wage distributions in step 4:  First I construct a random sample of M 
female employees. After this I implement a matching on the Mahalanobis distance in 
order to assign each woman to a similar male worker with respect to individual 
characteristics. From the matched pairs I consider the individual characteristics from 
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the female employees and the establishment characteristics from the matched male 
employees.  
Based on the estimation results generated by the procedure described above, I can 
decompose the gender wage gap into the contribution of the individual characteristics 
and the establishment characteristics as well as the contribution of the returns to 
individual characteristics and establishment characteristics. In order to simplify the 
comparison to the OB decomposition, I decompose the quantiles of the wage 
distribution as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2
( ) ( )
2 3 3
( ) ( )
                             .
m f m
i ii
f
iii iv
Q w Q w Q w Q w Q w Q w
Q w Q w Q w Q w R
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− = − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
% % % %
144424443 144424443
% % % %
144424443 144424443
   (3.6) 
In analogy to equation (3.4) there are four terms and an additional residual term. The 
first term (i) represents the contribution of individual characteristics and the second 
term (ii) denotes the contribution of the corresponding coefficients to the difference 
between the thθ  quantile of the male wage distribution and the thθ  quantile of the 
female wage distribution. The third term (iii) refers to the contribution of the 
establishment characteristics and the fourth term (iv) is the contribution of the 
corresponding coefficients to the difference between thθ  quantile of the male wage 
distribution and thθ quantile of the female wage distribution. The last term is a residual 
term in equation (3.6). It includes sampling errors which disappear with more 
observations, simulation errors which disappear with more simulations and 
specification errors by estimating a linear quantile regression. Assuming that my 
specification is correct, the residual term asymptotically tends to zero and equation 
(3.6) describes the true decomposition of the gender wage gap in quantiles.  
Note that the first and third terms do not have exactly the same meaning as in the case 
of an OB decomposition due to the previously described assignment strategy. As an 
example, the counterfactual log wage 1w%  for women is only based on the establishment 
characteristics of men with comparable individual characteristics. Thus, if there is no 
overlap between certain parts of the male and the female sample with respect to 
individual characteristics, the establishment characteristics of the corresponding male 
sub-sample is not used for the counterfactual female wage distribution 1w% . As a 
consequence, the contribution of establishment characteristics to the decomposition 
part (i) is not necessarily cancelled out, but leaves some unknown residual. Similarly, 
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decomposition part (iii) does not necessarily hold because the counterfactual 
establishment characteristics for women only refer to men who are comparable with 
regard to their individual characteristics. In other words, decomposition parts (i) and 
(iii) do not show the pure contribution of differences in individual characteristics and 
differences in establishment characteristics of male and female employees, but only 
hold in approximation. However, if male and female employees are not systematically 
different, i.e. there is a common support along the whole range of individual 
characteristics, than this residual effect is zero and term (i) and (iii) hold exactly.49 
3.4 Data and specification  
3.4.1 General construction of the data 
The empirical analysis is based on the IAB Linked Employer-Employee panel (LIAB) 
which combines data from the IAB Establishment Panel and the Employment Statistics 
Register. 
The first data set, the IAB Establishment Panel, is an annual survey of German 
establishments administered since 1993.50 The database is a representative sample of 
German establishments employing at least one employee who pays social security 
contributions. During the time of analysis around 84 percent of all employed persons 
in Germany are covered by the social security system. The survey was administered 
through personal interviews and provides general information on the establishment, 
such as investments, revenues, size, composition of the workforce, salaries and wages. 
The second data set, the so-called Employment Statistics Register, is an administrative 
register data set of all employees in Germany paying social security contributions.51 In 
order to comply with legal requirements, employers have to provide information to the 
social security agencies for all employees who pay social security contributions. Due 
to its administrative nature, this database provides reliable information on the daily 
earnings that are subject to social security contributions. Furthermore, the data include 
information on age, gender, occupation, employment status and education. The date of 
entry into the establishment and the ending date of the employer’s notification are also 
                                                 
49 For my analysis, these residuals turn out to be small when using a random assignment of female 
individual covariates and male firm characteristics.   
50 Eastern German establishments are surveyed since 1996. Detailed information on the IAB 
Establishment Panel is given by Kölling (2000).  
51 Information on the Employment Statistics Register is given by Bender et al. (2000). 
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available in the individual data and are used to calculate job tenure. Note, however, 
that this tenure variable cannot be corrected for employment breaks as this information 
is not available. Hence this variable is only a proxy for tenure.  
The sample for the subsequent analysis of the linked employer-employee data is 
constructed in two steps: First, I select establishments from the establishment panel 
data set for the year 2002.52 I exclude firms from eastern Germany and non-profit 
firms because both the wage level as well as the wage setting process is still different 
in those firms and would require a separate analysis. Furthermore, I only consider 
firms with at least 10 employees.  
In the second step, the establishment data are merged with the notifications for all 
employees employed by the selected establishments in 2002. From the worker data, I 
eliminate foreigners, apprentices, part-time workers and home workers in order to 
ensure that the dependent and the independent variables are comparable for my 
sample. I restrict the analysis to employees who are between 25 and 55 years old to 
avoid inference with ongoing education and early retirement. Since I consider only 
full-time workers, I also drop those whose wage is less than twice the lower social 
security contribution limit or have more than one employment. I am aware that by 
dropping part-time workers I exclude a lot of women from the analysis. However, the 
data set includes only information on the daily wage rate and no information of 
working hours. Thus, it is not possible to calculate wage rates per hour. Controlling for 
the working status by a dummy variable would also lead to improper results because 
part-time working can comprise a range of three to six hours. For this reason, I decide 
to limit my analysis to full-time workers. The final sample contains 384,908 male and 
98,368 female employees in 3,994 establishments.  
The dependent variable in the subsequent analysis is the log real gross daily wage. The 
wage also contains all fringe benefits that are subject to social security contributions. 
The reported wage rates are top-coded at the upper contribution limit to the social 
security system. In the sample, top-coding affects 18.1 percent of all observations. 
Male employees are more affected by top-coding than female employees.53 While in 
the subsample of male employees the wage is censored above the 81st quantile of the 
                                                 
52 From the available waves 1993 to 2003, I use one wave, the year 2002, since the estimation procedure 
does not allow for more observations.  
53 Top-coding affects 20.6 percent of all men and 8.5 percent of all women. 
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male wage distribution, the censoring of the female wage distribution appears above 
the 93rd quantile.  
To address this problem, a Tobit regression is estimated by gender with log daily wage 
as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the same individual and 
establishment covariates as in the decomposition analysis later on. Then, as described 
in Gartner (2005), right-censored observations are replaced by wages randomly drawn 
from a truncated normal distribution. Predicted values from Tobit wage regressions are 
used to construct the moments of the truncated normal distribution. The lower 
truncation point of the distribution is the contribution limit to the social security 
system. 
 
3.4.2 Individual and establishment covariates 
In order to estimate log wage equations, I use a set of individual characteristics and a 
set of establishment characteristics. Thus both labor supply and labor demand aspects 
of the wage setting process are taken into account.  
The set of individual characteristics should capture the productivity of individuals. 
These variables include six formal skill dummies, age, age squared, job tenure and six 
dummies for occupational categories.54 Table B1 (in the appendix) presents summary 
statistics of the individual characteristics used in the subsequent analysis. The 
summary statistic shows that, on average, male employees are older and have longer 
job tenures than female employees. Most male and female employees have a 
vocational training degree, yet the share of men is higher than the share of women. 
Furthermore, many females do not have any vocational training and the share of 
women without a degree is higher than the proportion of men. The summary statistic 
also indicates that most male employees in the sample are blue collar workers, while 
most female employees work in administrative occupations.   
While there are numerous theoretical and empirical studies discussing the effect of 
human capital variables (see e.g. Mincer 1974, Card 1999), there is no “universally 
accepted” set of establishment variables that should be included when investigating 
determinants of wages. However, as there is widespread empirical evidence that 
different establishments may pay different wages to employees of equal ability (see 
                                                 
54 Unfortunately, I cannot control for employment interruptions and the actual labor market experience. 
This could lead to a bias in the estimation, especially for female employees. However, the data set does 
not include such information.  
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e.g. Groshen 1991b, Abowd and Kramarz 1999, Cardoso 2000)55, I attempt to account 
for these differences by including establishment characteristics. Motivated by studies 
which investigate single aspects of establishment wage differentials (for instance 
employer size or bargaining regime wage differentials), I gather various establishment 
characteristics as wage determinants. First, I include variables describing the 
workforce within establishments. These are the number of employees and its square as 
well as the gender and qualification composition. The positive impact of the 
establishment size has been widely discussed in the literature (see for an overview Oi 
and Idson 1999) which considers the size typically as a proxy for various unobserved 
determinants such as job satisfaction, monitoring costs, more complex technologies 
and worker participation in monopoly profits.56 Other studies (see e.g. Carrington and 
Troske 1998, Reilly and Wirjianto 1999a, Datta Gupta and Rothstein 2005) stress the 
negative relationship between the female proportion within establishments and 
wages.57 The effect of the qualification level of the workforce can be explained by 
sorting theories. According to these, the quality of a worker has an impact on the 
productivity of his or her co-workers (see, for example, the model of Kremer 1993).   
In addition, I take into account establishment characteristics capturing the current 
profit-situation and the long run profitability. The theory of rent sharing in the labor 
market predicts that firms generating rents on the product market may share them with 
their workforce (e.g. Abowd and Lemieux 1993, Blanchflowers et al. 1996). The 
extent of rent sharing depends on the relative bargaining power of employers and 
employees. The theory therefore predicts that employees in more profitable firms may 
earn higher wages than workers in less successful firms. Therefore, I include sales per 
employee and two dummy variables indicating whether the revenues of the 
establishment increased or decreased during the last year. Furthermore, the share of 
exports in total sales is used as a wage determinant. This variable reflects the extent of 
product market competition under which firms operate. In the literature, there is the 
hypothesis that exporting renders firms more productive and leads to higher wages (see 
e.g. Bernard and Wagner 1997, Bernard and Jensen 1999). The reason is that exporting 
firms are forced to improve faster than firms only operating on the national market due 
                                                 
55 There is also earlier research on wage differentials that highlighted the relevance of wage policies at the 
firm level (see the overview by Kerr 1994).  
56 Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) find that when using all possible controls, wages increase with firm 
size. They conclude that there have to exist other reasons why large firms are able to pay higher wages 
and nevertheless survive. A possible explanation might be non-production economics of scale. 
57 In the next chapter I investigate the relationship for Germany.  
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to higher stress of competition. However, the recent theoretical literature (e.g. Melitz 
2003) argues that the positive relationship between productivity and exporting is due to 
a self-selection of more productive firms into foreign markets. The empirical findings 
of Schank et al. (2008) support this latter argument for Germany. Overall, one would 
expect a positive relationship between wages and the share of exports in total sales. In 
order to further control for firm productivity, estimations include a discrete choice 
variable indicating the state-of-the-art of the production technology used in the 
establishment. 
Furthermore, labor market institutions are taken into account. In Germany the most 
important institution is collective wage bargaining. A large theoretical and empirical 
literature shows that collective bargaining raises wages and reduces wage inequality 
(e.g. Blau and Kahn 1996, Card et al. 2003b, Fitzenberger and Kohn 2005, Gürtzgen 
2006). Some studies also examine the effect of collective bargaining on the entire 
wage distribution (e.g. Fitzenberger and Kohn 2005, Burda et al. 2008, Fitzenberger et 
al. 2008). In the analysis, I consider collective bargaining by including dummy 
variables indicating whether the establishment is covered by an industry-wide or firm-
specific wage agreement.58 In addition to collective wage contracts, works councils 
have an impact on wage distributions within establishments (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003). 
Although works councils’ co-determination rights do not formally include negotiating 
over wages, they may negotiate about placing workers in higher wage groups. Among 
other things they can also co-decide on the introduction of new payment schene, 
overtime work and working conditions. Freeman and Lazear (1995) point out that co-
determination confirms the bargaining power of employees. Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) 
argue that on the one hand works councils strengthen trust and cooperation between 
the management and the workforce. Thus, the works councils can support the 
management in implementing new productivity-enhancing work practices. On the 
other hand, works councils can also prevent the implementation of work practices 
which are not desired by the workforce. Thus, co-determination may considerably 
weaken the management’s bargaining position. Overall, one can conclude that the 
                                                 
58 In Germany, industry-specific unions and employers’ associations negotiate industry-wide agreements. 
Then the agreement is applied to all member firms of the employers’ association who signed the contract. 
A firm can also directly negotiate with a labor union if the firm is not member of an employers’ 
association. Empirical studies (e.g. Stephan and Gerlach 2005, Gürtzgen 2006, Fitzenberger et al. 2008) 
provide evidence of a positive and significant wage premium of industry-wide and firm-specific wage 
agreements for western Germany.  
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presence of works councils may have an impact on both the creation and redistribution 
of economic rents. Thus, I also control for the presence of a works council. 
Further establishment controls in the wage equation are the wage bill per employee, 
the number of the average agreed working hours, a dummy variable indicating whether 
the establishment has been found after 1989 and 10 industry dummies. 
The descriptive statistics of the establishment characteristics are given in Table B2. 
The summary statistics indicate that male employees, on average, work in larger, more 
export-orientated firms than female employees. Further men are rather employed in 
establishments applying wage agreements and with higher sales per employee than 
women. There are only small differences between an average man’s and an average 
woman’s workplace regarding the state of the technology, the presence of a works 
council in the establishment and profits of the last year.  
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Distribution of the gender wage gap 
Before I present and discuss my estimation and decomposition results I address the 
actual raw gender wage gap. Thus, all following statements refer to wage rates after the 
imputation (as described in Section 3.4.1). The usual procedure to measure the male-
female wage gap is to consider the differences between the average male wage and its 
female counterpart. In my sample, the average male daily wage is 105.47 Euro, whereas 
the average daily wage for women is 83.40 Euro. Therefore, the male-female average 
wage differential is 22.07 Euro. When I undertake the same calculation but consider log 
daily wages, the male-female average wage gap turns out to be 0.2347 log points. Thus, 
in my sample women earn, on average, about 23.5 percent less than men.   
Figure 3.1 shows nonparametric estimates of the density functions of male and female 
(log) daily wages.59 The male wage density is placed rightward with respect to the 
female wage distribution, indicating a non negligible raw gender wage gap.  
                                                 
59 Densities are estimated using an adaptive Epanechnikov kernel. The peak (in particular in the function 
for male employees) reflects a cluster of wages below the threshold above which wages are top-coded.  
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Figure 3.1: Density functions of male and female (log) daily wages  
Note: Kernel density wage estimation of man and women use Epanechnikov kernel function. The daily 
log wage rate after imputation is used.     
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Gender wage gap at quantiles 
Note: The gender wage gap is the difference between the log wage rate of male and female employees at 
the quantiles of the wage distribution.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001. 
 
Figure 3.2 plots the raw gender wage gap as a function at quantiles of the wage 
distributions.60 The gap is distributed unequally across the wage distribution. The wage 
                                                 
60 I present the gap only up to the 80th percentile, because the latter percentiles are too unreliable 
implicated by the imputation.  
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gap lies above its mean at low wages, drops below the mean around the 30th percentile 
and keeps on falling up to the 60th percentile.  
In contrast to other countries like Sweden (Albrecht et al. 2003), Spain (Gardeazabal 
and Ugidos 2005), Finnland or Denmark (see Arulampalam et al. 2007), the wage gap 
across the wage distribution has no increasing trend in Germany. Based on other 
sample definitions and data sets, Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005) and Hübler (2005) 
also find that the German gender wage gap is large in the lower part of the wage 
distribution and decreases as the quantiles increase. This falling tendency is not 
completely confirmed by Arulampalam et al. (2007). They reveal a u-shaped form of 
the wage gap. Figure 3.2 resembles the falling tendency of the wage gap with 
increasing quantiles. Whether it is increasing again in the upper tail of the wage 
distributions cannot be examined due to top-coding of wages. Still, the gender wage 
gap is far from being stable across the wage distribution.  
 
3.5.2 Regression results 
The first step in the empirical analysis of the gender wage differential is to estimate the 
log wage equations for male and female employees. As discussed in Section 3.4.2, in 
addition to individual characteristics, establishment characteristics serve as covariates.  
As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, for the gap decomposition across the wage distribution, 
it is necessary to estimate the wage by quantile regressions at each percentile of the 
wage distribution. In sum, this decomposition requires to run 99 quantile regressions 
for male and 99 quantile regressions for female employees. For comparison, I also 
present the decomposition of the average pay gap, for example OB decomposition. For 
this, I estimate separate wage equations by OLS for men and women.  
Table B3 and Table B4 in the appendix show the OLS coefficients with their standard 
errors and the coefficient estimated by quantile regressions for a subset of quantiles of 
the distributions61. All estimated effects in the OLS regressions are significantly 
different from zero. The variables describing the human capital have the expected 
effects for both male and female employees: wages increase with the education level, 
age indicating potential experience and job tenure. The findings also show that, on 
average, unqualified and qualified blue collar workers as well as individuals in service 
occupations earn much less than employees in an administrative occupation. That 
                                                 
61 The results for the other percentiles are available upon request from the author. 
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holds for male and female employees. The estimated quantile regression coefficients 
for the individual characteristics show the same pattern as in the OLS regressions, but 
vary across the wage distribution. The effect of tertiary education levels, such as a 
university or a technical university degree, decreases with increasing quantiles of the 
wage distribution for male employees, while the impact of this covariate increases with 
increasing quantiles for women. The same holds for the variable age. Without having 
standard errors, these findings should only be interpreted as some indication.  
Turning to the establishment variables, I find that wage rates increase with the number 
of employees and with the share of highly qualified employees for both men and 
women. The OLS regressions indicate that the share of female employees affects the 
wage rate of women and men negatively. This negative impact might reflect a sorting 
of women into firms with a preferred work environment for which lower compensating 
wages are paid. This hypothesis as well as alternative explanations are intensely 
investigated in the next chapter. The quantile regression results show that the impact of 
variables describing the workforce decreases with increasing quantiles of the wage 
distribution for male and female employees. 
The OLS findings further indicate that establishments with higher sales per employee, 
good results in the last year and a state-of-the-art production technology tend to pay 
higher wage rates both for male and female employees. Apparently, the workforce 
benefits from the success of the establishement in terms of higher wage rates. The 
export quota has a positive impact on the wage rate in the OLS regression. This 
indicates that exporting establishments are more productive and able to pay higher 
wages rates than establishments operating only on the national market. Whether this 
result is due to self-selection of more productive establishments in entering the foreign 
market or due to an increase of the productivity driven by international competition 
can not be concluded from this kind of analysis (see Schank et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, the OLS findings indicate that establishments covered by an industry-
wide or firm-specific wage agreement tend to pay higher wage rates than 
establishments which do not apply such wage agreements. Note that the impact of 
these institutional variables decreases with increasing quantiles of the wage 
distribution for both male and female employees. This finding can be explained by the 
compression of the wage distributions due to collective bargaining and is in line with 
Burda et al. (2008). Furthermore, the OLS results reveal a strong positive effect of 
works councils on the wage rate. Note, that the estimated coefficient for this covariate 
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is much higher for women than for men. As the quantile regression estimates show, the 
impact also increases with increasing quantiles of the wage distribution. The findings 
regarding the impact of works councils on wages and the wage distribution are in line 
with Addison et al. (2006) who study this issue for Germany.  
 
3.5.3 Decomposition results 
As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, the estimated quantile regression coefficients and 
randomly drawn samples of male and female covariates are used to simulate 
counterfactual wage distributions. The decomposition of the gender wage gap across 
the wage distributions is implemented, as shown in equation (3.6). Table 3.1 presents 
the gender wage gap and the four decomposition parts at eight deciles. Unfortunately, 
due to computational constraints at the research data center, I cannot provide standard 
errors.   
 
Table 3. 1: MM decomposition at selected quantiles and OB decomposition  
Wage differential due to difference in … Quantiles Gender 
wage gap individual 
characteristics 
returns to 
individual 
characteristics 
establishment 
characteristics 
returns to 
establishment 
characteristics 
0.1 0.3256 0.0207 0.0066 0.0493 0.2255 
0.2 0.2405 0.0089 -0.0095 0.0391 0.2153 
0.3 0.2218 -0.0024 -0.0126 0.0350 0.2107 
0.4 0.2122 -0.0131 -0.0077 0.0326 0.2044 
0.5 0.2054 -0.0250 0.0027 0.0281 0.1996 
0.6 0.2035 -0.0330 0.0139 0.0236 0.1955 
0.7 0.2098 -0.0297 0.0257 0.0197 0.1875 
0.8 0.2159 -0.0114 0.0410 0.0168 0.1643 
OB 0.2347 -0.0224 0.0470 0.0509 0.1592 
Note: The results are based on the log of the imputed daily wage. The gender wage gaps are calculated as 
the difference between log male wages and log female wages.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
 
For comparison, the last row in Table 3.1 includes the mean gender wage gap and four 
decomposition parts based on an OB decomposition (see equation (3.4)). As mentioned 
before, the mean gender wage gap is 23.5 percent. The largest proportion of the 
observed raw wage gap is explained by differences in returns to establishment 
characteristics. Thus, if male and female employees were comparable regarding their 
individual and establishment characteristics and they had the same returns to their 
individual characteristics, then nevertheless women would earn 16 percent less on 
average than men. This could be interpreted as a pay gap within firms and is in line 
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with a result of Hinz and Gartner (2005). By contrast, the contribution of the 
differences in individual characteristics to the mean pay gap is small and negative. 
This implies that on average, women would receive lower wages if they had the same 
endowment of productivity-related individual characteristics as male employees. This 
result suggests that full-time employed women are well educated.  
Furthermore, the OB decomposition shows that the gap attributable to differences in 
establishment characteristics and the gap referring to differences in the returns to 
individual characteristics are equally high.  
The OB decomposition is limited to decomposing the mean gender wage gap. The MM 
decomposition based on quantile regression considers the entire wage distribution. The 
four decomposition parts at each percentile of the wage distributions are also presented 
in Figure 3.3. The extreme quantiles are not presented because of unrobust estimates.   
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Figure 3.3: MM decomposition of the gender wage gap 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
 
The decomposition terms vary across the quantiles of the wage distribution. However, 
the variation is not as strong as other international studies indicate that only take into 
account individual characteristics (e.g. Albrecht et al. 2003 for Sweden, De la Rica et 
al. 2005 for Spain, Arulampalam et al. 2007 among other countries also for Germany). 
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The estimated quantile regression coefficients already provide first hints on these 
relatively small variations across the quantiles of the wage distribution.     
Similar to the OB decomposition, the largest fraction of the gender wage gap is 
attributable to differences in establishment-specific coefficients across the whole wage 
distribution. This finding is readily identifiable in Figure 3.3. This part of the pay gap 
slightly decreases with increasing quantiles of the wage distributions. Apparently, 
women benefit less from rents which might be shared between employer and 
employees than male colleagues. Or in other words, women tend to participate less in 
the success of the establishment, especially in the lower wage groups. Maybe, they are 
more diffident in wage negotiations with their superior or they have less bargaining 
power in comparison to male employees.   
Furthermore, Figure 3.3 shows that there is a male wage premium for the 
establishment characteristics across the whole distribution. This part also slightly 
decreases as the quantiles increase. In the lower part of the wage distribution women 
tend to work in firms which are less productive and profitable in comparison to firms 
where men are typically employed. This also contributes considerably to the gender 
wage gap. The differences in establishment characteristics are less important for the 
gap in the upper tail of the wage distribution. It seems that male and female employees 
in the upper tail of the wage distribution work in similar firms. Unfortunately, I cannot 
say anything about the statistical significance because the calculation of significance 
bonds with a bootstrap method is not possible given the computation time. 
The fraction of the gender wage gap that is attributable to differences in individual 
characteristics and the part due to differences in the returns to those characteristics 
vary around zero along the wage distribution. In the lower part of the wage distribution 
the fraction due to differences in individual characteristics is positive. Below the 30th 
percentile, men are endowed with the better paid productivity-related characteristics. 
By contrast, the reverse holds from above the 30th percentile. This suggests that 
women in the middle and the upper tail of the wage distribution receive a higher wage 
rate given their better human capital endowment and their occupations, ceteris paribus.  
The decomposition part due to differences in returns to individual characteristics is at 
first negative and then becomes positive. Between the 15th and the 45th percentile of 
the wage distribution women get higher returns for their human capital endowment 
than male employees.  
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The findings of the OB decomposition of the mean gender wage gap and the MM 
decomposition of the gap across the whole distribution both suggest the selection of 
women into less successful and productive firms. In addition, women participate in the 
success of firms by rent-sharing to a lesser extent than their male colleagues. This is 
the source of the largest part of the pay gap. The firm and respectively the workplace 
seem to be very important in explaining wage differentials between male and female 
employees. This finding is line with results of Drolet (2002), Datta Gupta and 
Rothstein (2005) as well as Simón and Russell (2005). Gender differences in human 
capital and occupations as well as differences in returns to these characteristics are less 
responsible for the wage differential.  
3.6 Conclusions 
This study investigates the role of individual characteristics and the establishments in 
determining the gender wage gap across the whole wage distribution in Germany. It 
thus differs from existing analysis examining the decomposition of the gender wage 
gap in three respects. First, instead of limiting the explanatory variables to individual 
characteristics, I include a set of detailed establishment characteristics. Second, I 
extend the traditional OB decomposition to disentangle the effect of human capital 
characteristics and the effect of establishment characteristics in explaining the gender 
wage gap. This approach yields new insights into what causes the gender wage gap. 
Are women less educated or do they work in worse firms compared to men? Third, I 
implement the decomposition across the entire wage distribution with the Machado 
Mata method.  
The unconditional gender gap is sharply decreasing within the first quartile of the wage 
distribution and then the decrease decelerates up to the 60th percentile, and from then 
on the gap slightly increases. The gender wage gap is not constant across the wage 
distribution, but the decomposition terms only vary slightly across the wage 
distribution. This result suggests that the sources of the wage differential are similar 
for high- and low-paid employees. One methodological reason for this may be that the 
top-coding of the data prevents an analysis of the gender wage gap above the 80th 
percentile. Strong changes in the decomposition of the wage gap might only occur in 
the upper quantiles though. As a robustness check, a similar analysis with the German 
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Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES), another large German linked employer-
employee data set might be helpful.62  
The present analysis shows that the selection of women into less successful and 
productive firms explains a sizeable part of the gap. This selection is more pronounced 
in the lower part of the wage distribution than in the upper tail. In addition, women 
also benefit from the success of firms by rent-sharing to a lesser extent than their male 
colleagues. This suggests the largest part of the gap is a wage gap within firms. The 
establishment seems to be very important in explaining wage differentials between 
male and female employees. Gender differences in human capital endowment as well 
as differences in returns to human capital are less responsible for the wage differential. 
In the middle and upper part of the wage distribution women even have better paid 
individual characteristics compared to their male colleagues.  
These are important findings from a public policy viewpoint. In particular, the findings 
pose the question why women participate less in the success of firms and what can be 
done about it. An explanation for married or cohabitating women could be that they 
have less bargaining power within firms than their male colleagues if they face a 
limited number of alternative job opportunities due to being tied to the regional labor 
market of the male breadwinner. The weak bargaining position of women may thus 
partially reflect the weak bargaining position within their relationship. A separate 
analysis for single and married/cohabitating women might shed light on the relevance 
of this argument. If women’s weaker bargaining position proves relevant, policies 
aiming at a reduction of the gender wage gap should strengthen women’s bargaining 
position in the private sphere by for example improving the public child care 
infrastructure or abolishing the employment disincentive inherent in the German tax 
system. In addition, women – irrespective of their marital status – might be too hesitant 
compared to their male colleagues to demand the merits of their work as a share of the 
firm’s rents. If this was the case, women should be encouraged to seek wage 
negotiations with the aim of enjoying greater financial rewards. 
                                                 
62 The German Structure of Earnings Survey is a linked employer-employee data set. It is conducted by 
the Federal Statistical Office. However, the establishment information is not so rich as in the LIAB.  
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Chapter 4 
Earnings of men and women in firms with a 
female dominated workforce: What drives the 
impact of sex segregation on wages? 
4.1 Introduction  
The fact that women earn lower wages than men has been documented in many studies 
for several countries and periods of time. One important result of this research is that 
there is a relationship between the wages of men and women and the gender 
composition of occupations, industries and firms63. Such evidence helps to understand 
the source of gender differences and could potentially increase the effectiveness of 
policies that aim to reduce the gender wage gap.  
Most segregation research has focused on the impact of occupational segregation of 
men and women on the gender wage gap (e.g. Macpherson and Hirsch 1995) and the 
effect of industry segregation (e.g. Fields and Wolff 1995). The empirical studies show 
that individual wages vary systematically according to the gender composition of 
occupations and industries. More precisely, an increasing proportion of women has a 
detrimental effect upon the wages of men and women. 
The relationship between wages and sex segregation at establishment level has been 
studied less in empirical analysis.64 The first studies (McNulty 1967, Buckley 1971, 
Blau 1977) found that women were more likely to work in lower paying firms than 
men. More recent investigations (e.g. Carrington and Troske 1998, Reilly and Wirjanto 
1999a, Bayard et al. 2003, Vieira et al. 2005, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2006) 
support this result and demonstrate that the individual wages of men and women 
decrease as the proportion of women within an establishment increases.  
However, most empirical studies do not sufficiently scrutinize the measured impact of 
the proportion of females within establishments on individual wages. For this reason, I 
                                                 
63 In the study the terms firm and establishment are used synonymously.  
64 One reason is the lack of micro-data with information on both the employers and employees. Indeed, 
the availability of linked employer-employee data in the last decade has generated many studies which 
highlights firm aspects. For a survey of linked employer-employee data see e.g. Abowd and Kramarz 
(1999) 
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shall attempt to go one step further in my analysis. Why should sex segregation at 
establishment level impact upon individual earnings? I examine three hypotheses. 
Firstly, by assuming gender differences in the preferences for specific establishment 
and workplace characteristics, the proportion of females in an establishment may 
reflect the attractiveness of a specific workplace environment for women, creating an 
environment in return for which they are willing to accept lower wages. Secondly, I 
examine the so-called quality sorting hypothesis, which considers the proportion of 
females within an establishment as a proxy for the skill requirements of the employer. 
The main assumptions are that skill requirements vary from establishment to 
establishment and that men and women have different skill endowments, with the latter 
being less well-qualified. Finally, another possible explanation for a connection 
between the proportion of females within establishments and individual wages could 
be discriminatory preferences among employers against women. In this study, I 
investigate the direction of the relationship between the proportion of females within 
establishments and the wages of male and female employees by specifying various 
wage equations for both western and eastern Germany. For this purpose, I use a rich 
linked employer-employee data set maintained by the Research Data Centre of the 
Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research in Germany. 
This data set is rich in terms of information on important productivity-related 
characteristics (e.g. education and tenure) and very detailed information on 
establishment characteristics (e.g. employment number, collective bargaining and 
industry). A further strength of this data is that the available number of observations is 
very large65, making it possible to obtain reliable estimates for the parameters of 
interest. 
By means of this analysis, I attempt to investigate why sex segregation affects 
individual earnings. Such an improved understanding is important for designing 
adequate policies. If the reason for a negative relationship between the proportion of 
females and individual wage rates arises from the choice of women to work for firms 
that provide an attractive working environment for them, such policies will differ from 
policies aiming at reducing discrimination against women. In the latter case, one can 
initiate the discussion about affirmative action or employment equity programs to 
                                                 
65 The data set contains a representative sample of German establishments with at least one employee 
covered by the German social security system and all employees in these establishments who pay social 
security contributions.  
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address issues of imbalance in the sex composition of establishments. If the impact of 
the proportion of females within establishments on individual wages is due to self-
selection of women in certain firms, then there is no need for direct political 
intervention at firm level. If the relationship between the proportion of females within 
an establishment and the level of wages paid can be attributed to lower qualifications 
among women, then policies should aim to improve qualifications among women.  
In this study, I will not address occupational segregation even though occupation is a 
very interesting dimension. Occupational segregation is more stable over time than 
segregation at firm level because occupational changes occur less often. Nonetheless, I 
refrain from including occupational segregation as many empirical studies measuring 
the impact of occupational segregation on wages have already been conducted. For 
instance, Achatz et al. (2005) as well as Jurajda and Harmgart (2007) have investigated 
this issue as it affects Germany.  
The study will then develop as follows. In the following section, I present a brief 
review of the empirical literature that investigates the relationship between the gender 
composition in establishments and individual wages. In Section 4.3, I formulate 
hypotheses that seek to explain the relationship between sex segregation and the wages 
of women and men. In Section 4.4, I describe the empirical methodology that I employ 
to gauge this relationship. In the subsequent section, I introduce the data set and 
provide descriptive statistics of the characteristics. The results of the estimations are 
presented in Section 4.6. The Section 4.7 provides a conclusion.  
4.2 Previous empirical literature 
In this section I will summarize the results of previous empirical studies that analyze 
the association between the proportion of females in establishments and wages. I will 
focus on studies that use establishment level data.66  
The first empirical studies investigating earnings and gender segregation at 
establishment level emerged in the seventies. McNulty (1967) and Buckley (1971) 
indicate that inter-firm gender segregation is an important factor for determining 
different earnings of male and female employees. Both studies point out that men tend 
to work in high-wage establishments and women in low-paying establishments. Using 
the same data set for the US they compare average wages of male and female 
                                                 
66 c. f. Foguel (2004) 
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employees between integrated and single-sex establishments by occupations. The 
comparison reveals that men’s earnings exceed those of women in the same 
occupations but these differences are smaller in establishments employing both sexes. 
However, the descriptive results are derived from selected occupational earnings and 
establishments. Blau (1977) also considers selected occupational groups in three 
metropolitan statistical area but she exploit the information to the accurate proportion 
of female employees within firms. She computes the correlation between the ranking 
of firms with respect to both wages and the proportion of female employees. This 
ranking is based on coefficients associated with firm dummies in two separate 
regressions on wages and the proportion of female employees, respectively. The 
negative estimated correlation coefficient suggests that females are highly represented 
in the workforce in firms which pay lower wages to both sexes, while males comprise 
a higher proportion of employees in those firms which pay higher wages.   
Groshen (1991a) extends the work of Blau (1977) by jointly estimating the effects of 
segregation by occupation, establishment and job-cells67 on the wages of workers 
within five industries in the US. Her results show a negative relationship between 
gender segregation at establishment level and individual wages in all five industries. 
Furthermore, it seems that in some industries gender segregation at establishment level 
explained the gender wage gap for the most part, while in other industries occupational 
segregation is more important in determining the gap. The used data set, however, does 
not include further information on employees and establishments. Hence, typical wage 
determinants such as education and experience are not taken into account, which are 
presumably important controls in gender wage regressions.  
Carrington and Troske (1995) study the establishment gender segregation in small U.S. 
firms. In an establishment level regression they estimate the impact of the proportion 
of women on the average wage within an establishment (wage bill per employee).  The 
estimates reveal that firms with a predominantly male workforce tend to pay higher 
average wages than firms where women account for the majority of the workforce. In a 
follow-up study Carrington and Troske (1998) improve their previous work by using 
individual worker information from a small sample of linked employer-employee data. 
In a pooled wage equation for male and female employees they control for various 
worker and establishment characteristics and use an interaction term between the 
                                                 
67 Job-cells mean the interaction between occupations and establishments. 
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female dummy and the proportion of women within an establishment variable to 
ascertain the impact of gender segregation on female and male wages. The basic 
findings are that both men and women earn less in firms that are predominantly staffed 
by women, but that the negative effects experienced by women are greater.  
Bayard et al. (2003) attempt to review the results of Groshen (1991a) by a using 
comprehensive matched employer-employee data set which covers all industries and 
occupations across all regions in the US. They also find negative effects arising from 
the proportion of females within an establishment on wages for both sexes. This 
negative impact is again greater for women. Their results also indicate that, even 
though a sizeable part of the gender wage gap can be explained by the segregation of 
females into lower-paying occupations, industries, establishments and job cells, a 
considerable part of the gap remains unexplained. These findings differ from other 
research, most notably that of Groshen (1991a). The authors attribute the deviations to 
the larger data set and to the inclusion of some controls for individual characteristics 
and industry dummies in separate regressions for men and women. 
The European studies conducted by Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) as well as 
Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2006) are similar to those of Groshen (1991a) and 
Bayard et al. (2003). Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) use matched employer-
employee data from Denmark to investigate how gender segregation affects the gender 
wage gap, while Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2006) focus on Spain. Both 
analyses estimate pooled (by gender) wage equations that include the proportion of 
females in industry, occupation, establishment and job-cell. The relationship between 
the proportion of females within firms and individual wages is negative. In addition, in 
separate wage regressions by gender, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2006) find 
that being employed in a predominantly female establishment has a negligible impact 
on men’s wages, whereas it significantly reduces female wages. In both studies the 
authors focus on the effect of segregation on the wage gap (rather than on individual 
earnings) and find that there is a significant within-job-cell gender wage differential. 
Reilly and Wirjanto (1999a) investigate the relationship between wages and gender 
segregation for Canada with a small sample of matched employer-employee data. In a 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) regression framework they find that the proportion 
of women in an establishment has a negative impact on individual wages for both men 
and women. Again the negative effect on the female wages is more pronounced than 
on male wages.  
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Vieira et al. (2005) study gender segregation at the establishment level over fifteen 
years in Portugal, and its impact on wages and the gender wage gap by using a large 
matched employer-employee data set. This is the only study that finds a negative effect 
arising from the proportion of women within firms on women’s wages and, to the 
contrary, a positive effect on men’s wages.  
In an empirical analysis, Achatz et al. (2005) use one wave (from the year 2000) of a 
German linked employer-employee data set (the LIAB data) to investigate the impact 
of the proportion of females within job-cells on individual wages in western Germany. 
Like most other studies, they find that the negative relationship is more pronounced for 
women. They conclude that discrimination occurs particularly through a gender-based 
assignment of jobs.   
In summary, previous empirical studies lead one to conclude that working in 
establishments with a predominantly female workforce reduces wages for both sexes, 
with this effect being more pronounced for women. Despite a consensus regarding 
these stylized facts, the magnitude and interpretation of the relationship between wages 
and gender composition remain unclear.68  In this study, I attempt to investigate the 
relationship between the proportion of females within establishments and individual 
wages by including individual characteristics such as experience, education and 
occupation as well as standard firm-specific variables such as establishment size and 
type of industry. In an extension to previous studies, I attempt to control for further 
establishment characteristics by exploiting the rich firm-side of my data set. If firm 
characteristics are important, including them should reduce the impact of the 
proportion of females within establishments on individual wages. In this way, I seek to 
understand what is measured by the impact of the proportion of females on individual 
wages.  
4.3 Theoretical framework 
In this section I present three hypotheses which deal with the gender wage gap and sex 
segregation at establishment level. I begin by reviewing the hypothesis that gender 
differences in wages and employment patterns are the consequence of preferences. I 
then go on to formulate a second hypothesis that is based on skill differences between 
men and women. I then present a third hypothesis that explains the relationship 
                                                 
68 Some studies hastily explain the negative impact by discrimination.  
Chapter 4: Earnings in female dominated firms 
 
77
between the proportion of females within firms and wages by assuming that 
discriminatory attitudes are adopted by employers against women. 
 
4.3.1 Preference hypothesis 
The role of differences in preferences is often emphasized in the discussion of 
gendered labor market outcomes. Men and women are assumed to differ in their 
preferences for market versus non-market work or leisure as well as for particular 
types of work, such as manual labor versus office work.69 The distribution of 
preferences for particular job attributes among men and women and the costs to 
employers of offering jobs with particular characteristics will affect the wage 
distribution. For instance, the theory of compensating differentials (Rosen 1986) 
predicts that if differences in job characteristics, such as inflexible work schedules or 
shift work, are associated with a disutility, then such jobs will offer a wage premium. 
The theory further predicts that those workers with a relatively high tolerance for such 
disamenities will naturally gravitate towards these jobs. If workers with these 
preferences are also predominantly males, then such jobs will be largely filled by men. 
The argumentation of the theory of compensating differentials can be used to explain 
the negative correlation between the proportion of females within firms and the wages 
of both males and females. Firms differ regarding the technologies used in production, 
the institutional background, the profit situation and so on. Hence, they offer jobs with 
different characteristics. On the other hand, there are certain job characteristics which 
are typically favored by women and which are connected to lower wage rates. These 
are mainly job characteristics which improve the work-life balance as the major burden 
of family work is still borne by women. These attributes are, for instance, flexible 
working time, less overtime, a firm kindergarten or crèche, or special mentoring 
programs for female employees. The workplace attributes are connected with costs for 
the employers and thus lead to a wage reduction, which is likely to be accepted by 
those individuals with a greater preference for these workplace amenities70. Based on 
                                                 
69 Related to the topic is the question concerning the source of gender differences in preferences (see 
Altonji and Blank 1999). There is only little direct evidence concerning the question how and why 
preferences might develop over time. For instance, the differential treatment of boys versus girls in the 
family or in the educational system may be one source of differences in preferences. However, regardless 
of the source, in a competitive labor market gender differences in preferences can imply gender 
differences in labor force participation, in workplaces and in wages.  
70 The costs are partly transferred from employers to employees and the resulting wage reduction depends 
on the bargaining power of employees and employers. 
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the assumption that women have a greater preference for these characteristics, firms 
offering these attributes will be particularly attractive for women. This results in a 
larger proportion of female employees than in establishments not offering such 
benefits. These considerations show that if one does not control for an attractive 
working environment in a wage regression analysis, the impact of the proportion of 
females in establishments on wages is likely to reflect part of the negative correlation 
between certain job characteristics and individual wages. This also holds true for men: 
Men choosing to work for firms with a predominately female workforce also seems to 
be willing to accept lower wages for job characteristics such as flexible working hours. 
Reilly and Wirjanto (1999b) argue in a similar manner. In their study they employ the 
expression “coincidence of needs”. They argue that firms with a high proportion of 
females offer employment contracts to employees that fit the employment pattern 
preferred by women. Worker and employers have preferences, technological choices, 
and constraints that have to correspond. A successful job match is thus a coincidence 
of needs. That implies the sorting of women into specific establishments. The resulting 
(compensating) wage differential reflects the mutually advantageous trade between 
employers and employees. 
 
4.3.2 Qualification hypothesis 
The second hypothesis dealing with the relationship between individual wages and sex 
segregation at establishment level is related to the so-called quality sorting hypothesis, 
which finds frequent mention in the literature (see e.g. Macpherson and Hirsch 1995, 
Carrington and Troske 1998, Reilly and Wirjanto 1999a). The idea is simple and based 
on two premises. The first is that firms are heterogeneous in terms of the skill demands 
on employees. Some establishments need many highly qualified workers for their 
production. These would include such establishments as research establishments. Other 
firms, for example cleaning companies, demand low skilled workers. The second 
premise is that women and men have different skill levels, with the former group being 
less qualified. The lower qualification of women is often explained by the human 
capital model (e.g. Mincer and Polachek 1974). This model departs from the traditional 
gender division of labor within families under which women are expected to have a 
shorter and more intermittent attachment to the labor market than men. This implies, 
ceteris paribus, that the net return on pre-labor market investments in human capital for 
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women will be lower than that for men. Similarly, the shorter and more discontinuous 
labor force participation of women reduces the long-run pay-off on investments in 
general and firm-specific training. Thus, given their shorter expected working life, 
women’s optimal response is to acquire a lower amount of human capital in terms of 
training and labor market experience. Polachek (1981) also argued that women invest 
rather in human capital and favor occupations with lower rates of depreciations for 
periods of absence from the labor force.       
The result of the two premises is that firms requiring relatively more unskilled (skilled) 
labor will have a higher (lower) concentration of females and pay lower (higher) 
wages. According to the quality sorting hypothesis, male employees in firms with a 
predominantly female workforce are also less well-qualified than men in other firms. 
Thus, in the quality sorting hypothesis the gender composition of a firm serves as an 
index of labor quality. This hypothesis therefore predicts that wages of men and 
women are negatively correlated with the proportion of females in the establishment if 
one does not control for productivity.  
Note that in the quality sorting hypothesis mentioned in literature (see e.g. Hirsch and 
Schumacher 1992, Macpherson and Hirsch 1995, Hirsch and Macpherson 2004)71, the 
proportion of female employees is assumed to be correlated to both measured and 
unmeasured labor productivity differences. Here, I can only control for observed 
characteristics. To the extent that measurable and immeasurable labor quality factors 
are positively correlated, this may partly cover unobserved differences.        
 
4.3.3 Discrimination hypothesis 
The third hypothesis is framed by the Becker (1971) model of employer 
discrimination. I shall explain this model in more detail since it is less straightforward 
than the two hypotheses already dealt with. Following this model, a wage-taking firm 
with a production function f  uses two inputs: the labor of men, M , and labor of 
women, F , which are perfect substitutes and have the same marginal products72. 
Employers have a dislike of hiring female workers, and do not maximize profits but 
rather maximize utility, defined as 
                                                 
71 However, the first two mentioned studies investigate wages and racial composition.   
72 Perfect substitutes imply that male and female employees have infinite substitution elasticity.  
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( ) ( ) ( ), , M FU M F Y M F w M w F d F Mπ = + − − − ⋅                           (4.1) 
where d  is the discrimination coefficient representing this dislike, Mw  and Fw  are the 
market wages of men and women respectively.73 Short-run utility maximization then 
implies 
( )2 ,    .M M F FMP d F M w MP d M w+ = − =                                       (4.2) 
The marginal product of male labor MMP  is below its input price Mw , because male 
labor increases the employer’s utility, ceteris paribus, the marginal product of female 
labor FMP  is discounted by the non-pecuniary cost of discrimination to the employer 
and hence is above the input price of female labor Fw . The discrimination coefficient 
d  will lead the firm in the short run to hire fewer women and more men than profit 
maximization would dictate.74 The degree of aversion to hiring female employees is 
assumed to vary across employers. Firms with weaker discriminatory preferences 
(smaller d ) will tend to hire relatively more women and relatively fewer men, and 
vice versa. Thus, preferences provide the exogenous source of variation in the 
proportion of females across otherwise identical firms. However, in the Becker model 
the firms are price-takers, so the wages for male and female employees do not vary 
across firms. Another drawback of the model is that employer discrimination cannot 
persist under perfect competition without productivity differences between male and 
female employees. Firms which have no aversion to hiring women pay wages 
according to their marginal productivity and force the discriminatory firms out of the 
market. Thus the assumption of perfect competition is relaxed towards that firms have 
monopsony power. 
The new monopsony literature emphasizes that monopsony power may even occur if 
there are many employers competing for employees, and not only in the case of one 
single employer (see for a systematic presentation of this literature Manning 2003). 
Models of new monopsony literature ascribe upward-sloping firm level labor supply 
curves75 to mobility costs, search frictions and heterogeneous preferences among 
                                                 
73 The output price is standardized to 1. See also Hellerstein and Neumark (2005) 
74 Arrow (1973) formulated it in this way. In the original model d simply multiplies F in the employer’s 
utility function, which generates complete sex segregation across the board with the exception of the 
marginal employer. The utility function based on the relative number of female employees leads to an 
equilibrium less at odds with observed employment patterns.  
75 The analyses of job-to-job flows within a search framework by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and 
Manning (1994) have established the idea that each single firm or establishment faces its own individual 
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employees.76 Discrimination against women in a situation of such imperfect 
competition results in lower wages and a reduced level of employment for women. In 
order to demonstrate this, it is supposed that the firm level labor supply curve of men 
and women is equal to ( ) use ,s gL w g M F= .77 The male and female employees are 
perfect substitutes in production. If the employer dislikes employing women, the utility 
function78 has the following form: 
  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).s s s s sM F M M F F FU Y L w L w w L w w L w dL w= + − − −                (4.3) 
By differentiating equation (4.3) with respect to Mw  and Fw , the optimal wage rates 
for men and woman can be obtained. They are as follows: 
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where ( )wε  denotes the elasticity of the labor supply and lies between 0 and 1, *gw  is 
the wage for male and female employees, ,g M F= , given the labor supply curve. If 
the second-order condition is satisfied, ( )2'' 2 ' 0s sL L− < , and one can see that women 
obtain a lower wage than male employees. Wages and employment therefore are both 
lower for women. This result would be even stronger if one assumes that the female 
labor supply is more inelastic than its male counterpart.79  
                                                                                                                                               
labor supply curve. The point is that workers quit endogenously, and have to be replaced by new hires. 
The higher the wage, the lower the number quitting and thus the easier it is to attract replacement hires.   
76 Bergmann (1974) argued in a related way in her “overcrowding” model. She acts on the assumption 
that men and women are segregated into two occupations. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is no 
mobility of labor between occupations. Hence, if the job opportunities for women are small relative to 
their labor supply, women will “crowd” to work in one occupation. This depresses the wage there. This 
results in a gender wage differential. The argumentation is often mentioned in studies dealing with 
occupational segregation. However, the segregation is exogenously given in that model framework. 
77 I suppress the firm subscript. 
78 Note, for simplification I return to the original formulation of the Becker model assuming that the 
utility negatively depends on the number of the hired women instead of the relative number. Using the 
relative number of female employees would unnecessarily complicate the analysis. Then the derivations 
of the utility regarding the male and female wages would also depend on the labor supply of the other 
gender. Thus I cannot formulate a clear relationship as an equation (4.4). 
79 This is the idea of monopsonistic discrimination in the labor market developed by Robinson (1933). In 
this model it is assumed that the female labor supply is more inelastic than the male labor supply. Thus 
women will earn less than men relative to their productivity, and thus face a higher level of exploitation in 
the labor market. In this model framework the existence of gender pay gap can be explained by difference 
in labor supply between men and women even if employers have no discrimination preferences. Ransom 
and Oaxaca (2005) and Hirsch et al. (2006) empirically support the idea that female labor supply to the 
firm is less elastic than male labor supply. 
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Thus the preference-based discrimination model predicts that the proportion of female 
employees varies across firm depending on the degree of discriminatory behavior: the 
less (more) discriminatory the employer is, the higher (lower) the proportion of women 
in the firm. In addition, the monopsony model framework allows employers a wage 
setting policy according to the firm-specific elasticity of labor supply and to the extent 
of aversion to employing women. Ceteris paribus, the wage rate of female employees 
decreases with the degree of discrimination. Thus, supposing the same wage 
elasticities for male and female employees, the formulated discrimination hypothesis 
predicts a positive relationship between wage rates of female employees and the 
proportion of women within an establishment when the latter is a proxy for the 
disinclination to employ women. In contrast to this, the hypothesis predicts a negative 
relationship for male employees. This directly results from the upward-sloping labor 
supply, predicting a lower employment level for the group that receives a lower wage. 
Note, in this hypothesis I use the preference-based discrimination model according to 
Becker (1971) and Arrow (1973) respectively. This model is embedded in a 
monopsony framework to derive a relationship between individual wages and the 
proportion of females which varies across establishments.  
To sum up, the first two hypotheses, the preference and qualification hypotheses, both 
predict a negative relationship between the proportion of females within 
establishments and individual wages for both male and female employees. The 
discrimination hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between the proportion of 
females and wages for women and a negative relationship for men. 
In the empirical analysis I want to investigate what drives the impact of the proportion 
of females within establishments on individual wages. By successively including 
productivity-related characteristics and variables describing the workplace I extract the 
impact of those variables from the effect of the proportion of females. Thus I can 
directly test my first two hypotheses. 
Unfortunately I cannot directly test the discrimination hypothesis because I cannot 
observe the discriminatory behavior of employers. However, if I can rule out that the 
proportion of females reflects preferences and productivity differences, the explanation 
is likely to be discrimination. Thus I can indirectly test the discrimination hypothesis 
by controlling for productivity-related characteristics and variables describing the 
workplace. I check whether the remaining effect of the proportion of females on wages 
is in accordance with the predicted relationship in the discrimination hypothesis.     
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4.4 Empirical methodology 
In order to analyze the effect of the proportion of females within an establishment on 
the wages of individuals I consider a standard Tobit model since the dependent 
variable is censored from above in the data set employed (see next section): 
                                      (4.5) 
where superscript ( ),g m f=  indicates the gender, gijw  describes the log wage of 
worker i  in establishment j , gijw
∗  refers to the true log wage, gijX  denotes a various 
set of individual and job related characteristics dependent of the specification, gjφ  
presents the proportion of females in the establishment. Furthermore gβ  and gγ  are 
the corresponding regression coefficients, gijε  is an error term and gjσ  is the 
establishment-specific variance of these. The right-censoring of the dependent variable 
can be dealt with by estimating a Tobit model, where the distribution of the log wage 
rate is censored from above at the point c (the daily social security threshold). 
n order to deal with this issue we adjust the standard errors using robust variance 
estimator based on clusters at establishment level 
I estimate the Tobit model (4.5) and adjust standard errors using robust variance 
estimator based on clusters at the establishment level. As I mentioned above, I use 
matched employer-employee data. For each establishment I observe wage rates of 
almost all employees.80 The standard regression assumption is that what is not known 
about the determination of wages is distributed independently across all observations. 
This is an extremely strong assumption for this type of data. It is not reasonable to 
assume that establishments will set an individual’s wage independently relative to 
other individuals in the firm. For instance, establishments might use internal labor 
markets to determine wages. This and other possible arguments suggest a non-
independence of wage equation error terms for individuals who work in the same 
establishment.  
                                                 
80 I do not observe all workers because the data set includes only employees which are covered by the 
social security system (see next section). I also do not use all observable wage rates because of my sample 
selection. In the next section I describe these details.  
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This is the reason for using robust standard errors based on clusters at establishment 
level. I assume the following structure for the covariance of the errors: 
2
    for ,  ;   , 1,..., ,   , 1,...,
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                                      (4.6) 
4.5 Data 
In the empirical analysis I use data from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee panel 
(LIAB) which combines data from the IAB Establishment Panel and the Employment 
Statistics Register. 
The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual survey of German establishments, which 
started in western Germany in 1993 and was extended to eastern Germany in 1996.81 
The sample of selected establishments is random and stratified by industries, 
establishment size classifications and regions. The sample unit is the establishment as 
the local business unit. The establishments asked in the survey are selected from the 
parent sample of all German establishments that employ at least one employee covered 
by social security. Thus, the self-employed and establishments employing only people 
not covered by social security (mineworkers, farmers, artists, journalists, etc.) as well 
as the public sector employing exclusively civil servants do not belong to the original 
sample. The data set is a representative sample of German establishments employing at 
least one employee who pays social security contributions. The establishments covered 
by the survey have been questioned every year about turnover, number of employees, 
composition of the workforce, personnel problems, industrial relations, wage policies, 
investments, innovations and business strategies.  
The worker information comes from the Employment Statistics Register. This is an 
administrative panel data set of all employees in Germany paying social security 
contributions.82 The data is based on notifications which employers are obliged to 
provide for each employee covered by the German social security system. According 
to the statutory provisions, employers have to report information for all employed 
contributors at the beginning and end of their employment spell. In addition an annual 
report for each employee is compulsory at the end of the year. This report contains 
                                                 
81 Detailed information on the IAB Establishment Panel is given by Kölling (2000). 
82 Information on the Employment Statistics Register is given by Bender et al. (2000). 
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information on an employee’s occupation, the occupational status, qualification, sex, 
age, nationality and industry. Also the available information on daily gross earnings 
refers to employment spell that employers report to the Federal Employment Service.83 
If the wage rate exceeds the social security threshold (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”), 
the daily social security threshold is reported instead. Note that the daily wage rate is 
therefore censored from above – mostly relevant for men.  
Both data sets contain a unique establishment identifier which is used to match 
information on all employees paying social security contributions with the 
establishment in the IAB Establishment Panel. 
I construct my sample in two steps. First I select establishments from the IAB 
Establishment Panel data set. I use the wave 2002 because it includes very interesting 
information describing the workplace. As mentioned in Section 4.3, the theoretical 
approaches are based on the profit-maximizing behavior of establishments. For this 
reason, I exclude observations corresponding to non-profit establishments, including 
the public sector. Since I implement separate analyses for eastern and western 
Germany I also construct separate data sets, whereby the location of the establishment 
determines the assignment. 
In the second step, I merge the establishment data with notifications for all employees 
employed by selected establishments in the year 2002. From the worker data I drop 
observations for apprentices, part-time workers and home workers. I consider only 
full-time workers because the Employment Statistics Register lacks explicit 
information on hours worked.84 To avoid modeling human capital formation and 
retirement decisions, I focus on individuals aged between 25 and 55 years. Some 
individuals in the data set have more than one job at the same time. Furthermore I 
select the observations that correspond to the main job of the individual to avoid that 
estimation with information on secondary labor market activities and notification 
errors are contaminated.   
The final western German sample comprises 757,914 individuals in 6,123 
establishments. The sample for eastern Germany contains 196,325 employees in 3,386 
establishments.  
                                                 
83 To deal with the problem of overlapping spells, I apply a hierarchical order of activities where 
employment trumps all other activities.  
84 However, I have in mind that the meaning of my results is limited to full-time employed males and 
females although a lot of women work part-time.  
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The individual data contain information on the gross daily wage, age, gender, 
nationality, employment status, educational status85 and on the date of entry into the 
establishment. The latter is used to calculate tenure by subtracting the entry date from 
the ending date of the employer’s notification which is also included in the data. Note, 
however, that this tenure variable cannot be corrected for employment interruptions as 
this information is not available. Hence this variable is only a proxy for tenure.  
The dependent variable in my empirical analysis is the real gross daily wage. The wage 
also includes such fringe benefits which are subject to social security contributions. 
The reported wage rates are top-coded at the upper contribution limit to the social 
security system. In my two samples, top-coding affects 17.66 percent of the 
observations from western Germany and 8.69 percent of those from eastern Germany. 
As can be seen in Tables C1 and C2 in the appendix, both in western and eastern 
Germany, male employees are more affected by top-coding than female employees.  
Tables C1 and C2 provide descriptive statistics for the individual characteristics I use 
in the estimation. Row 1 reports the observed average log wage for male and female 
employees. A simple estimation of a wage equation for male and female employees by 
a Tobit model including a constant and a female dummy shows a substantial wage gap 
between sexes in western Germany86: The average log wage of female employees is 
20.57 percent lower than for male employees. At only 7.79 percent the average gender 
wage gap is significantly lower in eastern Germany.87 It is also interesting to see in 
Table C2 that in eastern Germany there are little differences between the human capital 
of male and female employees. That means, there are only small differences between 
average job tenures and educational attainments between the sexes (with women 
actually enjoying a slight advantage). In western Germany the differences are more 
pronounced (see Table C1 in the appendix).    
I would now like to address the establishment variables described in Tables C3 and C4 
in the appendix. The main variable used in the subsequent empirical analysis is the 
proportion of female employees in an establishment. Since I have information on all 
employed individuals in the establishment, I can calculate this variable directly. For 
                                                 
85 The six categories (no degree, vocational training degree, high-school degree, high-school degree and 
vocational training, university of applied science degree and university degree) are summarized to three 
categories. Missing and inconsistent data on education are corrected according to the imputation 
procedure described in Fitzenberger et al. (2006). The basic idea of this procedure is that individuals 
cannot lose their educational degrees. 
86 The estimated coefficient for the female dummy gives the mean actual wage gap. 
87 Hunt (2002) points out that the lower gender wage gap is due to a selection of better qualified women 
in employment, while the unskilled women are rather unemployed or out of labor force.  
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comparison, I have also used the self-reported information from the IAB Establishment 
Panel. There are only small deviations between both measures. In the subsequent 
empirical analysis I have used the calculated proportion of female employees.88    
Row 1 in Tables C3 and C4 (in the appendix) presents the average proportion of 
females across establishments. An average man works in an establishment where 
women represent around one fourth of the workforce. Regarding this point the figures 
in western and eastern Germany are very similar. In contrast to this, women typically 
work in establishments where the proportion of females is around 50 percent of the 
establishment’s workforce in western Germany and around 60 percent of the labor 
force of an establishment in eastern Germany. Thus women tend to work in 
predominately female establishments, with the opposite being true for men.  
I use a detailed set of establishment variables to control for firm heterogeneity that 
may have been unobserved in previous studies. The set includes the size of 
establishments, the application of collective wage agreements (firm-specific and 
industry-wide), presence of a works council in the establishment, sales and wage bill 
per employee, state of the technology, the type of industry and the region where the 
establishment is located. I use additionally information on workplace attributes which 
might be related to gender specific preferences. I include a number of variables 
describing the extent of working hours in an establishment. Furthermore, I exploit 
information regarding an establishment’s practices for reconciling family and working 
life as well as practices for health promotion. Arrangements to improve the work-life 
balance comprise, for instance, a firm kindergarten or other child care facilities, 
mentoring programs for female members of staff, equal opportunity commissioners 
and so on. Tables C3 and C4 in the appendix show that both practices for reconciling 
family and working life as well as practices for health promotion are more common in 
establishments in western Germany than in eastern Germany. In both regions male 
employees rather work in establishments with programs promoting health than women 
do, while the opposite is true for programs to improve the work-life balance. In 
addition, the establishments provide information on which worker characteristics are 
important for the workplaces. I use information as to whether employees have to be 
especially flexible and need to be able to work under physical and mental pressure.  
                                                 
88 I also test the other variable and detect no qualitative differences and only quantitative differences 
between the estimation results.  
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4.6 Empirical results  
In the empirical analysis, I investigate the impact of the proportion of females within 
establishments on wages of male and female employees. In Section 4.3, I introduced 
three hypotheses through which I established a relationship between gender 
segregation across establishments and individual wages. In the empirical analysis, I 
attempt to test these hypotheses. The first is based on gender differences in 
preferences, suggesting that the proportion of females captures the impact of 
workplace characteristics favored by women. In this framework the impact of sex 
segregation on wages is negative for both male and female employees according to the 
theory of compensating wage differentials. In the second hypothesis, it is assumed that 
women are less well-qualified, thus involving lower wage rates. In such cases the 
proportion of women reflects the low qualification needs of the establishment and is 
connected with lower wage rates. The third hypothesis is based on discriminatory 
behavior against women by the employer. The impact of the proportion of females is 
negative on male wages and positive on female wages because the proportion of 
females is inversely related to the degree of discrimination.  
The empirical strategy is as follows: I successively include individual and 
establishment-specific variables describing a) the qualification and b) workplace 
characteristics in the wage regression of male and female employees. By observing the 
impact of the proportion of females on individual wages of male and female employees 
for each of the various specifications, I can test the previously discussed hypotheses 
concerning what lies behind the impact of the proportion of females within firms. That 
means I interpret the changes in the estimated coefficient of the interesting variable 
caused by the inclusion of information.   
For readability, Table 4.1 only presents coefficient estimates and corresponding 
standard errors for the main indicator of interest, the proportion of females within 
establishments. The complete regression results of the all specifications are in Tables 
C5, C6, C7 and C8 in the appendix.  
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Table 4. 1: Coefficients for the establishment proportion of females in various 
specification of a log wage equation  
    Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Specification Males Females Males Females 
       
(1) proportion of females  0.1071*** -0.2316***  0.1717*** -0.0099 
  (0.0368) (0.0298) (0.0567) (0.0567)
(2) (1) + human capital + occupation  -0.2082*** -0.2669***  -0.0889* -0.0819 
       + regions (0.0241) (0.0254) (0.0458) (0.0556)
(3) (2) + establishment size + industry -0.1687*** -0.2194***  -0.1413*** -0.2452*** 
  (0.0215) (0.0277) (0.0331) (0.0399)
(4) (3) + institutional setting -0.1645*** -0.1770***  -0.1293*** -0.1993*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0263) (0.0325) (0.0338)
(5) (4) + achievement potential  -0.0870*** -0.0520**  -0.0684** -0.1202*** 
  (0.0195) (0.0232) (0.0351) (0.0330)
(6) (5) + workplace characteristics  -0.0793*** -0.0462**  -0.0728** -0.1203*** 
  (0.0188) (0.0225) (0.0345) (0.0321)
(7) (6) + interaction terms  -0.0728*** -0.0458**  -0.0703** -0.1209*** 
    (0.0179) (0.0224)  (0.0329) (0.0309)
Number of observations 565,100 192,814   120,985 75,340 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level. The complete 
estimation results are in Tables C5 – C8. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002.   
 
I start with wage regressions for male and female employees using only the proportion 
of females and a constant as explanatory variables. There appears to be a positive 
relationship between the wage rate and the variable of interest for male employees in 
western and eastern Germany. By contrast, it seems that women earn less in 
establishments with a high proportion of females. However, the estimated parameter is 
not significant for eastern German women. The explanatory power of that specification 
is not very large. I compare here, for instance, a man employed in senior positions in a 
typical female dominated establishment such as a supermarket with an unqualified 
worker in a construction firm.  
In the next specification, I control for human capital endowment and occupations. The 
estimated coefficients for the proportion of females turn out to be negative for men 
both in western and eastern Germany. For women the estimated coefficients in this 
specification are more negative than in the first specification. So far, the results show 
that men and women respectively earn less in a female dominated firm than men and 
women respectively with the same observed human capital and occupation in an 
establishment with a lower proportion of women. These results contradict the second 
hypothesis that establishments with a high proportion of females rather employ 
unqualified workers. If this hypothesis were true the estimated coefficients for the 
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proportion of females would have to be larger in the specification controlling for 
qualification than in the specification without such controls.89  
In the third specification, I further include the establishment size (in terms of the 
number of employees) and the industry as explanatory variables in the wage 
regressions. The results show significant negative coefficients for the impact of the 
proportion of females on individual wages for both gender groups in western and 
eastern Germany. Furthermore, the estimated effect of the interesting variable is larger 
for female employees than for male employees. This pattern also appears in most 
international studies that control for the same firm-specific variables (see e.g. Bayard 
et al. 2003).  
In comparison to the second specification, the relationship between the proportion of 
females and individual wages is weaker in western Germany if I control for the 
establishment size and type of industry. This change is due to the selection of women 
in smaller firms paying at average lower wage rates (see results in Tables C5 and C6 in 
the appendix). A different pattern can be found in eastern Germany. The estimated 
coefficients for the effect of the proportion of females are smaller (more negative) for 
both gender groups in the third specification than in the second. Unlike in western 
Germany, women in eastern Germany tend to work in larger establishments.  
By controlling for the presence of a works council and the application of a collective 
bargaining agreement in the establishment, the estimated coefficient for the impact of 
the proportion of women becomes larger (less negative) for both gender groups in 
eastern as well as in western Germany in comparison to the last specification. This 
result suggests that female employees benefit more in terms of wages from the 
presence of a works council and the application of a wage agreement than male 
employees do.  
In the fifth specification, I further include variables reflecting achievement potential. I 
additionally take into account the sales and the wage bill per employee as well as a 
dummy for a state of the technology. Again the estimated coefficients for the 
interesting variable dramatically increase (become less negative) in all four sub-
samples compared to the last specification. This is particularly pronounced for women 
in western Germany. The impact of the proportion of females is now only significant at 
the 5 percent level. Furthermore in western Germany, the effect of that variable is now 
                                                 
89 Note, I only control for observed qualification. A sorting based on unobserved skills is also possible 
and is not accounted for in that estimation approach. 
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larger for male than for female employees, a finding which differs to most other 
studies. The opposite pattern appears in eastern Germany. Here, the estimated effect of 
the proportion of females on individual wages is still larger (more negative) for women 
while the coefficient is only significant at the 5 percent level for men.      
In the sixth specification, I include a large set of variables reflecting workplace 
attributes which could describe a selection of male and female employees in firms. In 
detail these variables comprise the weekly working hours, a dummy for overtime and 
dummy for no compensations for overtime working in terms of leisure or payments. 
Furthermore I include information on whether the firms explicitly implement measures 
to promote health and arrangements to improve the work-life balance. I also control as 
to whether the employers demand a high degree of flexibility and a high degree of 
mental and physical fitness from their employees. 
For western Germany, the results show a further weakening of the relationship 
between the proportion of females within establishments and the individual wages for 
male and female employees. However, the reduction of the partial correlation is 
marginal compared to my expectations. In eastern Germany, the estimated coefficients 
for the proportion of females even decrease in comparison to the last specification. 
Thus the coefficients are more negative than they would be without controlling for the 
defining workplace attributes. This result is puzzling as it contradicts the descriptive 
findings which show that the proportion of women is higher in firms with these 
workplace characteristics. An explanation could be that the effects of these variables 
are captured by other characteristics for which I have controlled in previous 
specifications. For instance, the data shows that firms with works councils and 
collective bargaining also offer arrangements to improve the work-life balance and less 
weekly working hours. In order to test this, I have changed the sequence of including 
firm-specific characteristics. The results are presented in Table C9 in the appendix. 
After controlling for individual characteristics, I start by taking into account the large 
set of workplace attributes. In the third specification, the estimated coefficient for the 
impact of the proportion of females becomes larger (less negative) for both gender 
groups in eastern as well as in western Germany in comparison to the last 
specification, controlling for individual characteristics. The weakening of the 
relationship between wages and the proportion of women within firms is now more 
pronounced than the observed change from specification five to six in Table 4.1. After 
controlling for workplace characteristics, I continue to include the other firm 
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characteristics (see Table C9 in the appendix). In western Germany, the impact of the 
interesting variable changes only slightly until I take into account variables reflecting 
the achievement potential of the firm. Then the estimated coefficient for the proportion 
of females again increases dramatically (less negative) for male and female employees. 
In eastern Germany, controlling for establishment size and type of industry again leads 
to an decrease of the estimated coefficient for the interesting variable. As mentioned 
above, this is because women in eastern Germany tend to work in larger 
establishments.        
This robustness check confirms the first hypothesis that the proportion of females 
reflects the attractiveness of the workplace for female employees for both western and 
eastern Germany. This is often captured by other firm characteristics such as work 
councils or collective bargaining agreements.  
I also check whether the workplace characteristics have different effects for different 
types of employees by including interaction terms between individual characteristics 
(human capital and occupation). However, as specification seven shows, the impact of 
the proportion of females within establishments on individual wages does not change 
compared to the specification without the interaction term.  
Regarding the second hypothesis my previous estimates show that the proportion of 
females within establishments does not reflect the demand for unqualified workers. I 
check the robustness of this result by running all specifications of the wage equations 
without controlling for productivity-related characteristics. I present the estimated 
coefficients for the proportion of females in Table C10 in the appendix. For male 
employees, I find that the estimated coefficient for the impact of the proportion of 
females is always positive in the wage equations without controlling for human capital 
and occupation. Thus the estimated coefficient for the interesting variable is smaller in 
the wage equation with controls for individual productivity. This result supports the 
conclusion that the second hypothesis does not hold. Otherwise, the effect would have 
to increase when controlling for productivity because these controls would absorb the 
negative effect of the lower productivity from the effect of proportion of females.  
However, for female employees such a clear pattern does not appear. For women, the 
estimated coefficient for the impact of the proportion of females within establishments 
is larger (less negative) in specifications with controls for individual productivity than 
in the specifications without these controls. This supports the hypothesis that 
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establishments with a high proportion of females demand less qualified and thus 
primarily female workers who are paid less.  
The last specification shows that a negative relationship between the proportion of 
females within establishments and wages for male and female employees still exists. In 
eastern Germany the relationship is more negative for women than for men. This result 
is in accordance with most other empirical studies. In contrast, in western Germany the 
negative connection between both variables is stronger for male employees. I cannot 
directly test the third hypothesis since I cannot capture the monopsony power and 
discriminatory preferences in observable firm characteristics. However, in the last 
specification I control for productivity-related and firm-specific characteristics. Thus 
the remaining effect of the proportion of females on wages should be an indicator of 
employer discrimination. The residual effect is still negative and significant for male 
and female employees, but is reduced in magnitude. In eastern Germany the effect is 
larger for women than for men, while in western Germany the reverse holds true. So 
far, the estimation results do not support the discrimination hypothesis. In this 
hypothesis, the proportion of females within establishments reflects the degree of 
prejudice against women among employers: the higher the aversion against women is, 
the lower the proportion of females. Furthermore, more discriminatory employers pay 
women less than employers who are more favorably disposed towards women. Thus 
this hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between individual wages and the 
proportion of females. The estimation results do not show this.90 Perhaps there is an 
alternative explanation as to what drives the impact of the proportion of females on 
individual wages.  
4.7 Conclusions 
In this study I examine why the segregation of women across establishments affects 
the wages of male and female employees. To investigate this issue, I use matched 
employer-employee data from eastern and western Germany. The IAB Linked 
Employer-Employee panel (LIAB) combines data from the IAB Establishment Panel 
and the Employment Statistics Register. The data set is rich in both worker as well as 
                                                 
90 However, I can speculate that controlling for more workplace attributes would lead to a further 
decrease in the estimated coefficients, at least for Western Germany. Maybe the estimated coefficients 
turn to a positive sign. However, this is a speculation.  
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establishment characteristics and includes particularly relevant information concerning 
the workforce composition of firms.  
My empirical results confirm the results of previous international studies (e.g. Reilly 
and Wirjanto 1999a, Bayard et al. 2003, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2006) 
which show a negative relationship between the proportion of females within 
establishments and individual wages of men and women. However, it is not always 
clear what is actually measured by the impact of the proportion of females on wage 
rates as potentially important information is omitted. For this reason I attempt to go 
one step further. Why should there be an effect of the sex segregation on individual 
earnings? I present three hypotheses. Firstly, assuming gender differences in 
preferences for specific firm and workplace characteristics, the proportion of women in 
an establishment reflects the attractiveness of a given workplace for women for which 
they are willing to accept lower wage rates in return. Secondly, I present a 
qualification hypothesis in relation to the so-called quality sorting hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, the proportion of females is a proxy for the skill 
requirements of the firm. This model framework predicts that women (men) will be 
over-represented in firms that demand comparatively less (more) skilled labor, so that 
the gender composition effect is negative on both male and female wages. As a third 
hypothesis, I suppose that discriminatory behavior against women by the employer can 
be a reason for a connection between the proportion of females within firms and 
individual wages. I use for this a Becker/Arrow model of employer discrimination 
embedded in a monopsonisitic framework in order to allow for heterogeneous wages 
across firms. Firms are assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of discriminatory 
preferences. Since the degree of discrimination against females is negatively correlated 
with the proportion of females within establishments and with female wages, the 
model framework predicts a positive relationship between the proportion of females 
and the wage rate for women. Furthermore, the model framework would predict for 
male employees a negative relationship with the proportion of females.  
The empirical analysis does not support the last hypothesis because both men and 
women continue to be paid less in female dominated firms after controlling for 
productivity-related individual and firm characteristics. Moreover, this remaining 
negative impact for women is larger in eastern than in western Germany. As one of the 
omitted firm characteristic in the wage regression is the market structure, one 
explanation for this difference between eastern and western Germany may be that 
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firms in eastern German can particularly exploit women due to their monopsonistic 
power.  
The second hypothesis is partly confirmed. It seems that the proportion of females 
partly reflects the low qualification of female employees, but low-qualified men are 
not selected in firms with a predominantly female workforce. As discussed before, 
these results only refer to the observed individual qualification. It is still possible that 
men and women with low unobserved labor productivity are selected by firms with a 
high proportion of females. In order to investigate this issue, a panel analysis is 
necessary. Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) investigate the quality sorting hypothesis for 
occupational segregation. Using a longitudinal analysis, they find that female 
dominated occupations reduce wages. They conclude that unobserved person-specific 
labor quality or preferences account for much of the negative relationship. However, a 
panel analysis is unable to ascertain whether the weakening of the relationship is due 
to preferences or labor quality. For this reason, this study chose a different 
methodological approach based on cross-section data.91 
As the strongest finding, my empirical analysis shows that the impact of the proportion 
of females across establishments on wages mainly captures a selection of male and 
female employees in different types of firms. It seems that women tend to prefer firms 
that offer better chances of reconciling family and work responsibilities and also 
accept lower wages in return. This outcome might reflect that a general lack of child 
care facilities in Germany creates a pressure on women to seek remedy for this lack of 
public infrastructure in the sphere of the work environment. As only some firms 
provide attractive workplaces, this constrains the number of employment opportunities 
for women and therefore creates a downward pressure on their wages. If this was true, 
such selection processes should be weaker in countries with a better public 
infrastructure for reconciling family and work responsibilities. This points to the need 
for an empirical cross-country comparison of the gender-specific workplace selection. 
Moreover, from a policy perspective, creating equal employment opportunities 
between men and women might be an important instrument for reducing the gender 
wage gap. For this purpose, policies should either aim at improving the public 
                                                 
91 I also use longitudinal data for the years 2000 to 2005. The estimations results show no significant 
effect of the proportion of females on individual wages. The comparison of longitudinal results and cross-
section estimates suggests, that unmeasured, time-invariant worker- and establishment specific effects are 
correlated with establishment proportion of females. However, I cannot disentangle whether this effect is 
due to preferences, individual productivity or the behaviour of the employer. 
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infrastructure and/or create incentives for men to take up an equal burden of child care 
responsibilities. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and outlook 
Even though the gender wage gap tends to shrink over time in most countries, a 
sizeable pay differential between men and women persists that cannot be fully 
explained by differences in individual characteristics which are considered as 
important determinants within the wage setting process. As it has been shown in the 
literature review of chapter 1, previous empirical studies have been unable to 
document the potential impact of employers and establishments respectively on the 
wage differences between men and women due to a lack of appropriate data. The 
presented thesis has incorporated the establishment level in three empirical studies on 
gender wage differentials by exploiting a newly available German data set - the Linked 
Employer-Employee Data Set of the IAB (LIAB). In the following, I briefly discuss 
the main findings of each of the last three chapters and conclude with an outlook on 
topics of future research.  
The second chapter, which is a joint work with Elke Wolf, is concerned with an 
empirical investigation of the gender wage gap within establishments. It provides a 
comprehensive study of the effects of the institutional framework and competitive 
pressure on the gender wage gap within establishments. For this purpose, two 
alternative measures describing the gender wage gap within establishments are 
defined: the observed mean gender wage gap in an establishment and a wage gap 
adjusted for the within-firm human capital differences between men and women. The 
second measure is estimated on the basis of establishment-specific wage regressions 
which control for human capital. In this way, the heterogeneity of the wage setting 
process across firms is taken into account. The first finding is that the intra-firm gender 
wage gap varies tremendously across establishments. The empirical study provides 
some evidence for the hypothesis that establishments operating under strong product 
market competition behave in a more egalitarian way. Furthermore, the analysis shows 
that establishments covered by collective wage agreements also have smaller gender 
wage gaps. Given that most unions are still dominated by men, this result is not self-
evident. Unions with a higher proportion of female members, however, seem to have 
no further decreasing effect on the intra-firm gender wage gap according to the 
findings. To the contrary, it is shown that a high proportion of female union members 
correlates with larger intra-firm wage differentials. One plausible explanation may be 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and outlook 
 
98 
that female union members focus on improving working conditions and the reconciling 
the demand of work and family rather than negotiating on wages only. The results also 
reveal a gender equalizing effect of formalized co-determination. This suggests that 
works councils systematically affect the establishment’s wage structure and actively 
use their co-decide rights on new pay schemes as well as the setting of wages above 
agreed tariff and bonus rates. Considering that establishments suffer less and less from 
institutional restrictions on the part of unions and works councils, the observed trend of 
stagnating gender wage gaps in Germany, and in most other countries (see e.g. 
European Commission 2007), may be caused by the reduced importance of formalized 
labor relations. 
While the investigation in the second chapter treats the segregation of women and men 
in different establishments as given, in the third chapter the selection into firms is 
explicitly taken into account as an explanation for the overall wage gap. The key issue 
is to disentangle differences in the individual characteristics (e.g. human capital 
endowment) of men and women and the segregation of men and women in different 
types of establishments as sources for the gender wage inequality. Therefore, the 
familiar decomposition method by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) is extended to 
four terms and is undertaken across the entire wage distribution. Drawing on a flexible 
parametric decomposition approach by Machado and Mata (2005), the four 
decomposition terms are implemented directly at each percentile of the wage 
distribution.  
The empirical analysis shows that the gender wage gap is highest in the lower part of 
the wage distribution. The decomposition of the observed wage gap reveals that only a 
small part of the wage gap is due to differences in individual characteristics of men and 
women. In the middle of the wage distribution women are even endowed with better 
individual characteristics. The selection of men and women into different firms also 
explains part of the wage gap, particularly at the lower part of the wage distribution. 
The largest part of the wage gap is attributable to differences in the remuneration of 
establishment characteristics. The findings reveal that even if men and women have the 
same endowment of individual characteristics, receive the same remuneration of these 
individual characteristics and work in the same firm, women still earn 16 percent less 
than men on average. This component of the wage gap is more pronounced in the 
lower part of the wage distribution than in the upper part. One possible explanation 
could be that women benefit less from rents which might be shared between employer 
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and employees than male colleagues. Or in other words, women tend to participate less 
in the success of the establishment, especially in the lower wage groups. Maybe they 
are more diffident in wage negotiations with their superior or they could have less 
bargaining power in comparison to male employees. Altogether, the four described 
decomposition components vary only mildly across the wage distribution i.e. the 
sources of the gender wage gap do not differ much between individuals in the lower 
and the upper part of the wage distribution. However, the decomposition was only 
considered up to 80th percentile due to right-censored wage rates. 
Finally, the fourth chapter also uses the LIAB data in order to examine the relationship 
between the share of female employees in establishments and the wages of men and 
women. The study addresses the possible reasons for such a correlation. To this 
purpose, hypotheses are formulated as to what a higher proportion of female 
employees in an establishment can indicate: attractive working conditions for women, 
lower qualifications requirements or less discrimination against women. These 
hypotheses are systematically examined in the empirical analysis. In addition to the 
proportion of female employees in the establishment, various individual and 
establishment characteristics are included successively in the regression analysis as 
determinants of wages.  
The empirical results show that an increasing proportion of women in an establishment 
reduces wages for both males and females. If variables describing workplace 
characteristics which appear to be particularly attractive for women are included, the 
impact of the proportion of female employees in the firm becomes less significant. 
Thus, there is empirical evidence that women themselves select employers which offer 
an attractive working environment and for which they are prepared to accept a 
reduction in pay. This also applies to male employees in female dominated firms. 
However, this effect is much weaker in eastern than in western Germany.  
The partly negative effect of the proportion of female employees in the wage 
regression for women when including variables capturing individual qualifications 
reveals that the proportion of women in an establishment appears to reflect the lower 
qualifications of female employees. There is no evidence that less qualified men select 
into female dominated firms.  
The discrimination preferences of employers cannot directly be observed. According to 
the discrimination hypothesis, it can be expected that there is a positive correlation 
between the proportion of female employees and the wages of female employees. 
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However, after controlling for individual qualifications and establishment 
characteristics, the proportion of women in an establishment is shown to have a 
negative impact on the wage of women, thus contradicting the discrimination 
hypothesis. 
While giving some answers this thesis has also opened up possibilities for future 
research. The unequal treatment of men and women within establishments deserves 
further attention – both in theoretical and empirical terms. Further research based on 
LIAB data could focus on the evolution of the wage differential within establishments 
as a function of tenure. One idea is to compare the gender wage gap within firms at the 
time of hiring with that for employees with longer tenure. This would allow finding out 
how much of the wage inequality between men and women within firms exists from 
the start of the employment contract and how it changes over time. Related to this, it 
would be interesting to study whether the career paths within establishments of men 
and women differ. Indeed, besides wages, it could be the case that the hierarchical 
position within firms also evolves differently for men and women. 
The present thesis neglects part-time employees due to the lack of information on the 
working hours in LIAB. However, part-time working is widespread among women, 
and deserves to be considered in further analysis. In order to include part-time 
employees in the analysis, data on the number of working hours of part-time 
employees is necessary.  It is unfortunately not possible to receive information related 
to working hours in the Employment Statistics Register which is an administrative data 
set. An alternative would be to use the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES), 
another German linked employer-employee data set, which contains hourly wage rates. 
This data set is not so comprehensive with regard to the included establishment 
characteristics and basically omits the public sector and smaller firms. However, the 
latter data set presents the further advantage that the wages are not censored from 
above. Thus, the gender wage gap can also be investigated in the highest percentiles of 
the wage distribution, possible identifying a glass ceiling.  
In order to further improve the analysis of the gender wage gap using the LIAB data, it 
would be worthwhile to extend the amount of available worker information with 
regard to the employment history. Through the incorporation of the employment 
history the human capital endowment could be better captured. Information on the 
number, length and timing of the career interruptions of the workers, drawn from the 
employee and benefit recipient history (BLH), could be matched to the LIAB data.  
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Recent literature from the US has shown that gender role attitudes can have a 
significant impact on the gender wage gap as well as on the employment status of 
women. For instance, Fortin (2005) finds that there are significant gender differences 
in the importance of ‘making a lot of money’ and ‘having a job useful to society’. 
These preferences will affect the types of jobs chosen by women and contribute to a 
larger gender wage gap. In further research, it would be of great interest to examine the 
importance of such social attitudes regarding gender roles for the occupational choice 
as well for the choice of a workplace in Germany. 
From the policy perspective, this thesis is interesting because it shows that gender 
differences in wages depends on the selection of men and women into different types 
of firms but within the same firm men and women are treated unequally as well. One 
reason for both key findings could be the lesser mobility of women due to anticipated 
or actual family responsibilities. This may limit women’s choice of potential 
employers on the one hand and weaken women’s bargaining position in firms on the 
other hand. In order to create equal employment opportunities between men and 
women and to improve women’s bargaining position in firms, policies could aim at 
improving the public childcare supply and/or create incentives for men to take up an 
equal burden of child care responsibilities. Indirectly, employment disincentives 
inherent to the German tax system may also weaken women’s bargaining position in 
firms.  
In sum, I hope this thesis does not only provide new insides into the nature and the 
source of gender inequality in Germany but also motivates new and exiting research.  
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Appendices 
A Appendix for Chapter 2 
 
Table A 1: Distribution of establishment size and industry sector in our sample and the 
original LIAB sample (2001) 
    Shares . . .   
    in the LIAB (%) in our sample(%) 
Establishment size        
 20 – 49 employees  28.18   <1.00  
 50 – 99 empl.  19.41   5.35  
 100 – 199 empl.  16.05   17.01  
 200 – 499 empl.  18.62   32.78  
 500 – 999 empl.  9.74   23.60  
 1000 – 4999 empl.  7.33   19.01  
 5000 – 9999 empl.  0.41   1.13  
 > 10000 empl.  0.26   <1.00  
Industry sector       
 Farming, forestry and mining  2.34   2.38  
 Manufacturing  30.9   47.08  
 Construction  5.96   1.19  
 Trade and repair  12.1   9.77  
     
 
Communication and information 
transmission  
4.67 
  
4.05 
 
 Credit and insurance industry  4.2   10.53  
 Firm-related services  9.84   7.56  
 Other services   17.76   14.74  
  Lobbies   12.23     2.70   
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2001. 
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Table A 2: Description of the sample and the gender wage gap in establishments  
Year Number of 
establishments 
Number of 
male 
employees 
Number of 
female 
employees 
Within-firm 
GWG based 
on reported 
value (in 
logarithm) 
Within-firm 
GWG (in 
logarithm) 
Overall GWG 
(in logarithm)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Establishments with at least 100 male employees       
1997 810 637,784 167,095 0.173 0.191 0.207 
1998 818 584,979 157,701 0.173 0.191 0.211 
1999 810 525,978 141,747 0.168 0.186 0.215 
2000 1,020 576,187 151,954 0.168 0.187 0.215 
2001 1,113 633,183 166,934 0.165 0.185 0.219 
Establishments with 20 to 99 male employees        
1997 338 17,218 22,712 0.207 0.217 0.207 
1998 377 19,161 23,751 0.207 0.218 0.211 
1999 369 17,977 22,407 0.208 0.220 0.215 
2000 620 29,223 32,560 0.213 0.227 0.215 
2001 739 36,512 40,151 0.202 0.216 0.219 
Note: The results refer to establishments with at least 20 female employees. Further explanations are 
given in chapter 2. 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001 
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Table A 3: Summary statistic of individual characteristics for the firm-specific wage 
regressions (pooled over 1997-2001) 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
Log wage 4.597 0.244  4.427 0.291 
Low education without vocational training 0.122 0.327  0.202 0.401 
Vocational training 0.706 0.455  0.603 0.489 
Secondary school  
(with and without vocational training) 0.049 0.215  0.127 0.333 
College of higher education or university 0.123 0.328  0.068 0.252 
Potential experience 21.900 9.657  19.758 10.682 
(Potential experience)2/100 5.729 4.436  5.045 4.626 
Job tenure (in days)/1000  4,269.920 2,865.767  3,563.518 2,715.643 
Share of censored wage rates 0.152 0.359   0.045 0.207 
Observations 2,958,111     785,431   
Note: The results refer to establishments with at least 100 male and 20 female employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB Data 1997-2001 
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Table A 4: Summary statistic of individual characteristics for the pooled wage 
regression (pooled over 1997-2001) 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
Log wage 4.435 0.323  4.226 0.302 
Low education without vocational training 0.137 0.344  0.218 0.413 
Vocational training 0.707 0.455  0.671 0.470 
Secondary school  
(with and without vocational training) 0.074 0.261  0.080 0.271 
College of higher education or university 0.083 0.276  0.031 0.174 
Potential experience 22.292 10.050  21.545 10.908 
(Potential experience)2/100 5.979 4.678  5.832 4.902 
Job tenure (in days)/1000  3,183.280 2,744.020  3,030.600 2,565.310 
Share of censored wage rates 0.092 0.290   0.013 0.111 
Observations 120,091     141,581   
Note: The results refer to establishments with 20-99 male and at least 20 female employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001 
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Table A 5: Summary statistic of establishment characteristics (pooled over 1997-2001) 
  Total Sample Restricted Sample 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
Raw gender wage gap (Gap1) 0.199 0.123  0.196 0.121 
Adjusted gender wage gap (Gap2) 0.135 0.098  0.132 0.096 
Number of employees 1,051.500 2,167.720  1,077.430 2,231.340
Relative establishment size (employees relative 
to total employment in the industry sector) 0.019 0.037  0.019 0.037 
Wage bill per employee 4,906.380 1,624.340  4,928.250 1,628.270
Female share (all employees) 0.386 0.230  0.381 0.230 
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.784 0.412  0.814 0.389 
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.104 0.306  0.101 0.301 
Export quota (sales) 0.179 0.252  0.181 0.252 
Works council 0.914 0.281  0.921 0.270 
Works council * female share  
(of all employees) 0.350 0.247  0.348 0.245 
Wage agreement * female share in involved 
union 0.323 0.219  0.332 0.215 
Agriculture and forestry; electricity,  
gas and water supply, mining 
0.030 0.170  0.029 0.169 
Manufacturing I 0.147 0.354  0.145 0.352 
Manufacturing II 0.350 0.477  0.352 0.478 
Construction 0.012 0.107  0.012 0.111 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.087 0.281  0.087 0.281 
Transport and communication 0.043 0.203  0.045 0.207 
Financial intermediation 0.102 0.302  0.109 0.311 
Real estate, renting and business activities  0.049 0.215  0.050 0.218 
Education 0.026 0.160  0.026 0.160 
Other service activities  0.155 0.362  0.145 0.352 
Berlin-West 0.061 0.239  0.061 0.240 
Schleswig Holstein 0.020 0.139  0.020 0.140 
Hamburg   0.056 0.230  0.059 0.235 
Lower Saxony 0.100 0.300  0.099 0.299 
Bremen   0.024 0.152  0.024 0.154 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.250 0.433  0.252 0.434 
Hesse  0.092 0.289  0.093 0.290 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.066 0.248  0.062 0.242 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.155 0.362  0.154 0.361 
Bavaria   0.163 0.369   0.161 0.368 
Observations 7,014     6,491   
Note: The results refer to establishments with at least 20 male and 20 female employees. The restricted 
sample does not contain establishments switching their union status.  
Source: own calculation. The total sample is based on LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001. The 
restricted sample is based on the LIAB cross-sectional model 1997, 1999, 2001. The female share of 
unions is given on the homepage of the DGB: http://www.dgb.de/dgb/mitgliederzahlen/mitglieder.htm.  
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Table A 6: Coefficients of the firm-specific wage estimations in Tobit models 
(establishments ≥ 100 male employees), percentiles  
Percentile Percentile Percentile 
Variables 
Number of 
Obs. 25th 50th 75th 
Potential experience 1,704 0.013 0.022 0.033 
(Potential experience)2/100 1,704 -0.056 -0.035 -0.020 
Job tenure (in days)/1000 1,704 0.106 0.246 0.427 
Low education without vocational training 1,192 -0.58 -0.439 -0.281 
Vocational training 1,669 -0.335 -0.145 0.089 
Secondary school (with and without 
vocational training) 904 -0.194 0.024 0.307 
College of higher education or university 1,118 0.159 0.304 0.509 
Note: Coefficients result from wage regressions in establishments with at least 100 male and 20 female 
employees. Further explanations are given in chapter 2.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 1997-2001 
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Table B 1: Summary statistics of individual characteristics for male and female 
employees 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.   Mean Std. dev. 
Log wage (imputated)  4.6584 0.3225  4.4237 0.3776 
Log wage (censored)  4.6205 0.2610  4.4089 0.3492 
Age 40.7127 7.8045  39.5960 8.3721 
Job tenure (in month) 138.0195 98.6705  119.0050 93.6713 
Low education without vocational 
training degree 
0.1161 0.3204  0.2033 0.4024 
Vocational training degree 0.7030 0.4569  0.6229 0.4847 
High school without vocational training 
degree 
0.0065 0.0802  0.0122 0.1096 
High school with vocational training 
degree 
0.0319 0.1758  0.0704 0.2559 
Technical university degree 0.0728 0.2598  0.0340 0.1812 
University degree 0.0697 0.2546  0.0572 0.2323 
Simple blue-collar occupation 0.2549 0.4358  0.2211 0.4150 
Qualified blue-collar occupation 0.2346 0.4237  0.0445 0.2062 
Engineer 0.1965 0.3973  0.0812 0.2732 
Service occupation  0.1177 0.3222  0.0886 0.2841 
Clerical and administrative occupation 0.1480 0.3551  0.4771 0.4995 
Profession, manager and others 0.0483 0.2145  0.0876 0.2827 
Number of employees 384,908  98,368 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
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Table B 2: Summary statistics of establishment characteristics for male and female 
employess 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Employment size (1/103) 2.3976 3.9996  1.7425 3.0503 
Proportion of female employees 0.2089 0.1604  0.3976 0.2354 
Proportion of highly qualified 
employees 
0.6855 0.2527  0.6500 0.2625 
Business start-up after 1989 0.1484 0.3555  0.1473 0.3544 
Export quota (sales) 0.3077 0.2956  0.2512 0.2821 
Wage bill per employee (1/103) 5.8003 2.0433  5.3250 2.3203 
Sales per employee (1/105) 5.0887 13.6998  5.3275 19.7887 
Good results last year 0.3595 0.4799  0.3527 0.4778 
Bad results last year  0.2826 0.4503  0.2895 0.4535 
Average results last year 0.3579 0.4794  0.3578 0.4793 
State of the technology 2.9817 0.7145  2.9974 0.7160 
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.7778 0.4157  0.7286 0.4447 
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.1128 0.3163  0.1048 0.3063 
No wage agreement 0.1094 0.3122  0.1667 0.3727 
Works council 0.9156 0.2780  0.8733 0.3326 
Average weekly working hours 36.7957 1.8723  37.2115 1.7615 
Agriculture and forestry, electricity, 
gas and water supply, mining 
0.0384 0.1922  0.0251 0.1564 
Manufacturing I 0.2190 0.4136  0.1785 0.3830 
Manufacturing II 0.4981 0.5000  0.4113 0.4921 
Construction 0.0344 0.1822  0.0148 0.1206 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.0541 0.2262  0.1341 0.3407 
Transport and communication 0.0687 0.2530  0.0462 0.2100 
Financial intermediation 0.0013 0.0360  0.0010 0.0320 
Real estate, renting and business 
activities 
0.0527 0.2235  0.0695 0.2543 
Education  0.0028 0.0524  0.0056 0.0746 
Other service activities 0.0306 0.1721  0.1138 0.3176 
Berlin-West 0.0432 0.2034  0.0583 0.2343 
Schleswig Holstein 0.0503 0.2185  0.0602 0.2379 
Hamburg  0.0588 0.2352  0.0522 0.2225 
Lower Saxony  0.0841 0.2775  0.0745 0.2625 
Bremen  0.0298 0.1700  0.0352 0.1843 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.1982 0.3986  0.1681 0.3739 
Hesse  0.1332 0.3398  0.1330 0.3395 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.0472 0.2120  0.0559 0.2298 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.1290 0.3352  0.1572 0.3640 
Bavaria  0.1668 0.3728  0.1664 0.3724 
Saarland  0.0595 0.2365  0.0391 0.1937 
Number of employees 384,908  98,368 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
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Table B 3: Estimates of OLS and Quantile wage regressions for male employees 
  OLS regression  Quantile regression 
      θ=0.10 θ=0.25 θ=0.50 θ=0.75
Variables Coeff. Std. err.   Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Age 0.0374*** 0.0004 0.0341 0.0335 0.0305 0.0299
Age squared (1/102) -0.0398*** 0.0005 -0.0376 -0.0363 -0.0325 -0.0313
Low education without vocational 
training degree 
-0.0936*** 0.0011 -0.0844 -0.0798 -0.0775 -0.0845
Vocational training degree 
(reference) 
- -  - - - -
High school without vocational 
training degree 
0.0442*** 0.0041 -0.0138 0.0323 0.0631 0.0603
High school with vocational 
training degree 
0.0858*** 0.0019 0.0563 0.0688 0.0872 0.0916
Technical university degree 0.2146*** 0.0014 0.2432 0.2218 0.2054 0.1978
University degree 0.2937*** 0.0015 0.3164 0.3046 0.2838 0.2692
Simple blue-collar occupation -0.2594*** 0.0012 -0.1507 -0.2034 -0.2695 -0.3272
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.2087*** 0.0012 -0.1137 -0.1610 -0.2228 -0.2735
Engineer 0.0259*** 0.0012 0.0599 0.0448 0.0230 0.0072
Service occupation  -0.2566*** 0.0014 -0.1846 -0.2195 -0.2739 -0.3099
Clerical and administrative 
occupation (reference)  
- -  - - - -
Profession, manager and others 0.0540*** 0.0018 0.0536 0.0707 0.0696 0.0599
Job tenure (in month) (1/102) 0.0334*** 0.0004 0.0417 0.0359 0.0315 0.0299
Employment size (1/103) 0.0179*** 0.0003 0.0224 0.0212 0.0200 0.0151
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0007*** 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0005
Proportion of female employees -0.0970*** 0.0024 -0.1362 -0.1289 -0.1035 -0.0719
Proportion of highly qualified 
employees 
0.0803*** 0.0015 0.0767 0.0569 0.0589 0.0648
Business start-up after 1989 0.0389*** 0.0010 0.0305 0.0426 0.0479 0.0433
Export quota (sales) 0.0099*** 0.0015 0.0107 0.0090 0.0019 0.0012
Wage bill per employee (1/103) 0.0230*** 0.0002 0.0231 0.0271 0.0289 0.0279
Sales per employee (1/105) 0.0005*** 0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Good results last year 0.0159*** 0.0008 0.0140 0.0147 0.0168 0.0156
Bad results last year  -0.0072*** 0.0009 -0.0110 -0.0068 -0.0038 -0.0055
Average results last year 
(reference)  
- -  - - - -
State of the technology 0.0136*** 0.0005 0.0122 0.0146 0.0133 0.0127
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.0366*** 0.0013 0.0634 0.0472 0.0368 0.0207
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.0214*** 0.0016 0.0240 0.0231 0.0224 0.0130
No wage agreement (reference)  - -  - - - -
Works council 0.0870*** 0.0014 0.1177 0.0940 0.0762 0.0619
Average weekly working hours -0.0097*** 0.0002 -0.0113 -0.0103 -0.0090 -0.0084
Constant 3.8928*** 0.0125  3.6841 3.8116 4.0144 4.1908
R2 0.6077      
Number of observations 384,908  384,908 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the imputed daily wage. Controls for regions and industries are 
also included in estimations. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent, Quantile 
regressions are without standard errors.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
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Table B 4: Estimates OLS and Quantile wage regressions for female employees 
  OLS regression  Quantile regression 
      θ=0.10 θ=0.25 θ=0.50 θ=0.75
 Variables Coeff. Std. err.  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Age 0.0241*** 0.0010 -0.0014 0.0194 0.0305 0.0351
Age squared (1/102) -0.0263*** 0.0013 0.0020 -0.0227 -0.0350 -0.0395
Low education without vocational 
training degree 
-0.0843*** 0.0025 -0.0602 -0.0639 -0.0715 -0.0816
Vocational training degree 
(reference) 
- - - - - -
High school without vocational 
training degree 
0.0712*** 0.0078 -0.0220 0.0249 0.0780 0.1225
High school with vocational 
training degree 
0.1142*** 0.0035 0.0792 0.0834 0.0968 0.1245
Technical university degree 0.2569*** 0.0049 0.2160 0.2255 0.2519 0.2697
University degree 0.3563*** 0.0040 0.3008 0.3204 0.3565 0.3890
Simple blue-collar occupation -0.1913*** 0.0028 -0.0675 -0.1395 -0.1963 -0.2478
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.1844*** 0.0044 -0.1033 -0.1533 -0.1975 -0.2212
Engineer 0.0154*** 0.0034 0.0554 0.0330 0.0101 -0.0115
Service occupation  -0.1560*** 0.0034 -0.1357 -0.1554 -0.1487 -0.1443
Clerical and administrative 
occupation (reference)  
- - - - - -
Profession, manager and others 0.0860*** 0.0037 0.1170 0.1113 0.0960 0.0765
Job tenure (in month) (1/102) 0.0428*** 0.0011 0.0524 0.0457 0.0401 0.0343
Employment size (1/103) 0.0270*** 0.0009 0.0381 0.0300 0.0247 0.0188
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0010*** 0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0006
Proportion of female employees -0.0762*** 0.0049 -0.0939 -0.0862 -0.0902 -0.0794
Proportion of highly qualified 
employees 
0.1406*** 0.0039 0.1896 0.1094 0.0825 0.0883
Business start-up after 1989 0.0431*** 0.0026 0.0181 0.0271 0.0427 0.0488
Export quota (sales) 0.0476*** 0.0042 0.0222 0.0422 0.0480 0.0364
Wage bill per employee (1/103) 0.0304*** 0.0004 0.0249 0.0355 0.0395 0.0421
Sales per employee (1/105) 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
Good results last year 0.0222*** 0.0021 0.0215 0.0276 0.0257 0.0255
Bad results last year  0.0073*** 0.0022 -0.0054 0.0095 0.0116 0.0140
Average results last year 
(reference)  
- - - - - -
State of the technology 0.0130*** 0.0013 0.0123 0.0103 0.0086 0.0066
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.0470*** 0.0028 0.0923 0.0572 0.0483 0.0357
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.0270*** 0.0038 0.0742 0.0377 0.0255 0.0160
No wage agreement (reference)  - - - - - -
Works council 0.1555*** 0.0031 0.2766 0.1934 0.1315 0.1054
Average weekly working hours -0.0193*** 0.0007 -0.0257 -0.0205 -0.0206 -0.0172
Constant 4.1050*** 0.0322  4.4006 4.0757 4.0733 4.0419
R2 0.4992   
Number of observations 98,368  98,368 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the imputed daily wage. Controls for regions and industries are 
also included in estimations. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent, Quantile 
regressions are without standard errors. 
Source: own calculation; LIAB cross-sectional model 2002 
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Table C 1: Summary statistics of individual characteristics for male and female 
employees, western Germany 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Log wage  4.6214 0.2683  4.4358 0.3440 
Age 40.5572 7.9364  39.4871 8.5406 
Job tenure (in months) 127.3092 96.8090  109.2366 91.0117 
Foreigner 0.1029 0.3038  0.0823 0.2748 
Without vocational training degree 0.1431 0.3502  0.1882 0.3909 
With vocational training degree 0.7048 0.4561  0.7101 0.4537 
Graduate degree 0.1520 0.3591  0.1016 0.3022 
Simple blue-collar occupation  0.2509 0.4335  0.1519 0.3589 
Qualified blue-collar occupation 0.1995 0.3996  0.0415 0.1995 
Engineers 0.1682 0.3740  0.0574 0.2325 
Service occupation  0.1282 0.3343  0.1173 0.3218 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.1814 0.3854  0.4540 0.4979 
Profession, manager and others 0.0719 0.2583  0.1780 0.3825 
Censored wage rates 0.2091 0.4067  0.0814 0.2734 
Number of employees 565,100   192,814 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 2: Summary statistics of individual characteristics for male and female 
employees, eastern Germany 
  Males   Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Log wage  4.2680 0.3239  4.1916 0.3743 
Age 41.5545 7.9294  41.7276 7.8038 
Job tenure (in months) 77.4810 43.7862  79.6125 43.4014 
Foreigner 0.0099 0.0989  0.0065 0.0801 
Without vocational training degree 0.0368 0.1882  0.0355 0.1851 
With vocational training degree 0.7929 0.4052  0.8068 0.3948 
Graduate degree 0.1703 0.3759  0.1577 0.3644 
Simple blue-collar occupation  0.2686 0.4432  0.1455 0.3526 
Qualified blue-collar occupations 0.2501 0.4331  0.0444 0.2061 
Engineers 0.1287 0.3349  0.0708 0.2565 
Service occupation  0.1632 0.3695  0.1229 0.3283 
Clerical and administrative occupations  0.0800 0.2712  0.3361 0.4724 
Profession, manager and others 0.1094 0.3122  0.2802 0.4491 
Censored wage rate 0.1054 0.3071  0.0571 0.2320 
Number of employees 120,985   75,340 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 3: Summary statistics of establishment characteristics for male and female 
employees, western Germany 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Establishment proportion of females 0.2419 0.1935  0.4870 0.2411 
Employment size (1/103) 3.4952 6.5812  2.4588 5.1064 
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.7784 0.4153  0.7727 0.4191 
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.1209 0.3260  0.0969 0.2958 
No wage agreement 0.1008 0.3010  0.1304 0.3367 
Works council 0.9158 0.2777  0.8888 0.3144 
Sales per employee (1/105) 10.7694 63.6161  17.3609 79.1176 
Wage bill per employee (1/104) 0.2975 0.0945  0.2656 0.1027 
Very high or high state of the technology 0.7624 0.4256  0.7622 0.4258 
Average weekly working hours 36.9283 2.1720  37.6515 1.7136 
Overtime 0.9525 0.2128  0.9264 0.2612 
No overtime compensation  0.0023 0.0478  0.0047 0.0687 
Measures for improving work-child compatibility 0.4625 0.4986  0.4749 0.4994 
Workplace health promotion  0.8725 0.3335  0.8418 0.3649 
Workplace with physical or mental stress 0.3860 0.4868  0.3964 0.4892 
Workplace with high flexibility needs 0.6463 0.4781  0.6315 0.4824 
West Berlin  0.0464 0.2104  0.0596 0.2368 
Schleswig Holstein 0.0474 0.2126  0.0593 0.2362 
Hamburg 0.0563 0.2305  0.0599 0.2374 
Lower Saxony 0.0959 0.2944  0.0863 0.2808 
Bremen 0.0288 0.1673  0.0349 0.1835 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.2146 0.4105  0.2023 0.4017 
Hesse 0.1301 0.3364  0.1280 0.3341 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.0448 0.2070  0.0539 0.2258 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.1322 0.3387  0.1399 0.3469 
Bavaria 0.1428 0.3499  0.1433 0.3504 
Saarland 0.0606 0.2386  0.0327 0.1778 
Agriculture and forestry 0.0024 0.0486  0.0016 0.0400 
Electricity, gas and water supply, mining 0.0278 0.1645  0.0130 0.1132 
Manufacturing 0.6241 0.4844  0.3825 0.4860 
Construction 0.0282 0.1656  0.0076 0.0868 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.0429 0.2026  0.0710 0.2568 
Transport and communication 0.0575 0.2328  0.0274 0.1631 
Financial intermediation 0.0646 0.2459  0.1411 0.3481 
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.0601 0.2377  0.0678 0.2514 
Other service activities 0.0923 0.2895   0.2881 0.4529 
Number of establishments 5,533  5,133 
Number of employees 565,100   192,814 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 4: Summary statistics of establishment characteristics for male and female 
employees, eastern Germany 
  Males  Females 
Variables Mean Std. dev.    Mean Std. dev.  
Establishment proportion of females 0.2791 0.2186  0.5915 0.2504 
Employment size (1/103) 0.8036 1.3813  0.8253 1.1746 
Industry-wide wage agreement 0.5417 0.4983  0.5893 0.4920 
Firm-specific wage agreement 0.1970 0.3977  0.1607 0.3673 
No wage agreement 0.2613 0.4393  0.2499 0.4330 
Works council 0.7740 0.4183  0.7984 0.4012 
Sales per employee (1/105) 2.3112 8.7614  3.3196 13.6779 
Wage bill per employee (1/104) 0.2189 0.0887  0.2065 0.0809 
Very high or high state of the technology 0.7553 0.4299  0.7254 0.4463 
Average weekly working hours 39.2733 1.4678  39.4793 1.2643 
Overtime 0.8606 0.3463  0.7746 0.4178 
No overtime compensation  0.0056 0.0746  0.0040 0.0631 
Measures for improving work-child compatibility 0.2442 0.4296  0.3002 0.4583 
Workplace health promotion  0.8300 0.3756  0.8200 0.3842 
Workplace with physical or mental stress 0.4621 0.4986  0.5028 0.5000 
Workplace with high flexibility needs 0.6207 0.4852  0.6042 0.4890 
Berlin-East 0.0547 0.2274  0.0734 0.2608 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 0.1530 0.3600  0.1614 0.3679 
Brandenburg 0.1240 0.3296  0.1069 0.3089 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.2818 0.4499  0.2428 0.4288 
Thuringia 0.1889 0.3914  0.2184 0.4132 
Saxony 0.1976 0.3982  0.1971 0.3978 
Agriculture and forestry 0.0212 0.1440  0.0159 0.1250 
Electricity, gas and water supply, mining 0.0668 0.2497  0.0402 0.1963 
Manufacturing 0.4809 0.4996  0.2819 0.4499 
Construction 0.0923 0.2894  0.0159 0.1249 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.0374 0.1897  0.0383 0.1920 
Transport and communication 0.0770 0.2666  0.0285 0.1664 
Financial intermediation 0.0152 0.1222  0.0580 0.2338 
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.0524 0.2228  0.0616 0.2404 
Other service activities 0.1569 0.3637   0.4598 0.4984 
Number of establishments 3.035  2.746 
Number of employees 120,985   75,340 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 5: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, western Germany 
  Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion 0.1071***0.0368 -0.2082***0.0241 -0.1687*** 0.0215 
Age    0.0320*** 0.0020  0.0343*** 0.0017 
Age squared (1/102)   -0.0336***0.0021 -0.0353*** 0.0019 
Job tenure (in month)    0.0014*** 0.0001  0.0011*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102)   -0.0003***0.0000 - 0.0002***0.0000 
Foreigner   -0.0053 0.0070 -0.0182*** 0.0047 
Without vocational training   -0.1099***0.0066 -0.1003*** 0.0059 
Graduate degree    0.2855*** 0.0084  0.2632*** 0.0079 
Simple blue-collar occupation     0.0318** 0.0123 -0.0135 0.0114 
Qualified blue-collar occupation    0.0742*** 0.0121  0.0423*** 0.0105 
Engineers    0.3283*** 0.0153  0.2924*** 0.0143 
Clerical and administrative occupation    0.3283*** 0.0157  0.2688*** 0.0136 
Profession, manager and others      0.3224*** 0.0153  0.3442*** 0.0128 
Employment size (1/103)      0.0219*** 0.0023 
Employment size squared (1/106)         -0.0005*** 0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement       
Firm-specific wage agreement       
Works council             
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours       
Overtime       
No overtime compensation        
Improving work-child compatibility       
Workplace health promotion        
Workplace with physical or mental stress       
Workplace with high flexibility needs             
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms no / no /no yes /no /no yes / yes /no 
Log pseudolikelihood -243,255.22 -55,910.22 -24,232.26 
Observations  565,100 565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author. 
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 5, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (4) Specification (5) Specification (6) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1645***0.0204 -0.0870***0.0195 -0.0793***0.0188 
Age  0.0347*** 0.0017  0.0346*** 0.0016  0.0348*** 0.0016 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0359***0.0019 -0.0358***0.0018 -0.0360***0.0017 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0010*** 0.0001  0.0010*** 0.0001  0.0010*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0002***0.0000 -0.0002***0.0000 -0.0002***0.0000 
Foreigner -0.0168***0.0046 -0.0188***0.0043 -0.0184***0.0042 
Without vocational training -0.0981***0.0056 -0.0921***0.0052 -0.0935***0.0050 
Graduate degree  0.2572*** 0.0077  0.2380*** 0.0070  0.2367*** 0.0067 
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0151 0.0113 -0.0140 0.0096 -0.0170* 0.0092 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.0470*** 0.0104  0.0437*** 0.0092  0.0375*** 0.0087 
Engineers  0.2924*** 0.0139  0.2734*** 0.0123  0.2683*** 0.0116 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.2691*** 0.0134  0.2520*** 0.0114  0.2501*** 0.0108 
Profession, manager and others  0.3424*** 0.0125  0.3315*** 0.0116  0.3256*** 0.0111 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0188*** 0.0022  0.0140*** 0.0024  0.0084*** 0.0021 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0004***0.0001 -0.0004***0.0001 -0.0002***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0404*** 0.0107  0.0420*** 0.0095  0.0321*** 0.0092 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0470*** 0.0146  0.0553*** 0.0137  0.0396*** 0.0123 
Works council  0.1210*** 0.0109  0.0878*** 0.0104  0.0679*** 0.0103 
Sales per employee (1/105)   -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0001* 0.0001 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)    0.7247*** 0.0546  0.6975*** 0.0518 
Very high or high state of the technology      0.0343*** 0.0074  0.0362*** 0.0064 
Average weekly working hours     -0.0114***0.0017 
Overtime      0.0434*** 0.0099 
No overtime compensation       0.0228 0.0228 
Improving work-child compatibility      0.0232*** 0.0071 
Workplace health promotion       0.0075 0.0075 
Workplace with physical or mental stress      0.0156** 0.0072 
Workplace with high flexibility needs         0.0053 0.0068 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes /no yes / yes /no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -16,433.64 715.51 4,492.13 
Observations  565,100 565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 5, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for males employees, 
western Germany 
  Specification (7) Specification (8) Specification (9) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.0728***0.0179 -0.1553***0.0169 -0.1549***0.0199 
Age  0.0347*** 0.0015  0.0341*** 0.0017  0.0348*** 0.0016 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0359***0.0017 -0.0355***0.0018 -0.0359***0.0018 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0010*** 0.0001  0.0012*** 0.0001  0.0011*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0002***0.0000 -0.0002***0.0000 -0.0002***0.0000 
Foreigner -0.0185***0.0039 -0.0129***0.0046 -0.0171***0.0045 
Without vocational training  0.0317 0.0855 -0.1081***0.0059 -0.1014***0.0056 
Graduate degree  0.0264 0.1163  0.2672*** 0.0074  0.2588*** 0.0073 
Simple blue-collar occupation   0.1292 0.1769  0.0067 0.0104 -0.0191* 0.0107 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.2440 0.1561  0.0513*** 0.0096  0.0338*** 0.0097 
Engineers  0.9130*** 0.1799  0.3006*** 0.0125  0.2828*** 0.0132 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.5887*** 0.1797  0.3132*** 0.0138  0.2649*** 0.0125 
Profession, manager and others  1.0588*** 0.2428  0.3082*** 0.0127  0.3350*** 0.0120 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0079*** 0.0021    0.0126*** 0.0023 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0002***0.0001     -0.0002***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0306*** 0.0089     
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0379*** 0.0118     
Works council  0.0669*** 0.0101         
Sales per employee (1/105) -0.0001* 0.0001     
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  0.6983*** 0.0511     
Very high or high state of the technology 0.0355*** 0.0062         
Average weekly working hours -0.0058 0.0037 -0.0226***0.0017 -0.0165***0.0023 
Overtime  0.0645*** 0.0377  0.0680*** 0.0121  0.0528*** 0.0112 
No overtime compensation   0.0193 0.0233 -0.0364 0.0324 -0.0133 0.0279 
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0557*** 0.0153  0.0676*** 0.0090  0.0361*** 0.0080 
Workplace health promotion  -0.0145 0.0235  0.0394*** 0.0105  0.0252*** 0.0094 
Workplace with physical or mental stress  0.0380*** 0.0135  0.0080 0.0091  0.0124 0.0083 
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0023 0.0144  0.0164* 0.0086  0.0080 0.0076 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / yes yes / yes /no yes / yes /no 
Log pseudolikelihood 7,409.61 -31,464.76 -16,299.04 
Observations  565,100 565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
Appendix for Chapter 4 
 
120 
Table C 5, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for males employees, 
western Germany 
  Specification (10) Specification (11) Specification (12)
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1555***0.0195  0.0717** 0.0301  0.0671** 0.0302 
Age  0.0350*** 0.0016     
Age squared (1/102) -0.0362***0.0018     
Job tenure (in month)  0.0010*** 0.0001     
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0002***0.0000     
Foreigner -0.0165***0.0044     
Without vocational training -0.0993***0.0053     
Graduate degree  0.2549*** 0.0073     
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0190** 0.0106     
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.0394*** 0.0097     
Engineers  0.2850*** 0.0129     
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.2658*** 0.0125     
Profession, manager and others  0.3351*** 0.0118         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0123*** 0.0022  0.0265*** 0.0029  0.0236*** 0.0026 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0002***0.0001 -0.0005***0.0001 -0.0005***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0287*** 0.0102    0.0167 0.0194 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0286** 0.0131   -0.0106 0.0238 
Works council  0.0973*** 0.0110      0.1857*** 0.0160 
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours -0.0126***0.0021     
Overtime  0.0437*** 0.0110     
No overtime compensation   0.0136 0.0267     
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0294*** 0.0079     
Workplace health promotion   0.0083 0.0088     
Workplace with physical or mental stress  0.0145* 0.0080     
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0088 0.0075         
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes /no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -11,981.09 -206,517.71 -198,969.22 
Observations  565,100 565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 5, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for males employees, 
western Germany 
  Specification (13) Specification (14) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Female proportion  0.1829*** 0.0241  0.1767***0.0236 
Age     
Age squared (1/102)     
Job tenure (in month)     
Job tenure squared (1/102)     
Foreigner     
Without vocational training     
Graduate degree     
Simple blue-collar occupation      
Qualified blue-collar occupation     
Engineers     
Clerical and administrative occupation     
Profession, manager and others         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0147*** 0.0030  0.0088***0.0029 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0004***0.0001  0.0002***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0235* 0.0142  0.0094 0.0140 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0103 0.0176 -0.0119 0.0172 
Works council  0.1227*** 0.0139  0.1013***0.0136 
Sales per employee (1/105) -0.0003* 0.0002  0.0002* 0.0001 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  1.2600*** 0.0819  1.2143***0.0766 
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0465*** 0.0083  0.0476***0.0079 
Average weekly working hours    0.0128***0.0027 
Overtime    0.0590***0.0136 
No overtime compensation     0.0727** 0.0319 
Improving work-child compatibility    0.0346***0.0088 
Workplace health promotion     0.0019 0.0091 
Workplace with physical or mental stress   -0.0051 0.0086 
Workplace with high flexibility needs      0.0310***0.0080 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -169,955.29 -166,251.24 
Observations  565,100 565,100 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 6: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, western 
Germany 
  Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.2316***0.0298 -0.2669***0.0254 -0.2194***0.0277 
Age    0.0260*** 0.0017  0.0285*** 0.0016 
Age squared (1/102)   -0.0302***0.0020 -0.0317***0.0019 
Job tenure (in month)    0.0012*** 0.0001  0.0010*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102)   -0.0001***0.0000 -0.0001***0.0000 
Foreigner   -0.0165***0.0059 -0.0141** 0.0055 
Without vocational training   -0.1051***0.0065 -0.1037***0.0057 
Graduate degree    0.3465*** 0.0089  0.3186*** 0.0086 
Simple blue-collar occupation    -0.0503***0.0151 -0.1030***0.0145 
Qualified blue-collar occupation   -0.0519***0.0139 -0.0880***0.0123 
Engineers    0.1914*** 0.0232  0.1472*** 0.0179 
Clerical and administrative occupation    0.1882*** 0.0161  0.1266*** 0.0114 
Profession, manager and others      0.2459*** 0.0109  0.2472*** 0.0104 
Employment size (1/103)      0.0333*** 0.0036 
Employment size squared (1/106)         -0.0008***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement       
Firm-specific wage agreement       
Works council             
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours       
Overtime       
No overtime compensation        
Improving work-child compatibility       
Workplace health promotion        
Workplace with physical or mental stress       
Workplace with high flexibility needs             
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms no / no / no yes /no / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -843,89.52 -46,300.90 -34,812.51 
Observations  192,814 192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 6, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, 
western Germany 
  Specification (4) Specification (5) Specification (6) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1770***0.0263 -0.0520** 0.0232 -0.0462** 0.0225 
Age  0.0293*** 0.0016  0.0283*** 0.0015  0.0284*** 0.0015 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0326***0.0018 -0.0314***0.0017 -0.0314***0.0017 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0008*** 0.0001  0.0009*** 0.0001  0.0009*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0001***0.0000 -0.0001***0.0000 -0.0001***0.0000 
Foreigner -0.0147***0.0052 -0.0182***0.0048 -0.0174***0.0045 
Without vocational training -0.1017***0.0056 -0.0975***0.0051 -0.0976***0.0049 
Graduate degree  0.3098*** 0.0083  0.2917*** 0.0073  0.2917*** 0.0072 
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.1053***0.0141 -0.0910***0.0124 -0.0953***0.0115 
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.0825***0.0120 -0.0884***0.0105 -0.0892***0.0100 
Engineers  0.1459*** 0.0169  0.1280*** 0.0151  0.1294*** 0.0141 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.1295*** 0.0113  0.1151*** 0.0099  0.1160*** 0.0094 
Profession, manager and others  0.2374*** 0.0102  0.2283*** 0.0088  0.2276*** 0.0085 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0270*** 0.0032  0.0224*** 0.0027  0.0172*** 0.0026 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0006***0.0001 -0.0006***0.0001 -0.0004***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0544*** 0.0120  0.0586*** 0.0113  0.0481*** 0.0107 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0427** 0.0177  0.0475*** 0.0165  0.0300** 0.0145 
Works council  0.1978*** 0.0168  0.1603*** 0.0164  0.1319*** 0.0145 
Sales per employee (1/105)   -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0002* 0.0001 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)    0.8957*** 0.0865  0.8553*** 0.0824 
Very high or high state of the technology      0.0172*** 0.0080  0.0168** 0.0079 
Average weekly working hours     -0.0172***0.0026 
Overtime      0.0439*** 0.0110 
No overtime compensation       0.0233 0.0302 
Improving work-child compatibility      0.0167** 0.0072 
Workplace health promotion       0.0335*** 0.0085 
Workplace with physical or mental stress     -0.0051 0.0071 
Workplace with high flexibility needs          0.0198*** 0.0066 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes /no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -29,500.68 -23,211.94 -21,815.03 
Observations  192,814 192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 6, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, 
western Germany 
  Specification (7) Specification (8) Specification (9) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.0458** 0.0224 -0.1810***0.0215 -0.1896***0.0257 
Age  0.0282*** 0.0014  0.0269*** 0.0016  0.0288*** 0.0016 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0312***0.0017 -0.0306***0.0019 -0.0318***0.0019 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0009*** 0.0001  0.0010*** 0.0001  0.0009*** 0.0001 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0001***0.0000 -0.0001***0.0000 -0.0001***0.0000 
Foreigner -0.0175***0.0043 -0.0148** 0.0053 -0.0128** 0.0051 
Without vocational training  0.3361** 0.1206 -0.1052***0.0057 -0.1035***0.0054 
Graduate degree -0.3013* 0.1561  0.3297*** 0.0085  0.3142*** 0.0083 
Simple blue-collar occupation   0.3829 0.2880 -0.0876***0.0130 -0.1102***0.0132 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.4586* 0.2734 -0.0687***0.0119 -0.0880***0.0111 
Engineers  1.2414*** 0.3134  0.1659*** 0.0177  0.1455*** 0.0162 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.8425*** 0.2878  0.1722*** 0.0129  0.1272*** 0.0107 
Profession, manager and others  1.7600*** 0.3364  0.2413*** 0.0100  0.2438*** 0.0099 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0179*** 0.0024    0.0225*** 0.0034 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0005***0.0001     -0.0005***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0478*** 0.0107     
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0311** 0.0142     
Works council  0.1288*** 0.0147         
Sales per employee (1/105) -0.0002* 0.0001     
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  0.8542*** 0.0816     
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0164** 0.0074         
Average weekly working hours  0.0000 0.0076 -0.0249***0.0031 -0.0261***0.0037 
Overtime  0.0709*** 0.0209  0.0861*** 0.0131  0.0624*** 0.0118 
No overtime compensation   0.0219 0.0307 -0.0389 0.0417 -0.0296 0.0312 
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0528*** 0.0143  0.0853*** 0.0110  0.0374*** 0.0084 
Workplace health promotion   0.0308 0.0190  0.0993*** 0.0122  0.0696*** 0.0106 
Workplace with physical or mental stress  0.0342** 0.0155 -0.0273** 0.0101 -0.0182** 0.0083 
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0171 0.0149  0.0354*** 0.0114  0.0272*** 0.0081 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / yes yes / yes /no yes / yes /no 
Log pseudolikelihood -21,054.55 -37,818.12 -30,847.80 
Observations  192,814 192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 6, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, 
western Germany 
  Specification (10) Specification (11) Specification (12)
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1669***0.0252 -0.3069***0.0333 -0.2656***0.0314 
Age  0.0294*** 0.0016     
Age squared (1/102) -0.0325***0.0018     
Job tenure (in month)  0.0008*** 0.0001     
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0001***0.0000     
Foreigner -0.0139***0.0049     
Without vocational training -0.1017***0.0054     
Graduate degree  0.3085*** 0.0081     
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.1100***0.0129     
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.0842***0.0110     
Engineers  0.1444*** 0.0156     
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.1289*** 0.0105     
Profession, manager and others  0.2359*** 0.0096         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0210*** 0.0031  0.0389*** 0.0045  0.0317*** 0.0042 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0004***0.0001 -0.0008***0.0001 -0.0006***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0415*** 0.0112    0.0626*** 0.0150 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0208 0.0154    0.0284 0.0234 
Works council  0.1619*** 0.0147      0.2270*** 0.0204 
Sales per employee (1/105)        
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours -0.0192***0.0032     
Overtime  0.0419*** 0.0113     
No overtime compensation  -0.0104 0.0285     
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0250*** 0.0082     
Workplace health promotion   0.0408*** 0.0097     
Workplace with physical or mental stress -0.0095 0.0078     
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0271*** 0.0079         
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes /no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -27,656.16 -67,723.87 -62,615.47 
Observations  192,814 192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 6, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, 
western Germany 
  Specification (13) Specification (14) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Female proportion -0.0825***0.0290 -0.0816***0.0286 
Age     
Age squared (1/102)     
Job tenure (in month)     
Job tenure squared (1/102)     
Foreigner     
Without vocational training     
Graduate degree     
Simple blue-collar occupation      
Qualified blue-collar occupation     
Engineers     
Clerical and administrative occupation     
Profession, manager and others         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0255*** 0.0035  0.0204*** 0.0034 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0006***0.0001 -0.0005***0.0001 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0678*** 0.0138  0.0578*** 0.0137 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0348* 0.0194  0.0195 0.0182 
Works council  0.1771*** 0.0197  0.1531*** 0.0185 
Sales per employee (1/105) -0.0004** 0.0002 -0.0003** 0.0001 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  1.1962*** 0.1131  1.1590*** 0.1099 
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0197** 0.0096  0.0183* 0.0100 
Average weekly working hours   -0.0120***0.0040 
Overtime    0.0496*** 0.0143 
No overtime compensation     0.0518 0.0347 
Improving work-child compatibility    0.0264*** 0.0096 
Workplace health promotion     0.0222** 0.0101 
Workplace with physical or mental stress   -0.0037 0.0096 
Workplace with high flexibility needs      0.0283*** 0.0082 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -54,275.75 -53,369.50 
Observations  192,814 192,814 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 7: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern Germany 
  Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion 0.1717***0.0567 -0.0889* 0.0458 -0.1413***0.0331 
Age    0.0307*** 0.0025  0.0324*** 0.0025 
Age squared (1/102)   -0.0376***0.0027 -0.0385***0.0029 
Job tenure (in month)    0.0048*** 0.0009  0.0035*** 0.0004 
Job tenure squared (1/102)   -0.0018***0.0007 -0.0011***0.0002 
Foreigner    0.0269 0.0170  0.0321** 0.0147 
Without vocational training   -0.0748***0.0126 -0.0521***0.0112 
Graduate degree    0.4060*** 0.0148  0.3480*** 0.0140 
Simple blue-collar occupation     0.0352 0.0227 -0.0066 0.0148 
Qualified blue-collar occupation    0.0308** 0.0139  0.0229* 0.0127 
Engineers    0.2406*** 0.0176  0.2331*** 0.0184 
Clerical and administrative occupation    0.2459*** 0.0214  0.2193*** 0.0168 
Profession, manager and others      0.1884*** 0.0212  0.2575*** 0.0218 
Employment size (1/103)      0.1587*** 0.0211 
Employment size squared (1/106)         -0.0150***0.0030 
Industry-wide wage agreement       
Firm-specific wage agreement       
Works council             
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours       
Overtime       
No overtime compensation        
Improving work-child compatibility       
Workplace health promotion        
Workplace with physical or mental stress       
Workplace with high flexibility needs             
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms no / no / no yes / no /no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -54,723.55 -22,515.08 -7,955.87 
Observations  120,985 120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 7, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (4) Specification (5) Specification (6) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1293***0.0325 -0.0684* 0.0351 -0.0728** 0.0345 
Age  0.0311*** 0.0023  0.0303*** 0.0023  0.0301*** 0.0022 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0369***0.0027 -0.0355***0.0027 -0.0351***0.0026 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0033*** 0.0003  0.0030*** 0.0003  0.0031*** 0.0003 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0013***0.0002 -0.0011***0.0002 -0.0012***0.0002 
Foreigner  0.0121 0.0131  0.0057 0.0129  0.0078 0.0126 
Without vocational training -0.0485***0.0100 -0.0456***0.0092 -0.0482***0.0093 
Graduate degree  0.3233*** 0.0129  0.2968*** 0.0147  0.2969*** 0.0140 
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0010 0.0137 -0.0076 0.0115 -0.0098 0.0115 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.0369*** 0.0117  0.0275*** 0.0099  0.0222** 0.0097 
Engineers  0.2445*** 0.0178  0.2348*** 0.0158  0.2311*** 0.0159 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.2356*** 0.0167  0.2242*** 0.0158  0.2204*** 0.0167 
Profession, manager and others  0.2697*** 0.0197  0.2618*** 0.0181  0.2581*** 0.0179 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0857*** 0.0202  0.0639*** 0.0195  0.0582*** 0.0187 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0067** 0.0028 -0.0057** 0.0025 -0.0044* 0.0024 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.1047*** 0.0152  0.0824*** 0.0143  0.0743*** 0.0132 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0263 0.0204  0.0185 0.0174  0.0080 0.0167 
Works council  0.1525*** 0.0153  0.1142*** 0.0164  0.1010*** 0.0152 
Sales per employee (1/105)    0.0039* 0.0022  0.0038* 0.0021 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)    0.8292** 0.3557  0.7830** 0.3429 
Very high or high state of the technology      0.0307*** 0.0107  0.0312*** 0.0105 
Average weekly working hours     -0.0174***0.0040 
Overtime      0.0499*** 0.0150 
No overtime compensation       0.1085** 0.0550 
Improving work-child compatibility     -0.0024 0.0130 
Workplace health promotion       0.0111 0.0109 
Workplace with physical or mental stress     -0.0139 0.0106 
Workplace with high flexibility needs          0.0100 0.0091 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -1,089.98 4,533.63 5,752.97 
Observations  120,985 120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 7, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (7) Specification (8) Specification (9) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.0703** 0.0329 -0.0675* 0.0414 -0.1354***0.0324 
Age  0.0293*** 0.0022  0.0294*** 0.0023  0.0311*** 0.0024 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0342***0.0026 -0.0356***0.0025 -0.0368***0.0027 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0030*** 0.0003  0.0048*** 0.0008  0.0035*** 0.0003 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0011***0.0002 -0.0020***0.0006 -0.0012***0.0002 
Foreigner  0.0093 0.0118  0.0176 0.0148  0.0296** 0.0136 
Without vocational training -0.3468 0.2717 -0.0780***0.0126 -0.0569***0.0117 
Graduate degree -0.2246 0.2698  0.3792*** 0.0134  0.3399*** 0.0133 
Simple blue-collar occupation   1.0842*** 0.2869  0.0170 0.0196 -0.0135 0.0143 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.9474*** 0.2365  0.0168 0.0123  0.0129 0.0120 
Engineers  1.4793*** 0.4113  0.2262*** 0.0167  0.2250*** 0.0180 
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.8075*** 0.2870  0.2352*** 0.0220  0.2122*** 0.0178 
Profession, manager and others  0.9394** 0.3883  0.2040*** 0.0203  0.2510*** 0.0208 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0547*** 0.0175    0.1134*** 0.0187 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0035 0.0023     -0.0082***0.0027 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0708*** 0.0126     
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0077 0.0157     
Works council  0.0964*** 0.0147         
Sales per employee (1/105)  0.0038* 0.0021     
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  0.7730** 0.3379     
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0343*** 0.0099         
Average weekly working hours -0.0071** 0.0034 -0.0372***0.0066 -0.0326***0.0053 
Overtime  0.1120*** 0.0324  0.1088*** 0.0238  0.0754*** 0.0180 
No overtime compensation   0.1073** 0.0509  0.0250 0.0785  0.1107 0.0849 
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0381* 0.0201  0.0686*** 0.0201  0.0284** 0.0159 
Workplace health promotion  -0.0272 0.0214  0.1038*** 0.0209  0.0572*** 0.0131 
Workplace with physical or mental stress -0.0235 0.0179 -0.0379** 0.0199 -0.0152 0.0120 
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0001 0.0157 -0.0175 0.0281  0.0062 0.0111 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood 6,757.33 -15,668.79 -4,276.65 
Observations  120,985 120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 7, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (10) Specification (11) Specification (12)
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1296***0.0318 -0.0054 0.0424  0.0109 0.0418 
Age  0.0307*** 0.0023     
Age squared (1/102) -0.0362***0.0027     
Job tenure (in month)  0.0034*** 0.0003     
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0013***0.0002     
Foreigner  0.0127 0.0125     
Without vocational training -0.0515***0.0104     
Graduate degree  0.3197*** 0.0123     
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0047 0.0134     
Qualified blue-collar occupation  0.0289** 0.0113     
Engineers  0.2390*** 0.0176     
Clerical and administrative occupation  0.2296*** 0.0179     
Profession, manager and others  0.2649*** 0.0192         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0707*** 0.0194  0.2432*** 0.0254  0.1445*** 0.0249 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0041 0.0028 -0.0283***0.0037 -0.0165***0.0035 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0925*** 0.0138    0.1172*** 0.0186 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0133 0.0193    0.0340 0.0261 
Works council  0.1332*** 0.0141      0.2025*** 0.0183 
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours -0.0198***0.0044     
Overtime  0.0667*** 0.0165     
No overtime compensation   0.1422*** 0.0694     
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0148 0.0150     
Workplace health promotion   0.0190 0.0117     
Workplace with physical or mental stress -0.0209** 0.0112     
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0130 0.0103         
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood 695.00 -42,504.92 -36,065.71 
Observations  120,985 120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 7, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for male employees, eastern 
Germany 
  Specification (13) Specification (14) 
Variables  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Female proportion  0.0889** 0.0434  0.0804* 0.0427 
Age     
Age squared (1/102)     
Job tenure (in month)     
Job tenure squared (1/102)     
Foreigner     
Without vocational training     
Graduate degree     
Simple blue-collar occupation      
Qualified blue-collar occupation     
Engineers     
Clerical and administrative occupation     
Profession, manager and others         
Employment size (1/103)  0.1106*** 0.0233  0.1004*** 0.0227 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0144***0.0029 -0.0125***0.0029 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0834*** 0.0183  0.0749*** 0.0169 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0214 0.0219  0.0100 0.0207 
Works council  0.1454*** 0.0213  0.1372*** 0.0196 
Sales per employee (1/105)  0.0043* 0.0023  0.0040* 0.0021 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  1.1717** 0.4995  1.1071** 0.4841 
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0341*** 0.0130  0.0344*** 0.0128 
Average weekly working hours   -0.0147***0.0044 
Overtime    0.0551*** 0.0182 
No overtime compensation     0.1641** 0.0771 
Improving work-child compatibility    0.0107 0.0167 
Workplace health promotion     0.0070 0.0127 
Workplace with physical or mental stress   -0.0323** 0.0136 
Workplace with high flexibility needs      0.0191* 0.0106 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -29,625.48 -28,717.36 
Observations  120,985 120,985 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 8: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, eastern Germany 
  Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.00990.0567 -0.0819 0.0556 -0.2452*** 0.0399 
Age    0.0383*** 0.0039  0.0412*** 0.0032 
Age squared (1/102)   -0.0453***0.0038 -0.0483*** 0.0036 
Job tenure (in month)    0.0051*** 0.0009  0.0040*** 0.0005 
Job tenure squared (1/102)   -0.0018** 0.0007 -0.0012*** 0.0004 
Foreigner    0.0623 0.0425  0.0546 0.0374 
Without vocational training   -0.0621***0.0210 -0.0504*** 0.0185 
Graduate degree    0.3296*** 0.0145  0.2941*** 0.0125 
Simple blue-collar occupation    -0.0757** 0.0323 -0.0384 0.0249 
Qualified blue-collar occupation   -0.0544* 0.0290 -0.0348 0.0223 
Engineers    0.1827*** 0.0289  0.1670*** 0.0247 
Clerical and administrative occupation     0.1964*** 0.0386  0.1575*** 0.0238 
Profession, manager and others      0.2735*** 0.0238  0.2727*** 0.0240 
Employment size (1/103)      0.1702*** 0.0307 
Employment size squared (1/106)         -0.0187** 0.0075 
Industry-wide wage agreement       
Firm-specific wage agreement       
Works council             
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours       
Overtime       
No overtime compensation        
Improving work-child compatibility       
Workplace health promotion        
Workplace with physical or mental stress       
Workplace with high flexibility needs             
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms no / no / no yes / no / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -37,926.55 -20,080.85 -11,633.91 
Observations  75,340 75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 8, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, 
eastern Germany 
  Specification (4) Specification (5) Specification (6) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1993***0.0338 -0.1202***0.0330 -0.1203***0.0321 
Age  0.0388*** 0.0029  0.0384*** 0.0026  0.0384*** 0.0026 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0448***0.0032 -0.0438***0.0029 -0.0438***0.0029 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0036*** 0.0004  0.0033*** 0.0004  0.0033*** 0.0004 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0013***0.0003 -0.0013***0.0002 -0.0013***0.0003 
Foreigner  0.0287 0.0273  0.0232 0.0280  0.0231 0.0247 
Without vocational training -0.0414** 0.0169 -0.0327** 0.0160 -0.0392***0.0149 
Graduate degree  0.2823*** 0.0110  0.2672*** 0.0111  0.2679*** 0.0106 
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0386* 0.0212 -0.0366* 0.0187 -0.0277 0.0183 
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.0379** 0.0191 -0.0430** 0.0170 -0.0372** 0.0170 
Engineers  0.1747*** 0.0231  0.1674*** 0.0207  0.1782*** 0.0209 
Clerical and administrative occupation   0.1623*** 0.0202  0.1460*** 0.0179  0.1519*** 0.0183 
Profession, manager and others  0.2509*** 0.0200  0.2386*** 0.0190  0.2402*** 0.0191 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0805*** 0.0246  0.0589*** 0.0209  0.0580*** 0.0214 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0069 0.0053 -0.0054 0.0042 -0.0049 0.0042 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.1228*** 0.0241  0.1003*** 0.0232  0.0976*** 0.0220 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0144 0.0282  0.0161 0.0239  0.0130 0.0227 
Works council  0.2395*** 0.0238  0.1870*** 0.0253  0.1701*** 0.0245 
Sales per employee (1/105)    0.0004 0.0008  0.0004 0.0008 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)    1.0434*** 0.3409  1.0356*** 0.3489 
Very high or high state of the technology      0.0146 0.0127  0.0119 0.0127 
Average weekly working hours     -0.0208***0.0054 
Overtime      0.0300** 0.0138 
No overtime compensation       0.0467 0.0668 
Improving work-child compatibility     -0.0098 0.0138 
Workplace health promotion       0.0218 0.0141 
Workplace with physical or mental stress      0.0114 0.0133 
Workplace with high flexibility needs          0.0009 0.0126 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -5,249.51 -2,154.62 -1,626.10 
Observations  75,340 75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 8, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, 
eastern Germany 
  Specification (7) Specification (8) Specification (9) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1209***0.0309 -0.0442 0.0462 -0.2231***0.0387 
Age  0.0372*** 0.0023  0.0394*** 0.0034  0.0416*** 0.0033 
Age squared (1/102) -0.0423***0.0027 -0.0462***0.0036 -0.0484***0.0037 
Job tenure (in month)  0.0032*** 0.0003  0.0047*** 0.0008  0.0038*** 0.0006 
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0012***0.0002 -0.0017***0.0006 -0.0012***0.0004 
Foreigner  0.0104 0.0198  0.0522 0.0356  0.0505* 0.0306 
Without vocational training  0.8617* 0.5230 -0.0637***0.0185 -0.0587***0.0168 
Graduate degree -0.2419 0.2020  0.3162*** 0.0130  0.2901*** 0.0122 
Simple blue-collar occupation  10,861 0.7980 -0.0659***0.0307 -0.0272 0.0238 
Qualified blue-collar occupation  2.2363*** 0.4579 -0.0429* 0.0260 -0.0258 0.0220 
Engineers  2.5088*** 0.5216  0.1935*** 0.0263  0.1862*** 0.0250 
Clerical and administrative occupation   1.7888*** 0.4112  0.2001*** 0.0323  0.1685*** 0.0241 
Profession, manager and others  1.7561*** 0.4345  0.2760*** 0.0223  0.2742*** 0.0236 
Employment size (1/103)  0.0565*** 0.0211    0.1426*** 0.0299 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0050 0.0044     -0.0143 0.0074 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.0995*** 0.0206     
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0154 0.0213     
Works council  0.1630*** 0.0234         
Sales per employee (1/105)  0.0005 0.0008     
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  0.9937*** 0.3406     
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0177 0.0118         
Average weekly working hours  0.0061 0.0083 -0.0294***0.0068 -0.0358***0.0063 
Overtime  0.0899** 0.0414  0.0542* 0.0306  0.0600*** 0.0222 
No overtime compensation   0.0414 0.0689 -0.0832 0.0688 -0.0376 0.0802 
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0755*** 0.0257  0.1145*** 0.0245  0.0182 0.0193 
Workplace health promotion   0.0353 0.0408  0.1222*** 0.0273  0.0749*** 0.0212 
Workplace with physical or mental stress  0.0438 0.0274  0.0235 0.0212  0.0051 0.0167 
Workplace with high flexibility needs  0.0237 0.0295 -0.0062 0.0218 -0.0047 0.0176 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / yes yes / yes /no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -705.27 -16,884.69 -9,985.71 
Observations  75,340 75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 8, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, 
eastern Germany 
  Specification (10) Specification (11) Specification (12)
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Female proportion -0.1906***0.0000 -0.3493***0.0467 -0.3000***0.0395 
Age  0.0392*** 0.0000     
Age squared (1/102) -0.0450***0.0000     
Job tenure (in month)  0.0036*** 0.0000     
Job tenure squared (1/102) -0.0014***0.0000     
Foreigner  0.0271 0.2590     
Without vocational training -0.0477***0.0030     
Graduate degree  0.2803*** 0.0000     
Simple blue-collar occupation  -0.0309 0.1300     
Qualified blue-collar occupation -0.0323 0.0890     
Engineers  0.1865*** 0.0000     
Clerical and administrative occupation   0.1691*** 0.0000     
Profession, manager and others  0.2538*** 0.0000         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0736*** 0.0030  0.2326*** 0.0339  0.1130*** 0.0261 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0056 0.2990 -0.0306***0.0082 -0.0138***0.0052 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.1209*** 0.0000    0.1410*** 0.0304 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0119 0.6570    0.0115 0.0359 
Works council  0.2167*** 0.0000      0.3003*** 0.0289 
Sales per employee (1/105)       
Wage bill per employee (1/104)       
Very high or high state of the technology             
Average weekly working hours -0.0219***0.0000     
Overtime  0.0425*** 0.0130     
No overtime compensation   0.0518 0.4610     
Improving work-child compatibility  0.0102 0.5280     
Workplace health promotion   0.0310* 0.0560     
Workplace with physical or mental stress -0.0019 0.8940     
Workplace with high flexibility needs -0.0008 0.9560         
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no yes / yes /no 
Log pseudolikelihood -4,616.97 -27,218.58 -20,404.96 
Observations  75,340 75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 8, continued: Estimates of Tobit wage regressions for female employees, 
eastern Germany 
  Specification (13) Specification (14) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Female proportion -0.1874***0.0388 -0.1901***0.0373 
Age     
Age squared (1/102)     
Job tenure (in month)     
Job tenure squared (1/102)     
Foreigner     
Without vocational training     
Graduate degree     
Simple blue-collar occupation      
Qualified blue-collar occupation     
Engineers     
Clerical and administrative occupation      
Profession, manager and others         
Employment size (1/103)  0.0814*** 0.0224  0.0810*** 0.0227 
Employment size squared (1/106) -0.0111***0.0039 -0.0105***0.0039 
Industry-wide wage agreement  0.1090*** 0.0282  0.1054*** 0.0269 
Firm-specific wage agreement  0.0142 0.0285  0.0097 0.0269 
Works council  0.2229*** 0.0310  0.2063*** 0.0298 
Sales per employee (1/105)  0.0007 0.0008  0.0008 0.0008 
Wage bill per employee (1/104)  1.3758*** 0.4359  1.3656*** 0.4459 
Very high or high state of the technology  0.0274* 0.0143  0.0230* 0.0140 
Average weekly working hours   -0.0192***0.0065 
Overtime    0.0381 0.0151 
No overtime compensation     0.0199 0.0935 
Improving work-child compatibility   -0.0079 0.0160 
Workplace health promotion     0.0127 0.0162 
Workplace with physical or mental stress    0.0117 0.0158 
Workplace with high flexibility needs      0.0141 0.0144 
Region / Industry controls / Interaction terms yes / yes / no yes / yes / no 
Log pseudolikelihood -16,563.54 -16,164.01 
Observations  75,340 75,340 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors at the establishment level. The estimated coefficients for the regional, industry 
controls and interaction terms are available upon request from the author.  
Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: LIAB cross-sectional model 2002. 
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Table C 9: Coefficients for the proportion of females in establishments in various 
specifications of a log wage equation 
    Western Germany  Eastern Germany 
 Specification Males Females  Males Females 
       
(1) proportion of females  0.1071*** -0.2316***  0.1717*** -0.0099 
  (0.0368) (0.0298) (0.0567) (0.0567)
(2) (1) + human capital + occupation  -0.2082*** -0.2669***  -0.0889* -0.0819 
      + regions (0.0241) (0.0254) (0.0458) (0.0556)
(8) (2) + workplace characteristics -0.1553*** -0.1810***  -0.0675* -0.0442 
  (0.0169) (0.0215) (0.0414) (0.0462)
(9) (8) + establishment size + industry -0.1549*** -0.1896***  -0.1354*** -0.2231*** 
  (0.0199) (0.0257) (0.0324) (0.0387)
(10) (9) + institutional setting -0.1555*** -0.1669***  -0.1296*** -0.1906*** 
  (0.0195) (0.0252) (0.0318) (0.0334)
(5) (10) + achievement potential -0.0793*** -0.0462**  -0.0728** -0.1203*** 
    (0.0188) (0.0225)  (0.0345) (0.0321)
Number of observations 565,100 192,814   120,985 75,340 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level. The complete 
estimation results are in Tables C5 – C8. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002.   
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Table C 10: Coefficients for the proportion of females in establishments in various 
specifications of a log wage equation without controlling for individual productivity-
related characteristics 
    Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Specification Males Females Males Females 
       
(1) proportion of females  0.1071*** -0.2316***  0.1717*** -0.0099 
  (0.0368) (0.0298) (0.0567) (0.0567)
(11) (1) + establishment size + industry 0.0717*** -0.3069***  -0.0054 -0.3493*** 
  (0.0301) (0.0333) (0.0424) (0.0467)
(12) (11) + institutional setting 0.0671** -0.2656***  0.0109 -0.3000*** 
  (0.0302) (0.0314) (0.0418) (0.0395)
(13) (12) + achievement potential 0.1829*** -0.0825***  0.0889** -0.1874*** 
  (0.0241) (0.0290) (0.0434) (0.0388)
(14) (13) + workplace characteristics  0.1767*** -0.0816***  0.0804* -0.1901*** 
    (0.0236) (0.0286)  (0.0427) (0.0373)
Number of observations 565,100 192,814   120,985 75,340 
Note:  The dependent variable is the log of the real daily wage. The results are based on Tobit regressions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level. The complete 
estimation results are in Tables C5 – C8. Significance levels: *: 10 percent **:5 percent ***: 1 percent 
Source: own calculation, LIAB cross-sectional model 2002.   
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